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Abstract and Short Methodological Overview 
ÔConspiracy Theory in TurkeyÕ can best be described as a philosophical reflection on the Gezi and Coup 
events, seen through the lens of Conspiracy theory. In particular, this means that both events are considered 
by virtue of the State response thereto, which in both cases was one of the accusations of conspiracy against 
the State. In order to ÔcompareÕ these two events on the level of the emergence of conspiratorial 
interpretations and ÔparanoidÕ narratives, I propose a blend of Ôframing theoryÕ (as used primarily in the 
conflict analysis literature), as well as political thought on conspiracy theory (for example, Karl Popper and 
Charles Pigden1), with occasional inspiration taken from literary theory (in particular, the notion of ÔreadingÕ 
conspiracy for its own logics of power, rather than strictly speaking ÔdiagnosingÕ the social impact of 
conspiracy, I look into the conditions from which it arises and according to what logic and narratives it is 
perpetuated), critiques of post-modernism (Fredric James reading of ÔcontingencyÕ2), and psychoanalytic 
theory (mostly Freudian, with some Lacanian concepts borrowed from Slavoj ZizekÕs work). I will now 
briefly break down each of these so as to explain their function within the overall thesis, keeping in mind 
that they are used to enhance what is at heart a work of comparative politics; that is to say, a comparative 
account of the role of conspiracy theory in the 2013 Gezi protests and 2016 coup attempt. 
1:Framing Theory 
Several ideas from what is known as framing theory are employed in this thesis. In particular, I draw upon 
the ideas of Benford and Snow and their work on the influence of framing in social protest. Subsequently, I 
draw upon ÔeliteÕ framing theory, to examine the State response to the Gezi protests and the coup attempt, 
especially the way in which both were framed within an overarching narrative of conspiracy theory. I also 
employ the terms Ôpeace frameÕ, Ôfrozen frameÕ, and Ôadversarial frameÕ to think about how one might 
conceptualize accusations of conspiracy as a form of elite framing. My contribution to the field comes in the 
form of a proposed Ôconspiracy frameÕ, that manages to posit itself as a peace/frozen/adversarial frame, 
while also challenging the space from which the ÔlegitimacyÕ of social protest framing can occur. 
2:Philosophy and Political Thought apropos conspiracy theory 
The so-called Ôphilosophical approach to conspiracy theoryÕ is what provides the theoretical opening for my 
thesis. In particular, I look at the way in which following from Karl Popper, to the subsequent rebuttal by 
Charles Pigden, the study of conspiracy theory has evolved from ÔdiagnosingÕ conspiracy, to ÔdebunkingÕ 
conspiracy. In my thesis I have sought to suggest a novel way of examining conspiracy theory, namely as a 
political strategy, or, in the philosophical terminology, as a Ôpolitics of truthÕ. In order to subsequently flesh 
out this Ôtheory of conspiracy theoryÕ I look into the political conditions from which conspiracy theory 
emerges as a plausible political strategy. However I also draw upon various theoretical approaches to the 
nature of truth, and suggest the possibility of a dialectics of conspiracy theory in Turkish politics (where 
non-factual accusations strengthen ÔrealÕ political power), or, as I conclude, the more likely option of a 
(Adornian) negative dialectics of conspiracy.3 In sum, I have employed these various philosophical attitudes 
to ÔtruthÕ to think about the logic(s) and possible epistemology of untruths which include, but are not limited 
to, conspiracy theory and paranoid interpretations of reality. 
3:Literary Theory 
In referring to Ôliterary theoryÕ what I have in mind is similar to critiques of postmodernism, in which 
political ÔtextsÕ are considered within the broader logics of power in which they are produced. This means 
focusing on what in this thesis I refer to as the Ôconditions for the production of knowledgeÕ. In the thesis I 
borrow concepts from Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Fredric Jameson.4 While I do not follow a 
                                     
1 Karl Popper, ÔThe conspiracy theory of societyÕ, Conspiracy theories: The philosophical debate (2006), pp. 13-16; Charles Pigden, 
ÔPopper revisited, or what is wrong with conspiracy theories?Õ, Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1995), pp. 3-34. 
2 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the ontology of the present (London, 2002). 
3Theodor Adorno, Negative dialectics (London, 2003). 
4 Specifically: Jacques Derrida, Politics of friendship (London, 2005); Michel Foucault, Archaeology of knowledge (London, 2013); 
Jacques Rancire, On the shores of politics (London, 1995); Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the ontology of the 
present (London, 2002). 
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strictly deconstructionist method, I do try to examine the ways in which conspiracy theory becomes 
institutionalized as a form of narrative ÔeventÕ through its signification related to Gezi and the coup. In 
addition to this, I have drawn upon the work of Fredric James, one of the leading scholars of postmodernism 
(and the critique thereof) in order to think about how conspiracy theory revolves around the antinomy of 
contingency/legitimacy, i.e. that conspiracy theory is used as a form of narrative sabotage by which to both 
delegitimize, as well as, curtail ÔnewÕ forms of emancipatory, counter-hegemonic narratives, such as that of 
the Gezi protests. 
4:Psychoanalytic Theory 
Finally, I draw upon various psychoanalytic terms, many of which feature also in literary theory. These are 
mostly terms and themes that feature in the works of Jacques Lacan, for example the notion of a 
Ôconstitutive lackÕ and a Ôconstitutive otherÕ (although the latter is also engrained in certain theories of the 
political, such as in the works of Carl Schmitt or Chantal Mouffe5). I also use the term Ôobjet petit aÕ and 
Ôbig otherÕ to describe the way in which the idea of conspiracy theory comes to loom large as a form of 
master-frame, when employed in the way I examine in Turkish politics. I also employ Freudian terminology. 
In the chapter on strongman politics I borrow certain ideas from Ôtotem and tabooÕ on the notion of symbolic 
leadership, and I also refer to the politics of conspiracy as a form of ÔuncannyÕ politics, therein drawing 
upon FreudÕs Ôtheory of the uncannyÕ. Finally, I refer sporadically to Slavoj ZizekÕs application of 
psychoanalysis to contemporary politics, citing primarily those instances in which he refers to conspiracy 
theory. 
In sum, I have sought to theorize how conspiracy theory has emerged as such a potent force in contemporary 
Turkish politics. Examining the various ways in which political narratives of conspiracy theory emerge, are 
constituted, and how they enforce existing power structures, I have attempted to suggest a novel way of 
examining the problem of conspiracy theory in Turkish politics. This means, finally, that I am also indebted 
to Turkish scholar who have studies Gezi, the coup, and conspiracy theory. In particular I have been inspired 
by the work of Turkay Salim Nefes, who has written extensively on Turkish conspiracy theories, to posit a 
theory of conspiracy theory of my own; one that is strongly informed by philosophical notions of Ôtruth and 
falsehoodÕ, psychoanalytic notions of paranoia and various forms of ÔuntruthsÕ (or non-truths), as well as 
employing devices from literary theory to consider conspiratorial and paranoid politics as a form of ÔtextÕ. 
These, in turn, have been integrated in a broadly comparative analysis of the role of conspiracy in the Gezi 
protests and coup attempt. 
                                     
5 Carl Schmitt, The concept of the political: Expanded edition (Chicago, 2008); Chantal Mouffe, The return of the political (London, 
2005); Chantal Mouffe, The democratic paradox (London, 2000).  
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Introduction 
In this thesis I analyze the 2013 Gezi protests and the 2016 coup 
attempt through the lens of conspiracy theory and elite framing. 
Specifically I defend the claim that elite accusations of conspiracy 
constitute a systemic form of disinformation as part of a state response 
to divergent manifestations of political resistance. Conspiracy theories are 
therefore employed to justify increased political repression, the silencing 
and marginalization of political opponents, and the manufacture of 
political paranoia among an increasingly divided Turkish public.   
The central sub-claims I make in the thesis are the following: (1) 
Conspiracy theory should be taken seriously as a discursive tactic of 
political ÔwinnersÕ rather than ÔlosersÕ. (2) Conspiracy theory in Turkey 
constitutes an elite framing strategy in Turkey. (3) The growing impact of 
conspiracy theories as justification for political repression in Turkish 
politics between 2013 and 2016 suggests a conspiratorial ÔpraxisÕ beyond 
the confines of the so-called paranoid style as a mere idiosyncrasy of 
antagonistic rhetoric. The thesis focuses on the changing nature of 
conspiratorial rhetoric among the Turkish political elite between 2013 and 
2016, and makes the claims that TurkeyÕs current President, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, systemically employs paranoid narratives for political 
gain, the silencing of opponents, and the consolidation of state power.  
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The objectives of the research are as follows: (1) to help navigate the 
contradictory and confusing manifestations and mechanisms of 
antagonistic and conspiratorial political rhetoric in contemporary Turkish 
politics; (2) to situate the debate on conspiracy theory in Turkey within 
the wider framework of theoretical approaches to conspiracy theory, elite 
framing strategies, and the social movement literature on Turkey; (3) to 
provide one of the first post-coup studies of the links between 
conspiratorial rhetoric and growing authoritarian tendencies in Modern 
Turkey. As such, my research question can be formulated in the following 
manner: How does conspiratorial framing of the Gezi protests and the 
coup attempt consolidate state power? This then leads to the following 
sub-question: Under what conditions and according to what mechanisms 
can the ruling party employ conspiratorial framing as a means by which to 
silence opposition? 
The key findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Conspiracy theory in 
Turkish politics underwent a shift in the post-Gezi political landscape 
towards emphasizing internal rather than external enemies. (2) In the 
years between the Gezi protests and the failed coup attempt, the Turkish 
political elite systemically invoked accusations of conspiracy as a 
polarizing strategy. (3) The current state of the theory of conspiracy 
theory suggests that accusations of conspiracy are an expression of 
political ÔlosersÕ. The thesis demonstrates that, on the contrary, political 
ÔwinnersÕ employ accusations of conspiracy to consolidate state power. 
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(4) The thesis demonstrates that the failed coup attempt, and the 
conspiratorial interpretations thereof, can best be understood in light of 
the rise of conspiracy theories in Turkish politics since Gezi. While 
conspiracy theory is often employed as a form of adversarial framing, not 
exclusively in Turkish politics, the case studies of Gezi and the coup 
suggest a new development, in which so-called Ôin-groupsÕ are targeted, 
rather than focusing on pejorative ÔoutsideÕ conspirators or minority 
groups. This presents an opportunity to formulate a novel argument on 
the discursive practices of conspiratorial framing in Turkish politics, that 
could also be extended beyond the scope of Turkey. 
Conspiracy Theory in Turkey therefore fulfils multiple and interrelated 
conceptual, analytical, empirical, and policy objectives. Building on 
contemporary and historical evidence, the thesis situates Turkey within 
the broader literature of conspiracy theory and elite framing studies and 
puts forward a novel explanation of why and how leaders make certain 
choices to either make accessions to or vilify protestors.6 In this thesis I 
                                     
6 Charles Pigden, ÔComplots of MischiefÕ, in David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories 
(Farnham, 2006). See also Susan Feldman, ÔCounterfact Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (2011), pp. 15Ð24; Neil Levy, ÔRadically 
Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, Episteme 2 (2007), pp. 181Ð92; Juha 
Rikk, ÔOn Political Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2009), pp. 
185Ð201; S. Clarke, ÔConspiracy Theories and Conspiracy TheorizingÕ, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 2 (2002), pp.131Ð150. David Snow and Robert Benford, ÔMaster Frames 
and Cycles of ProtestÕ, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory (New Haven, CT, 1992), pp. 133Ð152; Neophytos G. Loizides, 
ÔElite framing and conflict transformation in TurkeyÕ, Parliamentary Affairs 62.2 (2008), 
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set Turkey within the post-Gezi landscape to study, on the one hand, the 
endurance of socio-political divides in ErdoğanÕs New Turkey, and on the 
other, the relative absence of successful integration mechanisms and 
opportunity structures among social movements and other forms of 
opposition.  
The thesis offers a puzzle-driven analysis by assessing conspiratorial 
rhetoric in Turkey that could be further applied across issues and policies 
as well as other conflict-prone areas such as the changing media 
landscape, the integration of religion into politics, and resurgent forms of 
nationalism.  Finally, it investigates how elites and social movements 
challenge and frame the language of resistance and conspiracy and 
identifies a set of analytic concepts to use when negotiating and 
understanding the intricacies of local and national grievances and State 
response.  
My research questions emerged as follows: (1) I questioned one of the 
core assumptions in the conspiracy literature (winners versus losers), 
then (2) applied this question to elite framing studies, that is, Ôhow does 
the political elite (winners) frame conspiracy theory for political benefit?Õ 
And finally, I took this question and sought to answer it within the 
framework of critical theories of resistance. From this followed the more 
                                                                                                           
pp. 278-297; Robert M. Entman, ÔFraming: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigmÕ, 
Journal of communication 43.4 (1993), pp. 51-58; Porismita Borah, ÔConceptual issues 
in framing theory: A systematic examination of a decade's literatureÕ, Journal of 
communication 61.2 (2011), pp. 246-263. 
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holistic question (3) Ôhow can the notion of non-real political action 
influence real political action?Õ, or, in other words, is conspiracy theory in 
Turkish politics essentially a Ôvanishing mediatorÕ between real and 
perceived threats to the status quo?7 
 
Case Selection and Within Case Variation 
Conspiracy theories in Turkey abound. Ranging from the historical to the 
ideological, from the religious to the mundane, politics in modern Turkey 
is undeniably inundated with accusations of conspiracy. The polarization 
and high visibility of social tensions that have marked the last years have 
only led to an increase in such rhetoric. Amidst the ongoing purge of both 
real and imagined adversaries, the Turkish political elite readily employ 
accusations of conspiracy as an interpretative and framing lens for all 
manner of opposition to the ruling party. As a result, conspiracy theories 
have become a mainstay of Turkish political rhetoric, and are used to 
                                     
7 I borrow a concept from the psychoanalytic literature here, which was described by 
Fredric Jameson in 1973, but in this case refers to the way in which Zizek applied it to 
the study of social movements and their evolving ÔmeaningÕ vis--vis their own purpose 
and the relative longevity of their resistance to the (perceived) status quo: Fredric 
Jameseson, ÔThe vanishing mediator: narrative structure in Max WeberÕ, New German 
Critique 1 (1973), pp. 52-89. Slavoj Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor, (London, 1991), p. 182. 
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justify the implementation of increasingly harsh repression, and indeed 
persecution, of any form of political opposition.8  
Turkey stands at a crucial juncture vis--vis its democratic future and the 
consolidation of the democratic advancements that its leaders have made 
since the 1990s. The dramatic events of Gezi and the coup attempt, 
including the increasingly repressive state response to opposition situate 
Turkish democracy on a tipping point. This makes Turkey a fascinating 
case study of the relative effectiveness of elite framing of conspiracy. 
And in turn, it imbues the case with a sense of urgency, regarding the 
high stakes of social protest, civic inclusion, and democratic opposition to 
the limitation of freedom of speech and the dilemma of resisting and 
diverting conspiratorial framing of such efforts. Turkey, however, is not 
necessarily a Ôcrucial caseÕ selection.9 Nor, for that matter are the sub-
cases of Gezi and coup crucial case studies. Instead, my case selection 
                                     
8 In addition, the intensity of the Turkish state response to the 2013 Gezi protests and 
the 2016 coup attempt has radically challenged the international consensus on Turkish 
politics. The optimism with which commentators formerly greeted the so-called ÔTurkish 
modelÕ as proof of the compatibility of secular democracy and religious conservatism has 
ceded to pessimism regarding the future of Turkish democracy and concern regarding 
the increasingly authoritarian measures employed to curb opposition, freedom of speech 
and civil liberties.  
 
9 I refer here to Harry EcksteinÕs conceptualization of the term: Harry Eckstein, ÔCase 
study and theory in political scienceÕ, Case study method (2000), p. 148. For the reason 
why I deem it unsuitable to describe the current case, I adhere to: John Gerring, ÔIs there 
a (viable) crucial-case method?Õ, Comparative Political Studies 40.3 (2007), pp. 231-
253. 
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can best be understood as part of a so-called Ôpathway analysisÕ in which 
both Gezi and the coup are employed as part of a mixed-methods 
research design by which to identify causal mechanisms of conspiratorial 
framing.10 It is, however, important to note that both case studies are not 
in and of themselves directly causal with regard to conspiratorial framing, 
but instead form part of a wider process of conspiratorial discourse. This 
makes them both highly interesting as case studies, but difficult to 
establish concrete variables, which would otherwise be required for the 
identification of causal mechanisms.11  
 
I have therefore chosen the Gezi and coup cases because they share 
characteristics that make them particularly fruitful for comparison. Both 
cases are demonstrative of the elite framing process of conspiracy 
because they exhibit interpretation of opposition framing that is rendered 
conspiratorial. To varying degrees both cases are influenced by the idea 
of resistance to the status quo and different forms of mobilization of 
                                     
10 Nicholas Weller and Jeb Barnes, ÔPathway Analysis and the Search for Causal 
MechanismsÕ, Sociological Methods & Research 45.3 (2016), pp. 424-457. 
11 For contrasting arguments on the relative importance of such mechanisms, see: Jon 
Elseter, ÔA plea for mechanismsÕ, Social mechanisms: An analytical approach to social 
theory 49 (1998), pp. 45-71; John Gerring, ÔCausal mechanisms: Yes, butÉ.Õ, 
Comparative Political Studies 43.11 (2010), pp. 1499-1526. For an overview of the 
debate, see: James J. Heckman and Jeffrey A. Smith, ÔAssessing the case for social 
experimentsÕ, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9.2 (1995), pp. 85-110; Peter 
Hedstrm and Petri Ylikoski, ÔCausal mechanisms in the social sciencesÕ, Annual review of 
sociology 36 (2010), pp. 49-67. 
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government opposition outside the stateÕs institutions. Both cases are 
considered Ôtipping pointsÕ for TurkeyÕs democratization as they 
constitute events that drastically changed the way in which both 
opposition to the status quo and the legitimacy of the ruling party were 
to be interpreted. This does not mean that I consider Gezi and the coup 
to be comparable instances of mobilization. Nor for that matter, do they 
appear to share overarching ideological or political goals, methods, or 
proposed solutions. Instead, the case studies are selected within their 
interpretation as part of a state response seeking to link them to broader 
evidence of conspiracy.  
Simply put, I present the case studies of Gezi and the coup attempt as 
they exist in the framing of conspiracy, or, in the elite framing of their 
relative legitimacy vis--vis the status quo. In this, it is important to 
emphasize that both events, while of historic significance to the political 
destiny of Turkey, are here considered within their conceptualization as 
conspiratorial events. In other words, not as bona fide occurring social 
phenomena, but rather in their imagined forms in the state response 
thereto. This means that although the cases differ in crucial aspects, the 
way in which they have been integrated into a broader narrative of 
conspiratorial resistance makes them uniquely suited for an analysis of 
conspiratorial discursive practice. The fact that both were such seismic 
events makes them even more suitable, considering the radical difficulty 
of incorporating their import into any pre-existing hegemonic framing 
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process, which the events arose to resist in the first place. Below follows 
a short introduction to both the Gezi and the Coup cases. 
 
How did the Gezi Protests start and unfold?  
Gezi Park is not a particularly large park. Yet it occupies one of IstanbulÕs 
most visible public spaces, nestled adjacent to Taksim Square and Istiklal 
Avenue. As part of a broader redevelopment of the Taksim Square area, 
the municipality had received approval from the Government to begin 
reconstructing an Ottoman-style military barracks on the site of Gezi Park. 
Despite attempts to receive a court order to prevent the project, a 
relatively small group of activists persisted in their attempts to save the 
park. On May 27, bulldozers began tearing up the first trees on site. 
Research into the ÔearlyÕ participants of the Gezi protests has indicated 
that the majority of participants were either ÔveteranÕ activists, or ÔlocalsÕ 
living close to the park.12 Interestingly, the latter group identified as being 
otherwise non-political and unaware of broader socio-political issues. This 
would contradict the accusation that the ÔinitialÕ protestors were foreign 
conspirators. However it also suggests that the first protestors did not 
demonstrate the strong anti-governmental message that the movement 
would later adopt as its central message. This emphasis on public policy 
and a growing dissatisfaction with the AK partyÕs social policy is one way 
in which it has been argued that Turkey should be considered as a unique 
                                     
12 Mert, Ayşem. "The trees in Gezi Park: environmental policy as the focus of democratic protests." Journal of 
Environmental Policy & Planning (2016): 1-15. 
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case, separate from the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements.13 It has 
also been suggested that the events of 2013 were the culmination of a 
longer governmental attempt to curb public protest, union mobilization 
(including the May Day protests) and opposition rallies.14 In addition, the 
theme of the proposed redevelopment project Ðthat of a reconstructed 
Ottoman military barracks- is commonly cited as a unique feature of the 
Turkish protests; that is to say, the particular blend of resistance towards 
social policy, and the rejection of neo-ottoman and Islamist overtures in 
what Nikos Modouros has called ÔTurkeyÕs Ôsocial realityÕ.15 So already at 
the outset of the protests we can determine both a practical and a 
symbolic form of resistance, which becomes a key feature both in the 
exponential growth of the protests and the strongly antagonistic State 
response. 
 
The first Gezi activists were able to delay the demolition of the park for 
some time. The next day, further activists, including students and 
members of the parliamentary opposition, joined them. Tents were 
erected, allowing the occupation, however small, to remain overnight. On 
the morning of the 29th of May, police violently attacked the protestors, 
seeking to put an end to the occupation. The images of police brutality 
went viral among Turkish social media users and sparked a surge of 
                                     
13 Seckinelgin, Hakan. "Social policy and conflict: the Gezi ParkÐTaksim demonstrations and uses of social policy for 
reimagining Turkey." Third World Quarterly 37.2 (2016): 267. 
14 Yrk, Erdem. "The long summer of Turkey: The Gezi uprising and its historical roots." South Atlantic Quarterly 113.2 
(2014): 419-426. 
 
15 Moudouros, Nikos. "Rethinking Islamic Hegemony in Turkey through Gezi Park." Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies 16.2 (2014): 181-195. 
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popular support and drove hundreds to support the Gezi activists. This, in 
turn, elicited the first official response from then Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, who denounced the protestors and announced his 
intentions to ÔcleanÕ supposed ÔterroristsÕ out of Gezi Park. He also stood 
defiant against those in the EU who had expressed criticism of the violent 
police response, stating Ôwho do you think you are? He also issued a Ôfinal 
warningÕ to protestors and stated that Gezi Park belonged now to 
Ôoccupying forcesÕ rather than Ôthe peopleÕ.16 Similar to the US student 
protests against gun violence and the 2018 ÔGreat March of ReturnÕ in 
Gaza, the manner in which the protests were reported became itself an 
issue of contention. As Gezi protestors were vilified either as terrorists or 
accused of being foreign hired actors, the media contention surrounding 
Gezi rendered the movement in apocalyptic terms. As images of police 
violence spread further on social media, hundreds, thousands, and 
ultimately hundreds of thousands took to the streets occupying the area 
around Taksim Square, Gezi Park, and Istiklal Avenue, with barricades 
stretching to the neighborhood of Besiktas. As the local Gezi protests 
transformed into what some referred to as the ÒGezi CommuneÕ, fieldwork 
has shown that the protests went through four ÔstagesÕ, evolving from (1) 
local resistance to neoliberal development policies; (2) the social and 
communicative formation of a Gezi ÔcollectiveÕ; (3) the online mobilization 
of sympathizers and protests beyond Gezi; and finally (4) the 
                                     
16 Paul Owen and David Batty, Turkey: Erdogan threatens to ÔcleanÕ Gezi Park of ÔterroristsÕ: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jun/13/turkey-referendum-plan-mooted-as-erdo-an-sets-
protesters-deadline-live-coverage (Last accessed on 02.08.18.) 
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ÔexperimentalÕ alternative strategies by which the Gezi protestors 
organized life in the Gezi occupied space.17 The movement from a single-
issue protest to a ÔmassÕ revolt is commonly termed a Ôscale-shiftÕ in the 
social movement literature, and is not unique to the Turkish case.18 
 
The protests quickly spread both throughout the city and across the 
country. In a dramatic march, thousands of protestors crossed the 
Bosphorus bridge in the early hours of June 1st and erected makeshift 
barricades along the waterfront. Similar uprisings occurred across the 
country, most notably in TurkeyÕs second-largest cities, Ankara and Izmir. 
As this point, IstanbulÕs Sixth Administrative Court granted a stay of 
execution on the shopping-mall project, seemingly ceding a victory to the 
protestors. (However, an administrative court was to unanimously 
overturn the ruling shortly after19). But at this stage the uprising had 
already transformed into a nationwide movement against the ruling party, 
and no longer focused simply on the park.  
 
Clashes continued day and night at Gezi Park, injuring nearly a thousand 
protestors and killing four. Yet in the interludes between fighting a 
community of activists began to emerge in the park, with Gezi taking on a 
festival atmosphere, including soup kitchens, libraries, and performances. 
                                     
17 Farro, Antimo L., and Deniz Gnce Demirhisar. "The Gezi Park movement: a Turkish experience of the twenty-first-
century collective movements." International Review of Sociology 24.1 (2014): 176-189. 




As more barricades were created by the protestors, Gezi seemed to be 
fully occupied, and the ÔTaksim communeÕÑin which food, drink, medicine 
(etc.) were shared collectively- emerged as a grassroots collective in the 
manner of the youth revolt of 1968, but inspired by contemporary anti-
globalist, anarchist, anti-neoliberal movements (this lack of single origin is 
often cited as ÔevidenceÕ for the movementÕs conspiratorial backing).20 It is 
estimated that 16 percent (1.5 million) of IstanbulÕs population joined the 
protests in the days that followed.21 In Izmir, for example, half a million 
people took to the streets. 
 
Finally, on June 11th, police were able to retake the park, forcing 
protestors out in coordinated waves of assault, employing tear gas, water 
cannons and thousands of police officers, many of whom had been 
brought in from outside the city. Smaller protest continued throughout 
the city, as the Turkish Government began to round up those it suspected 
of leading or contributing to the proliferation of the protests. Both as a 
symbol and as a historical event, ÔGeziÕ lives on as a deeply polemical 
feature in Turkish (political) life. While the protests may not have resulted 
in a change of power, nor Ðperhaps- in the long term delay of future such 
development projects, the Gezi uprising radically shifting the narrative on 
                                     
20 Evren, Sreyyya. "Gezi resistance in Istanbul: something in between Tahrir, occupy and a late Turkish 1968." Anarchist 




TurkeyÕs democratic stability, and presenting an unprecedented challenge 
to ErdoganÕs model of a so-called ÔNew TurkeyÕ.  
Following the Gezi protests, the final casualty count had risen to eight. 
The final victim was 14 year-old Berkin Elvan, who was struck by a tear 
gas canister while walking near the protests, supposedly to buy bread for 
his family. As Berkin lay in a coma for nearly a year (268 days), the fight 
for his life became a symbol of the opposing Gezi narratives. For many he 
was the tragic victim of police brutality, whereas according to the pro-
government press he had been a child manipulated by protestors for their 
purposes. The news of his death on March 11 sparked a further wave of 
small-scale demonstrations and renewed clashes with police. In addition to 
the eight civilians killed, 104 were seriously injured (The Guardian 
estimates that in total 8000 were injured) Ð11 of them permanently losing 
their eyesight following excessive exposure to teargas and pepper spray- 
and police 5000 arrested during the month of June 2013. According to 
HRFT (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey) data, the initial arrests 
consisted of 3653 individuals, yet was brought down to 126 (by July 
2013).22 However, since these are only the official accounts, the estimate 
(see above) is considered to be at least 5000. The charges brought 
include but are not limited to Ôbeing a member of an illegal organizationÕ, 
ÔseditionÕ, and Ôdestroying public propertyÕ. 
                                     
22 Fact Sheet: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/fact-sheet-on-gezi-park-protests-13704 
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It should also be noted that these numbers, when compared to the post-
coup purges, appear significantly lower. In just nine months following the 
coup attempt, Turkish police arrested 110,000 individuals, with nearly half 
(50,000) being further held on official charges. The Turkish Medical 
Association estimated that 11155 people were directly exposed to 
chemical riot control agents (there has also been discussion of whether 
the Turkish police employed illegal chemical substances to make up for a 
deficit of available tear gas). At the time of writing, post-coup purges 
continue, with the website ÔTurkey-purge.comÕ accumulating data since 
2016.23 The current estimate, as of July 22nd, 2018, is that since 2016 
141,558 individuals have been detained, with a total of 170,372 
dismissed from their professional positions (state officials, bureaucrats, 
teachers, academics). 80, 147 have officially been charged, many of which 
fall under laws accusing them of conspiracy against the state. The 
government has also issued 31 decrees granting it special powers to 
persecute those it believes culpable for the coup attempt. In this thesis I 
attempt to demonstrate how this escalation ca be seen as part of a 
broader escalation of an accusation of conspiracy and a strong 
persecution of dissent, beginning (in its current form) with the Gezi 
protests. 
Who led Gezi and what were the decisions made?  
                                     
23 see: www.Turkeypurge.com 
 20 
One of the key questions surrounding the Gezi protests was that of their 
leadership structures. And, perhaps in a more straightforward sense, who 
were its participants? The predominant critical interpretation of the Gezi 
protests, voiced for example by the Turkish scholar Caglar Keyder, was 
that the protests had resulted from a new middle class of Turkish society, 
predominately university-educated youth, demonstrating strong 
dissatisfaction with the AK partyÕs neoliberal politics.24 In other words, this 
was a largely class-based analysis. However, the class-oriented narrative Ð
such as argued by the Turkish Marxist scholar Korkut Boratav, does not 
tell the full story.25 While there may have been what he refers to as a 
Ômass class uprisingÕ, data suggests that the picture was a slightly more 
diverse and divergent one. If anything one might therefore consider 
separating the ÔmassÕ and the ÔclassÕ components, to study on the one 
hand how such ÔmassÕ groupings emerged, and to question subsequently 
what role ÔclassÕ had to play in this emergence. 
In an attempt to investigate these various claims of a class or Ômass classÕ 
uprising, Erdem Yrk and Murat Yksel have published a sequence of 
data-driven responses to the question of Gezi social formation.26 The 
research was conducted to explore three basic questions: (1) who were 
the Gezi protestors, in the broadest sense of the word?; (2) What was 
their class composition (3) and finally, What was their ideology, or, in the 
terms of the social analysis: Ôwhat ideology did they espouseÕ. Their 
                                     
24 Caglar Keyder 
25 Korkut Boratav 
26 Yrk New Left Review 
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definition of Ônew middle class isÕ employs categories of the proletariat 
similar to those suggested by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in 
ÔEmpireÕ.27 The idea of the Ônew middle classÕ as found in commentaries on 
Gezi is therefore summarized as the Ònon-manual formal proletariat 
(salaried technicians and white-collar employees), professionals 
(university-trained, salaried professionals in the public service and large or 
medium-sized private firms)Ó. This means that the manual formal 
proletariat and the informal proletariat were largely considered outside this 
definition. What is also important to note, is that the initial goal was to 
test the social formation of Gezi against that of the general population of 
Istanbul and Izmir. So not just to look at protest participation, but also to 
reflect this back onto the overall urban population to test the idea of new 
and politically active middle class. 
First, despite their relatively low participation, ÔexecutivesÕ (5%) and 
ÔcapitalistsÕ(4) formed in by comparison a larger fraction of the protestors 
than they do in general society. In other words, by percentage, there were 
more ÔeliteÕ class participants in the protests than in society writ large. 
However, this should not obscure the fact that the large majority of 
participants were from the Ômanual formal proletariatÕ, i.e. working class 
(36%) followed by the non-manual proletariat (20%) and non-formal 
proletarian (18%) as well as the Ôpetty bourgeoisieÕ Ða form of Ôlower 
middle classÕ (11%) and professionals (6%). The conclusion of these initial 
                                     
27 Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Harvard University Press, 2001. 
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findings was therefore one that seemed to contradict the claim of a new 
middle class, with a higher rate of proletarian participation, although a 
relative high likelihood of ÔeliteÕ participation drawing from a smaller group. 
As Yruk and Yksel write: 
ÒAdding the non-manual formal proletarians, i.e. white-collar employees 
and technicians, increases the proletarian participation rate to 74 per 
cent. At the same time, the upper classes had a higher representation 
among Gezi protesters than among the population as a whole: in other 
words, the likelihood of an individual having participated increased if he or 
she was from a higher class location. This does not, however, erase the 
fact that the absolute majority of protesters came from a proletarian 
background.Ó28 
When these findings were then analyzed strictly in terms of participation 
in the Gezi protests, the survey suggested that 31% of protestors 
conformed to the above definition of Ônew middle classÕ, whereas the 
majority (54%) were proletarian, 11% petty bourgeois and 4% capitalist. 
In other words, both in direct participation and in contrast to social 
formation in the city, there appeared to be no evidence to support the 
emergence of a new middle class theory. While the theory itself appears to 
be invalid, the emergence of the theory itself can be explained with the 
survey. After all, what emerged was that the middle class, in comparison 
to society at large, had a higher participation rate (the authors also 
                                     
28 Ibidem 
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speculate that since it is easier for non-working class participants to take 
time off, their support is more visible. Indeed, the findings suggest that 
while the majority of participants were working class, that compared to 
the overall population, there was a higher participation rate among the 
middle classes; therefore lending credence to the theory that these 
groups were newly politicized, although not larger or indeed entirely newly 
emergent compared to the proletariat. 
 
 
Another popular conceptualization of the occurrence of the Gezi protests 
revolves around a tendency to compare it to the Arab Spring. Yet apart 
from the generalized narrative comparison in much of the Western media, 
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in which Turkey is seen as a participant to the Arab Spring by virtue of its 
majority Muslim population, the two ÔuprisingsÕ have rather less in 
common than one might think. However, there are two main points of 
conversion. First, there was a strong display of police violence, which led 
to an escalation of the initial protests. And secondly, both movements 
were marked by an emphasis on ÔnetworkedÕ grassroots mobilization 
through social media in a manner than suggested an innovation in popular 
mobilization strategies from the past.29 However, when one examines the 
social formation of the Gezi protestors, it becomes apparent that the 
grievances, while perhaps linked to the global dissonance of neoliberal 
exploitation, nevertheless take on a distinctly ÔTurkishÕ range of issues. 
For example, in their study ÔThe Gezi Movement and the Networked Public 
SphereÕ Vatikiotis and Yrk argue that Gezi consisted of various 
intersecting socio-political grievances, for which the Gezi protests became 
an umbrella network.30 They list these as being: ÒLabor and Oppressive 
Neo-Liberal Reconstruction, ÒRight to the CityÓ and Green Activism, The 
UprootedÓ Urban Poor and Youth Activism, Social Media Censorship and 
the Frustrated Youth, The Syrian Civil War, Sunni Authoritarianism, Selefi 
Terrorism, and the Alevi Identity, Soccer Fans, Women, LGBTT, and the 
Kurds.Ó On the other hand, one can make the following two counter-
claims to these ÔuniqueÕ facets in the Turkish case. First, the process by 
                                     
29 Ozturkcan, Selcen, et al. "An analysis of the Gezi Park social movement tweets." Aslib Journal of Information 
Management 69.4 (2017): 426-440. 
 
30 Vatikiotis, Pantelis, and Zafer F. Yrk. "Gezi Movement and the networked public sphere: A comparative analysis in 
global context." Social Media+ Society 2.3 (2016): 2056305116662184. 
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which Turkey became more repressive and hence less open to social 
mobilization and an embrace of the social sphere can be traced back to 
the period following the Arab Spring. Therefore, in an indirect sense, the 
protests might be considered a form of backlash to the internalization of 
the Arab Spring rather than a participatory feature. Secondly, if one 
examines the above categories, then it becomes apparent that their 
interrelation is precisely that of the limitation of social expression under 
the guise of continued urban growth. So this is not a direct challenge to 
an autocratic regime (such as in Tunisia), nor for that matter, a revolt 
against a corrupt and dictatorial leadership structure (Egypt), but rather a 
more contemporary display of dissent against the ÔhiddenÕ costs of 
TurkeyÕs economic and democratic success story. In turn, these 
contentions where all played out under the relatively more visible (and 
binary) narrative of ÔsecularÕ versus religious social formations. Therefore 
the study concludes that,  
 
ÒOverall, the Gezi uprising was a comprehensive expression of various 
existing and deepening antagonisms. Among them, the polarization 
between Islamism and secularism can be identified as the most visible of 
these antagonisms. Beneath this surface, however, there are a number of 
significant structural issues, including the consolidation of neoliberal 
policies, centralization of power (along with allegations of cronyism and 
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authoritarianism), urban gentrification and environmental destruction, and 
a neo-Ottoman shift of orientation in foreign affairs.Ó31 
 
An alternative international comparison can be found in the movementÕs 
affiliation with the so-called ÔoccupyÕ movements. While in this thesis I 
compare some of the challenges faced by the Gezi protestors with those 
of the 1968 youth movements in Western Europe, the most direct link to 
ÔWesternÕ social movements is evidently in the form of the ÔoccupyÕ 
slogan. The occupation of Gezi park, in its banners, slogans, and even 
early organizational identification sought to strongly align itself with he 
Occupy movement that began with the 2011 occupation of Zucotti park 
in New York city. The main point of convergence should however not be 
considered strictly speaking in terms of the ÔoccupationÕ of a public 
space. After all this was also the main feature of many of the Arab Spring 
protests, notably Tahrir Square in Cairo. Instead, research suggests that 
the overlap between Gezi and Occupy can be identified in the ways in 
which the organizational strategy developed as a post-68 ÔhorizontalÕ 
form of mobilization and communication. ÔHorizontalÕ refers here to those 
forms of leadership that do not employ a top-down hierarchy, nor feature 
any one specific demand, goal, or policy change. This fluidity of the 
movementÕs ÔintentÕ becomes its central emancipatory feature, similar to 
the ÔculturalÕ movement of the 1960s, in which the main slogan was 
                                     
31 Ibidem, 6. 
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Ôenough is enoughÕ (Ca suffit) and Ôbe realistic, demand the impossibleÕ 
(Soyez ralistes, demandez l'impossible). This seemingly contradictory 
function, in which all forms of positivist or ÔproductiveÕ change are 
dismissed in favor of a radical pluralism or a symbolic non-demand, can be 
seen as a wholesale rejection of the status quo, rather than as a specific 
grievance-oriented issue. In this sense, one can identify a similar overlap 
between the Ôspirit of 68Õ, European anti-globalization (and Leftist 
movements such as the Spanish os Liberados) in the Gezi refusal to be 
identified according to one specific demand. In particular, the Turkish 
activist collective ÔAcademics for PeaceÕ has been vilified and persecuted 
for its open dissent towards the Turkish GovernmentÕs policies. In that 
regard, one might for example also think of how the group compares to 
ÔPussy RiotÕ in Russia. Although the two collectives differ greatly, they 
face similar challenges with regards to a conspiratorial state response in 
the wake of their relative popularity and impact in shaping Western 
opinions of their home countries. In this thesis I have sought to expand 
upon this notion to demonstrate how this ÔspiritÕ makes the movement 
both vulnerable to accusations of conspiracy (what some researchers call 
Ôvilification as counter-mobilization), yet also strengthens it against being 
co-opted within the government it contests.  
 
What was the broader societal support for Gezi, and what was the 
response to the accusation(s) of conspiracy theory?  
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It is interesting in this case to examine a mass survey conducted by 
KONDA on July 6-7, 2013, shortly after the Gezi protests. Among the 
many questions put to the 2629 participants, more than half responded 
that they believed Gezi to be the result of a plot against Turkey, rather 
than citizens demanding rights. However, when asked to identify who or 
what was exactly behind this foreign conspiracy, more than half of 
respondents could not point to a single country or actor. This allows for 
two interpretations. Either the notion of Ôforeign conspiratorsÕ was simply 
a rhetorical trope invoked so frequently by Erdogan that it became a 
symbolic concept for a broader dismissal of the protests as illegitimate; or, 
on the other hand, the belief may well have been ÔgenuineÕ and that many 
people believed in a fully-fledged foreign operation to undermine Turkish 
influence. As I will suggest in my thesis, I believe that these two 
interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and may well in fact reinforce 
another in a dialectical sense: that is to say, that both the relevant 
legitimacy and ÔforeignÕ influence of the Gezi protests are come to be 
considered entirely on the level of conspiracy rather than on the level of 
social resistance or political representation. One must also take into 
account that according to the survey 14,7% of respondents identified the 
protestors directly (as opposed to a general question as to what ÔstartedÕ 
the protests) as Ôforeign conspiratorsÕ, and 4,2% identified the Gezi 
participants as traitors. This makes Ôforeign conspiratorsÕ the third most 
frequent chosen response, ahead of Ðfor example- ÔyouthÕ or 
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ÔenvironmentalistsÕ. (The most frequent response was Ôcitizens demanding 
their rights (30,6%) and ÔAK party opponents (22,4%)). Below I have 
included the two most relevant graphs from the KONDA Gezi survey 




There is an interesting distinction here between the decision to (1) refrain 
from answering; (2) to declare ÔI do not knowÕ; and (3) to declare that 
there were no foreign conspirators. First, this suggests a high level of 
doubt and ambiguity as to the possibility of foreign conspirators. It is 
possible that those who did not respond at all did not want to contradict 
Erdogan, but this cannot be proven based on the data alone. There also 
appears to be a strong belief in a domestic plot to destabilize Turkey. By 
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and large, however, the second most popular response is to identify 
Ôforeign countriesÕ as those who are meant by the expression Ôforeign 
conspiratorsÕ. This, however, is also where a problem in the survey 
becomes apparent, in particular with regards to the way in which the 
question is framed. After all, the question ÔWho do you think the Ôforeign 
conspirators areÕ?Õ does not inquire into the personal conspiratorial beliefs 
of the respondents themselves, but rather asks them to ÔdefineÕ what is 
meant when Erdogan uses the ÔexpressionÕ foreign conspirators. Still, when 
compared to the response to the coup (see following section), it is 
apparent that a much larger segment of the respondents identified Gezi as 
a foreign conspiracy, relative to how many considered the coup a false-
flag attempt. This suggests at the very least that accusations of 
conspiracy are not strictly speaking the majority opinion, but that they are 
largely dependent on political polarization. As a final note, the dominant 
conspiratorial interpretation of the coup attempt is not one that finds 
foreign conspirators at fault, but rather points towards the suspicion (or 
paranoia) that the Turkish Government itself had orchestrated the coup. 
So we see here an interesting mirroring effect between a certain level of 
Ôpolitical convenienceÕ for the ruling party in the coup (distasteful as this 
may seem in light of the coup fatalities) and the political inconvenience of 
the Gezi protests. 
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The final questions posed by the coup survey revolve around shifting 
attitudes towards political freedoms. In light of conspiratorial 
interpretations of the coup, these show an interesting trend towards 
those who believe the false-flag theory and more liberal interpretations of 
the State, and more conservative emphasis on ÔjusticeÕ among those who 
do not adhere to a conspiratorial interpretation of the coup. See, for 




This demonstrates that those who adhere to the conspiratorial option 
(Ôthe coup was a complete fabricationÕ) also emphasize the necessity of 
equality (a key characteristic of the liberal attitude to society), and that 
those who think there was no conspiracy whatsoever other than the coup 
itself, emphasize ÔjusticeÕ. This is also the group that features the highest 
response rate for the Ôsurvival of the StateÕ option. The emphasis here on 
justice and state power lends credence to the notion that the 
conspiratorial view Ðor lack thereof- is here strongly associated with 
 32 
support of the AK party (The link between the justice for the coup and 
the justice contained within the name of the party being an additional 
semantic overlap). 
 
While these results evidently do not tell the whole story of how the coup 
was organized, and what it means for the future of Turkish democracy, I 
believe that the survey gives us insight into at least two significant 
factors, which in turn have bearing upon the notion of conspiracy theory. 
First, the results suggest that one of the central narratives of the protests 
has been largely overlooked, and this is the extent to which religious 
(grassroots) mobilization motivated the peopleÕs resistance to the coup. 
Secondly, although somewhat less surprising, is the indication that the 
coup was interpreted along strongly polarized lines, with AK party 
supports championing the notion of a peoples resistance movement, and 
opposition parties favoring conspiratorial interpretations. While the survey 
cannot tell us this, I think it reasonable to suggest that this polarization 
increased due to the State response to the Gezi protests. In the main 
body of the thesis I will further contrast the shift that occurs between the 
Gezi mobilization and the anti-coup mobilization as an evolving ÔspiritÕ of 
social resistance. 
 
How did the coup emerge/unfold?  
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Among the many contradictions of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in 
Turkey, one must stand out in tragic detail. Of all the coups in Turkey it 
was the most bloody, despite Ðor perhaps because of- its immanent failure 
to create a surge of public momentum in its favor. 
 
The opening moments of the coup began just before ten p.m. on Friday 
the 16th of July. The first assault came in the form of Turkish Air Force 
jets, flying low over Ankara. In Istanbul several tanks blocked bridges 
between the European and Asian sides of the city. Meanwhile, foot soldiers 
conducted raids on various military targets. Most notably, they took the 
General Staff headquarters in Ankara, as well as a special police force base 
outside the capital. Various civilian areas were also targeted, including 
IstanbulÕs Atatrk Airport and City hall. As part of an attempt to take over 
the media, soldiers briefly seized the public broadcasting station and 
various other facilities related to telecommunications and Turkish satellite 
systems. 
 
The coup attempt went live around 10 p.m. (all times are local) on Friday, 
15 July 2016. At that hour, Turkish Air Force fighter jets took to the skies 
over Ankara while, 325 kilometers to the west, tanks of the Turkish Army 
stopped traffic on the bridges that tie together the European and Asian 
portions of Istanbul. The putschists launched simultaneous raids aimed at 
seizing a number of key objectives. These included the General Staff 
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Headquarters in Ankara plus the police special-forces base at Go ̈lbaoõ near 
the capital. Also targeted for takeover were military high schools, 
IstanbulÕs Ataturk Airport and city hall, the national public-broadcasting 
station, and facilities critical to controlling the national 
telecommunications and satellite systems. 
 
Within an hour Prime Minister Binali Yildirim made an official televised 
statement, denouncing the coup. As Erdogan did not appear in the 
recording there was much initial speculation as to his whereabouts (from 
which, in turn, stemmed various conspiracy theories). An hour later, 
shortly after midnight, first images of Erdogan emerged, recorded on the 
mobile video application Ôface timeÕ. In his statement, apparently recorded 
from an airplane, he accused the Turkish armed forces of being led by the 
cleric Fetullah Glen in a Glenist plot to ÔinvadeÕ Turkey. (The term invade 
here resonates with the fact that Glen himself lives in self-imposed exile 
in the United States). In addition, Erdogan made a public appeal to the 
Turkish people to take to the streets and to fight the coup attempt. As a 
result, thousands of government loyalists took to the street, risking their 
lives to oppose the tanks and armed soldiers. 173 civilians died in these 
skirmishes. However, indiscriminate violence occurred on both sides, with 
images Ðfor example- emerging of Turkish civilians beheading a soldier 
participating in the coup. Equally graphic images were broadcast on 
various media, showing the mutilated bodies of civilians who had died in 
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the assault. In the final moments of the coup attempt, further military 
escalation followed, with jets attacking the national parliament and 
dropping bombs on the National Intelligence Agency. In the early hours of 
July 17th, the coup attempt came to an end, with many of the remaining 
participants surrendering. In the following days coup-soldiers were 
reported to have been beaten, starved and sexually assaulted. In all 
respects the coup was among the most deadly and chaotic instance of 
violent escalation in TurkeyÕs modern history. This, in turn, has contributed 
to the difficulty posed by seeking to interpret the conditions that gave 
rise to its emergence, and indeed, its execution. 
 
One of the factors that contributed to the confusion as to the culprits of 
the coup was the apparent lack of any unified leadership. Nor, for that 
matter, was there a single figure to emerge who declared the coup on 
television, social media, or radio. The only statement to be released came 
shortly after the seizure of the public broadcasting station. In the name of 
the so-called ÔPeace at Home CouncilÕ (itself a reference to Kemal 
AtaturkÕs mantra of ÔPeace at Home, Peace in the WorldÕ) a group of 
soldiers read out a written statement accusing the Government of failing 
to combat terrorism as well as citing its disregard of the constitution and 
the courts. While Erdogan was not named directly, they accused the 
Turkish political leadership of corruption, and promised to initiate 
constitutional and legal reforms. At gunpoint, the Turkish broadcaster 
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Tijen Karas was made to announce the new governing council of Turkey. 
The council, however, never made any further proclamations, nor did it 
take power, following the failure of the coup attempt. The lack of clarity 
as to the leaders of the council has since led to speculation Ðfor which 
there is no evidence- that the coup attempt was staged by the AK party 
to consolidate existing power. On the other hand, the overtones in the 
statement to AtaturkÕs ÔStatement to YouthÕ has led alternately to 
interpretations that this was to obscure a Glenist agenda; or, for that 
matter, to argue that the coup was not Glenist. As with so many 
conspiracy theories in Turkey, the evidence is sufficiently scant so as to 
allow for either interpretation. The government account, despite being 
contradicted by European intelligence agencies, continues to be that 
Fettulah Glen organized the coup. However, as no evidence to the 
contrary has emerged, and indeed various members of the coup (see the 
following section on leadership) were Glenists, we still cannot say with 
any certainty who masterminded the coup attempt. 
 
That being said, for the purposes of this thesis, three factors of the coup 
are directly relevant to the topic of conspiracy theory. First, the 
significant mobilization of populist counter-coup forces is considered as a 
unique characteristic of the 2016 coup attempt. Indeed one of the most 
notable reasons why the coup appeared to fail was this wave of popular 
resistance by civilian forces. Secondly, the very fact that the coup has 
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remained so poorly interpreted Ðindeed the fact that it resists 
interpretation- has resulted in the proliferation of both a conspiratorial 
State response and very harsh counter-measures, commonly referred to 
as a ÔpurgeÕ of military, governmental and civilian institutions in Turkey. 
Finally, when seen in the light of Gezi (but as I shall argue, not directly 
ÔcomparableÕ to Gezi) the State response to the coup continues a form of 
challenges to (a) the notion of the necessity/contingency of popular 
resistance, (b) the idea of conspiratorial forces seeking to undermine 
Turkey from within and without, and finally (c) the way in which the AK 
party has sought to create a form of anti-revolutionary momentum, by 
which consolidate its powers in a distinctly revolutionary (that is to say, 
non-consensual and non-traditional) manner of its own. 
 
Who were the coup leaders and what were the decisions made? 
 
The question of leadership during the military coup, its relative lack of 
coherent messaging or coordination, as well as the ongoing accusations 
against the Glenist Fet organization, have led to an unprecedented 
amount of confusion regarding the organization of the coup attempt. 
Shortly after the coup, the Government released reports that accused a 
group of senior military figures Ðincluding both active and retired generals- 
as well as lieutenants were responsible for the kidnapping and removal of 
several senior general loyal to the Government. The most significant 
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attribute of these reports was that they suggested that the military was 
internally divided. In addition, the Government ordered the arrest of 2,839 
military officials on July 16th, the morning after the coup attempt. (The 
speed at which the government ordered these arrests has since led to 
conspiratorial musing regarding the origins, and specifically the date at 
which this list was drawn up, leading some to believe that the Government 
had anticipated making these arrests in advance). The most senior 
member to be named directly was General Adem Huduti and Major General 
Avni Angun. Another individual to be singled out as a leader was the 
former Air force commander General Akin ztrk, who initially is reported 
to have alternately (or either, depending on what one believes) to have 
confessed to being the mastermind behind the coup, or, to have been on 
the airbase by accident visiting his grandchildren and son-in-law who were 
stationed there. 
While I do not intend to provide an in-depth account of the criminal 
proceedings that followed, I do want to address three points which I 
believe are pertinent to understanding the role the coup has played 
apropos conspiracy theory and political decision-making conducted under 
the rhetorical umbrella thereof. In this it might be useful to think of Ian 
AngusÕ notion of rhetoric as the Ôceremonial confirmation of the institution 
through the saying. In particular, the way in which the State responded to 
a ÔgenuineÕ conspiratorial event Ði.e.- the coup was to emphasize the 
importance of the popular mobilization and the public response to the 
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coup attempt. In this, the rhetoric was the exact opposite of the response 
to the Gezi protests. Here, the rapid mobilization of protestors was touted 
as evidence of a historic popular sensibility in favor of the Government, 
and indeed of Turkish democracy. Soon, however, more details of the 
counter-coup mobilization began to emerge. 
For example, reports emerged that the Turkish Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet) had issued an order for minarets to broadcast a message 
urging people to take to the streets. The conflict with the military was 
here directly phrased as being that of a religious confrontation with non-
believers. In a subsequent statement the head of Diyanet declared the 
coup plotters to have enacted Ôthe greatest betrayal of our exalted 
religionÕ.32 Furthermore, once the coup attempt had ended, Prime Minister 
Yildirim addressed the civilian protestors (and vigilantes), urging them that 
their work was not done, and to keep fighting to democracy, in what he 
called a Ôdemocracy-vigilÕ. Perhaps the problem here begins with referring 
to these groups as ÔprotestorsÕ. What exactly were they protesting? Or 
were they simply groups of vigilantes mobilized by the government to 
engage in a pitched battle with the military? The answer, I would say, lies 
somewhere in the middle as needs to be seen in the context of the Gezi 
legacy. For example, as pro-Government protestors took to Kizilay Square 
on July 16th, the contextual knowledge required to understand the 
symbolism of this act, is that the square had been off limits for public 




gatherings since the Gezi protests. Popular hash tags such as #nobetteyiz 
(we are on vigil) were reappropriated from the Gezi protests, and in 
Yildirim'sÕ speech he made various linkages between the fight against the 
military and the fight against ÔhooligansÕ and ÔterroristsÕ similar to the way 
in which the Gezi protestors had been described. Perhaps the most 
extreme message came in the form of a massive banner on the Ataturk 
cultural center adjacent to Taksim Square (also a site from which Gezi 
protestors hung banners) alluding to Glen as ÔDog of SatanÕ and ÔWe will 
hang you and your dogs by your own leashes.Ó 
Challenging the notion that most post-Arab Spring grassroots efforts 
consist of secular mobilization, a group of researchers published a study in 
foreign affairs, in which they mapped the way in which mosques across 
Istanbul had coordinated a response to the coup. Interestingly, their study 
also showed that much of this mobilization was seemingly spontaneous, 
thereby suggesting that the religious community in Turkey Ðand indeed 
the religious leadership- felt strongly that supporting the government and 
resisting the military to be in their favor. This suggests that the AK 
partyÕs pro-Islamic message has been firmly rooted within the leadership 
structures of the Islamic community in Turkey. This also contradicts the 
idea that Erdogan and Yildirim were personally responsible for the mass 
anti-coup mobilization, rather fanning on the flames than igniting them. 
The mapping research Ðcombined with data from a KONDA poll- also 
demonstrated that those areas with the highest concentration of Mosques 
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saw the highest level of participation in the anti-coup demonstrations. This 
does not mean that the men who went to fight the soldiers were radical 
extremists, but it does suggest that the confrontation between the coup 
and the ÔprotestorsÕ was a fight tinted by secularism versus religiosity, not 
just a statement of pro-or anti-Government sympathies. Soner Capagtay, 
writer and expert on Turkey described the coup as the Ôvictory of the 
digital age over an analogue coupÕ, but it seems that the response to the 
coup may itself have benefitted precisely from a particular blend of analog 
and digital technologies, calling both upon pre-existing social formations, 
communication and new online communities to spread the call to the 
streets of Istanbul and Ankara.  
 
What was the broader participation and societal support for the coup, in 
particular with regards to accusations of conspiracy?  
Again I would refer here to a subsequent (yet separate) KONDA survey, in 
which 2676 face-to-face interviews were conducted across 160 
neighborhoods and villages across Turkey following the coup attempt. The 
survey was conducted three weeks following the coup attempt and sought 
to explain what peopleÕs opinions and beliefs were regarding the ÔrealityÕ of 
the coup attempt, what their perceived role f the public is/was in 
preventing coups, and whether or not they expected a future coup 
attempt. The results were in turn categorized according to education, 
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income, religion, and party-affiliation. The results were striking, leading 
researchers to identify that a majority of interview participants believes 
that the people should be the primary force to resist coup attempts (note 
that 50% if respondents did not take to the streets during or after the 
coup) and protect democracy in Turkey, as well as suggesting that the 
most conspiratorial interpretations of the coup (in other words, that the 
event was fabricated by the Government) existed among non-religious, 
mostly HDP voting individuals. In contrast, 85% of interviewees stated 
that they were AK party voters. Seeming to contradict the findings from 
the Foreign Affairs article, only 2,2% of respondents said that they had 
heard of the coup through mosques Although this could be due to the 
fact that they heard the news first on television, and subsequently heard 
the mosquesÕ call to action. Although 27% claimed to have taken to the 
streets before Erdogan made the public call to action. This, in turn, seems 
to confirm the Foreign Affair report, and suggests again the importance of 
non-governmental mobilization. It also suggested a limited initial response 
through social media, with only 8,8 of respondents claiming to have seen 
the news first on social media. This differs starkly from the Gezi protests Ð
which KONDA researched as well- in which most of the initial reports 
surfaced online rather than on (state) television. In the response to the 
coup however, 65% of respondents said they had first heard about the 
coup on television. One might also speculate that this high rate is due to 
the coup occurring at night, when there is a higher TV-audience. In fact, 
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an overwhelming percentage of respondents (77,6%) said they had 
followed the events on television, whereas only 10,3% said they had 
followed it primarily on social media. This suggests a difference with the 
Gezi protests, which following the governmental media-ban were largely 
followed online. Interestingly, the report also demonstrated that a vast 
majority of people who had taken to the streets (77,4%) claimed to have 
never participated in any protests or demonstrations prior to the coup. 
(Although the report does not confirm this, it does suggest that the coup 
signaled an unusual surge in otherwise non-political, conservative 
participants; thereby lending credence to the notion that the response 
was largely organized as a religious resistance to the coup.) 
For the purposes of this thesis the most interesting aspect of the data is 
that revolving around the different interpretations of culpability in the 
coup attempt, in particular those that are conspiratorial interpretations. In 
other words, these are conspiratorial interpretations of a conspiratorial 
event. The question of culpability is therefore one of whether the coup 
was a ÔrealÕ conspiracy, or a false-flag initiative of the Government. In their 
question, the respondents were also offered a middle ground answer, 
which suggested that the Government may have known in advance of the 
coup attempt and did not act to prevent it, or alternately, that it was 
taken by surprise but used the coup to its advantage (this option was 
chosen most frequently by university students). The overall results 
showed that 74% believe that the coup was a ÔrealÕ uprising. 11,1% 
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responded that the coup was real but that the Government had 
manipulated it to their own ends. In third place, 9,2% believed the coup 
attempt was a complete fabrication, and the remaining 5,5 percent 
believed that the Government had advance warning of the coup yet had 
chosen not to act to prevent it. Below is a graph from the study detailing 
the response partitions appertaining to the belief in whether or not the 





The chart suggests an overlap between secularism and conspiratorial 
belief. That is to say, the largest demographic that exhibited a completely 
conspiratorial interpretation of the coup was among those who described 
themselves as Ônon-believersÕ. In turn, this belief resonated also with 
strongly pessimistic views about the economic situation in Turkey. The 
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educational spread is fairly equal, yet suggesting a slight propensity 
among high-school students to adhere to a conspiratorial interpretation of 
the events. We can also see that the most paranoid, or let us say ÔcriticalÕ 
interpretations of the coup come from those categorized under a ÔmodernÕ 
lifestyle, whereas religious conservatives cite the most certain attitude 
towards the coup and display the most optimism about TurkeyÕs economic 
stability. This is not strictly speaking surprising, but demonstrates some 
interesting results, when the question is further detailed into party-
affiliation (see below): 
 
In this chart we can identify a strong spread of suspicion regarding the 
coup primarily among non-voters and the political opposition (CHP, HDP). 
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The extreme outlier is here the faction of HDP voters, who have the most 
strongly conspiratorial interpretation of the coup. It seems also that this 
suspicion fuels those voters who are against the introduction of the 
presidential system, with a small majority claiming to have suspicions 
regarding the role of the Government in the coup. When measured for 
geographic spread, the survey result also Òconfirms that responses that 
reflect a critical opinion speak to a different social base and are located 
away from the region where the majority of society are present.Ó This 
means that the accusation of conspiracy functions as an indicator of 
polarization across a broad variety of issues, which the KONTA report 
indicates could also be used to Òto measure political polarization, 
questions on subjects such as opinions on the Ergenekon trial or the Gezi 
protests, as well as the evaluations on the general state of affairs in the 
country.Ó 
 
Beyond Erdogan: Moving towards systemic considerations of elite framing 
rather than polemical accusations 
Defiant in the face of unprecedented popular challenges, President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has emerged as a populist and innovative, yet equally 
polarizing and enigmatic, political leader. Under his leadership, political 
crackdowns and nationwide purges of public institutions, higher education 
and the civil service have sown the confusion surrounding legitimate 
versus illegitimate resistance to the status quo. Commentators express 
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growing concern for the vitality of Turkish democracy, pointing towards a 
deteriorating record on civil liberties and human rights, increasingly 
authoritarian leadership, and the unstable prospects for continued 
economic growth.  
Many attribute these issues specifically to ErdoğanÕs distinctive leadership 
style. Both friend of the people, and pursuer of perceived enemies, his 
distinctive political persona is one that cultivates opponents and allies 
both real and imagined. As such, there exists an understandable 
propensity in the academic literature towards focusing on Erdoğan as the 
chief culprit for TurkeyÕs political turmoil.33 While Erdoğan is indeed 
central to the popularization and successful exploitation of paranoid 
politics in Turkey today, this thesis argues instead that conspiratorial 
rhetoric and political framing of narratives of conspiracy warrant a much 
more systemic, and indeed holistic, analysis of what is essentially a 
system of contentions and contradictions appertaining to the idea of the 
friend/enemy in Turkish democracy amidst its uncertain future. This 
means that the changing way in which conspiratorial discourse in 
contemporary Turkey situates the Ôconspiratorial OtherÕ as inherently part 
of the Ôin-groupÕ of Turkish politics, rather than as an external other, 
                                     
33 Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (London, 
2017).; Halil Caraveli, ÔErdoganÕs Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in TurkeyÕ, 
Foreign Affairs 121 (2016); Heper, Metin, and Şule Toktaş. ÔIslam, modernity, and 
democracy in contemporary Turkey: The case of Recep Tayyip ErdoğanÕ The Muslim 
World 93.2 (2003), pp.157-185.  
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suggests the formation of new discursive practices beyond mere 
adversarial or paranoid framing. 
The thesis makes the case that the experience of Turkish democracy in 
its current guise cannot, and should not, be boiled down to the theatrics 
of one antagonistic leader, no matter how contentious. Instead, the thesis 
suggests a critical reading of the impact and forces brought to bear 
through, in reference to, and deriving from conspiracy theory. Or, to be 
precise, the thesis juxtaposes the academic literature theory on 
conspiracy theory with the political impact of conspiracy theory in 
contemporary Turkish politics as evidenced by the post-Gezi and post-
coup elite framing strategies. 
That is to say, I use the case studies to examine the extent to which such 
framing can be seen as symptomatic, and indeed strategic, of the Turkish 
state response to opposition and the consolidation of increasing powers 
both democratic and autocratic in nature. The thesis provides an urgent 
yet balanced account of the escalating tensions in ErdoğanÕs ÔNew TurkeyÕ 
by focusing on paranoid politicians, conspiracy theories, inside agitators, 
and accused coup-plotters, activists, academics, and journalists. The goal 
is to explore the relative merits, or lack thereof, of the discussion of 
conspiracy theory in Turkey, and to contrast both the resistance and pro-
government interpretations of the post-Gezi and post-Coup Turkish 
political experiment within a critical discussion of the role of conspiracy 
theory in Turkish politics. 
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In Turkey, where it has become difficult to distinguish fact from fiction, 
allies from enemies, and democracy from autocracy, the rise of 
conspiracy theory in Turkish political rhetoric is readily apparent. This, 
however also makes it difficult to identify what type of data can be 
collected on such conspiratorial discourse.  
That is to say, to understand whether or not Turkish democracy can 
evade the clutches of a paranoid politics and what has popularly come to 
be known as a Ôpost-truthÕ politics (although the term remains 
problematically ill-defined), we must first question the ideas, fears, hopes 
and dreams with which such a politics is either sustained or combated. In 
this thesis I set out to provide a critical and comprehensive framework of 
the processes of conspiracy theory in Turkey today, so as to lay the 
groundwork for a better understanding of the impact of real versus non-
real political narratives, and in turn, to provide those seeking to 
understand, negotiate, and facilitate TurkeyÕs integration within the wider 
international community with a toolkit of sorts by which to make better 
sense of TurkeyÕs oftentimes fantastical political rhetoric. 
 
The geopolitical dimensions of Gezi and the Coup  
 
The rapid rate at which Turkey has reverted from being a model of 
democratization towards a more authoritarian society, has been dubbed 
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the Turkish ÔexitÕ from democracy.34 This raises an interesting question 
regarding the manner in which the notion of ÔdemocracyÕ functions in 
Turkish politics today. Is it simply a matter of leaving democracy behind, 
or is there something integral to the democratic process itself that allows 
for a certain type of manipulation characterized by ErdoganÕs paranoid 
brand of populist politics? The question is also whether Turkey presents a 
special case, or whether the erosion of democratic norms and the rise of 
conspiratorial and paranoid interpretations of politics simply conforms to a 
wider, perhaps global, trend in neo-liberal political societies; societies 
which have become increasingly decentralized, focused on the 
entrepreneurial and individualized attitude towards self-fulfillment and the 
competitive pursuit of non-communitarian advantage(s). 
The term ÔexitÕ is employed most commonly to describe the process of 
departure from democratic norms following the Ôrepeat electionsÕ of 
November 2016. Specifically, the AK party failed in regular elections to 
secure a majority or to form a coalition. During this period, between June 
and November, Turkey did not form a government and the time was 
marked by increased violence and attacks both in the Eastern provinces 
and against the HDP. This led to a resurgence of conflict with the PKK 
(Kurdistan WorkerÕs Party) and a stronger focus by Erdogan both internal 
and external enemies (indeed, this occurred during the continuing State of 
Emergency, which ended only in July 2018). Supporting the AK party, now 
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President Erdogan declared that only he could keep Turkey safe. In the 
subsequent November (re)elections the AK party secured a sufficient 
majority for a one-party rule. Today, of course, it is more apt to refer to a 
more permanent Turkish ÔexitÕ in light of the 2017 referendum that 
granted Erdogan unprecedented powers to change the constitution, 
effectively rendering the country a Presidential system that allows the 
President, among other things, to appoint members of the judiciary and 
sign executive orders into law. 
 
The idea of the Turkish model as a geopolitical project Ðrather than just a 
rhetorical device- suggests that there are specific instances in which 
Turkey stands out as an exemplary case. According to Kerem ktem and 
Karabekir Akkoyunlu, Turkey does correspond to broader challenges that 
fall within the critique of neo-liberalism (such as the erosion of democratic 
norms under the auspices of free speech and rightwing populism), but that 
these are subject to two unique conditions: The first regards what they 
call Ôthe conduct of a revisionist project of regime changeÕ, or, in other 
words, the ideological component underlying a deliberate campaign 
towards the consolidation of elite power in Turkey. And the second is that 
of TurkeyÕs ÔfluidÕ geopolitical environment, that both weakens and 
strengthens the governmentÕs capacity to consolidate such power.35 This 
second category falls within a broader trend in so-called Ôcritical 
                                     
35 ktem, Kerem, and Karabekir Akkoyunlu. ÒExit from Democracy: Illiberal Governance in Turkey and Beyond.Ó (2016); 
469-480. 
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geopolitical studiesÕ, that reads geopolitics as a form of discourse.36 
Consider, for example, Leslie HeppleÕs interpretation of the narrative force 
wielded by means of geopolitics. Choosing to read geopolitics as a ÔtextÕ, 
she argues that, Ôthe texts of geopolitical discourse are not free-floating, 
innocent contributions to an ÔobjectiveÕ knowledge.37 The element of 
Ôknowledge productionÕ suggests here a potential link between the way in 
which paranoid and conspiratorial narratives are formed, and the manner in 
which the (Turkish) State can employ them to fit, or draw inspiration from, 
geopolitical prejudices and contradictions; for example, between that of 
both a European and Ottoman Turkey, an Islamic and Modern Turkey, and 
more recently, a democratic yet autocratic Turkey. 
 
To stay for a moment with Hepple -and this falls within a wider critical 
ÔrevivalÕ of geopolitics in the post Cold-War environ, in which a particularly 
counter-intuitive danger emerges- Ôgeopolitics always risk having the 
subjectÕs past used against themÕ writes Hepple, inferring that, for 
example, while Americans may well see in the future of geopolitics 
evidence for the Ôend of historyÕ, the Russian perspective regards it as a 
potential return, and a token of legitimacy, by which to restore its 
perceived historical significance. In this sense, geopolitics always blends 
the old with the new, mythology with the creation of knowledge, and risks 
confusing historical agency with manifest destiny. What this means is that 
                                     
36 discourse (Campbell 1992, î Tuathail & Agnew 1992; Hepple 1992). 
37 Hepple, 139 
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one way to understand the strong contradictory dynamic of accusations 
of conspiracy theory Ðfor example in Turkey- is to see this as an extension 
of the same sort of mythologizing to which geopolitics becomes subject; a 
narrative in which Turkey is both inside and outside, and both victim and 
victor. The idea of historical purpose becomes legitimized through an 
institutionalized form of knowledge in turn derived from systematizing 
certain geopolitical narratives, as well as conspiratorial forms of historical 
thinking commonly referred to as the Sevres-Syndrome. 
 
This, in turn, can be seen to have bearing on the coup attempt, as the 
Turkish military is seen as integrally linked to the way in which Turkish 
society blends narratives of civil society and democracy with the 
geopolitical resonance of its role towards its neighbors, notably in the 
Middle East. Geopolitics therefore functions as a means by which the 
military can make a claim to a special perspective on statecraft, rather 
than just being employed to protect the borders. The overlap between the 
production of knowledge and the military institutions is particularly evident 
in the realm of geopolitics in Turkey, with the majority of the early 
geopolitical literature stemming from either military outlets or authors 
with a background in the military.38 It is also vital to understand the way in 
which the Turkish military considers itself through this form of knowledge 
production as the ÔprotectorÕ and guarantor of Turkish democracy, both to 
                                     
38 The authors mentioned above are all published through military outlets. (Bilge 1959; Eren 1964; Turfan 1965; 
ngr 1963) Since then the literature has developed much further, with notable authors including Ilhan 1971/2002, 
Sezgin & Yilmaz, Tarakci 2003, Tezkan 2000), 
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understand the coup attempt, as well as to see how it differs from 
TurkeyÕs previous coups. To make an even stronger connection between 
the critical study of geopolitics and the Ôpolitics of truthÕ in the 
Foucauldian conception of power/knowledge or WalkerÕs Ôinside/outsideÕ, 
one might therefore cite Pinar BilginÕs work, on the employment of 
Ôgeopolitical truthsÕ in Turkey to justify strongman tactics as necessary for 
the survival of Turkish sovereignty.39 
 
When one views the political narratives of the Gezi protestors, there is an 
attempt to provide a counter-form of geopolitical narrative, or resistance, 
that revolves around more emancipatory models of ÔTurkishnessÕ. 
Consider, for example, that research has demonstrated that half of the 
Gezi demonstrators were women.40 This means that the image of the 
Ôwoman in the red dressÕ (Ceyda Sungur) being pepper-sprayed, was not 
only symbolic of the movement (linking it to other revolutionary imagery), 
but in fact a very real representation of the large female participation, 
and indeed instigation and organization, of the protests. This clashes with 
the male-dominated narrative of the ÔlooterÕ, ÔconspiratorÕ, or Ôviolent 
youthÕ that the media and the government sought to disseminate. It has 
even been argued that the way in which the protests moves around 
various sites, in particular Taksim Square and Gezi park, but also through 
the area between the park and Besiktas, created a certain ÔgeopoliticsÕ of 
                                     
39  See: Walker 1993 and Pinar Bilgin 
40 Konda Gezi Raporu, 2014 5-10, as cited in Jim Kuras, 2015) 
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the city; a space in which the contestation fluctuated between both the 
stasis of an occupation and the more militant aspects of nearby 
confrontations with police. This means that the meaning of Gezi park 
went through various symbolic stages, from the original site of a sit-in 
protest, to a contested space of active confrontation, to an alternative 
form of communal space, and finally, upon its eviction, to a site of non-
violent resistance. The mixing of the spatial functions of Gezi was also 
reflected in the variety of practices and communications evidences by the 
differing factions that gathered in and around the park; including, but not 
limited to nationalists, feminists, Leftists, anarchists, and LBGT activists 
(Of course these groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive). 
 
If anything, the geopolitical element of the protests became part and 
parcel of the non-Turkish media narrative. This, in turn presented certain 
challenges as well as opportunities for the burgeoning Gezi movement. 
The dominant interpretation of Gezi took on either a left, or a rightwing 
narrative in which the Gezi protestors were either seen as some form of 
continuation of the Arab Spring, or, on the other hand, as a revolt against 
the dubious idea of ÔIslamo-fascismÕ. In other words, the narrative of the 
Gezi protests was not just subject to domestic political (mis)conceptions 
and prejudices that features also in a broader, and indeed global suspicion 
of TurkeyÕs role in the world. The two above interpretations, therefore, 
corresponded with two further geopolitical assumptions: First, the idea 
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that, if Gezi was indeed a further instance of the Gezi Spring, then this 
would mean that the Erdogan regime was by proxy as oppressive as, say, 
Gaddafi or Assad (evidently untrue, but with a kernel of truth); or, that 
the protests were a secular resistance against a Muslim take-over of an 
otherwise promisingly secular Turkish democracy (again, evidently untrue, 
although with a kernel of truth). 
 
My own interpretation is that these two categories function together in a 
dialectical sense. The ruling party in Turkey successfully plays off both its 
role as a leader in the region, as well as its more victimized stance 
towards the West. In so doing, it shapes a narrative in which it is both the 
Ôenfant terribleÕ and the role model in a region that remains largely 
undemocratic. Specifically, I will look at the way in which conspiracy 
theory, as both a symbolic concept and a narrative practice, creates a 
system, a closed loop as it were, in which the potency of this particular 
paradox is harnessed to great political advantage. 
 
Understanding Conspiracy Theory in light of the Turkish context 
Conspiracy Theory, and accusations of conspiracy have emerged as one 
of the primary justifications for an increasingly repressive and 
antagonistic politics in Turkey. The challenge is then, how to take the idea 
of conspiracy theory seriously, not by engaging in the practice of de-
bunking, or fact-checking, but instead by understanding the mechanisms, 
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contradictions, and processes that fuel the logic and (un)reason 
underlying such a paranoid politics.41  
What can conspiracy theory tell us about the political turmoil in Turkey? 
Does it not merely reflect the imaginary, or perhaps even strategic, 
adversaries invoked by the government and opposition alike? In other 
words, how does one study something that is by its very definition 
dependent on the impossibility of its successful verification?  
One way to approach this dilemma is to direct attention from ErdoğanÕs 
distinctly antagonistic leadership style, to instead emphasize the 
characteristics, processes, and forces that come into play in Turkish 
politics. In the popular conception of the term, such a politics is marked 
by accusations of conspiracy, paranoid leadership, and a media war on 
(perceived) opposition.42  
This thesis argues that conspiracy theories, whether invoked by the 
opposition or by the Government, serve as a primary tool for mobilizing 
and reconsolidating the public across pre-existing social and ideological 
divides. I address these issues by looking at the political processes of 
conspiracy theory in Turkey as indicative of deeper divides, as well as a 
                                     
41 Alessandro Bessi et al, ÔScience vs conspiracy: Collective narratives in the age of 
misinformationÕ, PlOS one 10.2 (2015); Michelle A. Amazeen, ÔRevisiting the 
epistemology of fact-checkingÕ, Critical Review 27.1 (2015), pp. 1-22. 
42 The term was popularized following the unexpected outcome of the British EU 
referendum and the 2016 US Presidential campaign. In both instances, the word became 
a blanket-term for supposed strategies of disinformation and the apparent lack of 
factuality in public discourse surrounding either event. 
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conscious or intuitive framing strategy to place the experience of social 
protest and resistance outside the wider responsibilities of the State.  
In his description of Conspiracy as a zero-sum game, Charles Pigden 
suggests that the politicoÕs knack for paranoia constitutes a professional 
hazard. He describes paranoid politicians as ÔThe real devotees of 
conspiracyÕ who Ôtry to frustrate those conspiracies with counterplots of 
their ownÕ43 On the other hand, if we embrace PopperÕs definition of 
conspiracy as lying in the act of discovery (since a truly hidden conspiracy 
canÕt be identified Ð in the same way in which a true secret is not longer 
thus once it becomes known) as Ôthe discovery of the men or groups who 
are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a 
hidden interest which has first to be revealed) and who have planned and 
conspired to bring it aboutÕ it becomes clear that the very visibility of 
protest, which at first sight seems to make it lack the necessary 
secretiveness of conspiracy, in fact makes it an ideal candidate to be 
accused of conspiratorial scheming.44  
The current study rejects PopperÕs notion of conspiracy as a subjective 
paranoia, and instead relocates conspiracy both as political strategy and 
socio-political phenomenon. It uses the case study of modern Turkish 
politics, specifically in the post-Gezi era, to provide a more nuanced 
                                     
43 Charles Pigden, ÔPopper revisited, or what is wrong with conspiracy theoriesÕ 
Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate, Coady D (ed) (2006), p. 21. 
44 Karl Popper, The open society and its enemies, (new edn, London, 2012), pp. 352. 
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analysis of the forces that shape conspiratorial rhetoric than the 
ÔdebunkingÕ approach to Conspiracy to be found in Popper and PigdenÕs 
work. In doing so it seeks to provide a conceptual framework for the 
study of conspiracy as both narrative process and political calculation. 
This brings us to a question that has already been brought forth by critics 
of Popperian conspiracy theory:45 is it in fact only unsuccessful 
conspiracies that we are aware of? I argue that such a claim should be 
revised to ask instead Ôis it the non-existent conspiracies that fuel real 
political actionÕ? In this case, for example, the question of the veracity of 
online conspiracies against Turkey is relatively insignificant. It is the claim 
of conspiracy that makes it real, in that it justifies the reactionary 
measures, which the government initiated after the protests to curb 
these imaginary threats. Instead of accepting the protest movement as a 
legitimate popular challenge to social inequalities and dissatisfaction, the 
Government responded by rallying its own supporters and dismissing the 
protestors as malignant conspirators, or even more dismissively, as the 
unwitting victims of secret conspiracies. 
This situates the use of conspiratorial rhetoric within social movement 
studies, as well as touching upon issues of nationalism and ethnicity, and 
federal and institutional failures in Turkey, and philosophy and political 
                                     
45Ibidem, pp. 17-46; See also: Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, ÔConspiracy 
theories: Causes and curesÕ, Journal of Political Philosophy 17.2 (2009), pp. 202-227; 
Ashutosh Jogalekar, ÔFalsification and its DiscontentsÕ, Scientific American, January 24, 
(2014). 
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thought in the literature on conspiracy theory. I aim to initiate a debate 
on the under-emphasized linkages between State response and targeted 
use of conspiracy theory as a political mobilizing tool. My work 
investigates how political leaders choose to respond to seemingly 
contingent manifestations of opposition and protest, focusing in 
particular on elite framing and the mutual capacity of government and 
opposition to use conspiracy as an integrating or isolating rhetorical 
device.  
Determining what the merit or relative impact is of increasingly paranoid 
and conspiratorial rhetoric in Turkish politics can be a puzzle. This thesis 
hopes to shed some light on the processes in which accusations of 
conspiracy relate to a systemic relationship of forces; to examine the 
extent to which such accusations drive real political action, rather than 
treating them as the mere theatrics of antagonistic rhetoric or evasive 
discursive tactics.  
My motivation in writing this thesis has therefore been to provide an 
innovative study of the role that conspiracy theories play in contemporary 
Turkish politics, that is to say between 2013 and 2017, and to contribute 
to the literature on conspiracy theory, elite framing and Turkish studies in 
contemporary Turkey in a fashion that contributes to the emergent 
transnational discussion on conspiratorial framing of political discourse. 
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Relationship to Existing Literature 
The literature on conspiracy theory has previously proven a fruitful 
subject for Turkish studies and philosophical inquiries into the nature of 
truth in politics.46 While the two have not necessarily been merged, the 
separate literatures fall roughly into two categories. First, there are 
studies of specific social contentions in Turkey, most notably the Kurdish 
issue and the Armenian Genocide issue.47 Secondly, and with a stronger 
focus on conspiracy theory in Turkey, there has also been an emphasis on 
the so-called ÔDnmar ConspiracyÕ, as well as the Ôinterest-rate lobbyÕ, 
including various iterations of EU- and US-themed conspiracy theories.48 
                                     
46 Kenneth Fidel, ÔMilitary organization and conspiracy in TurkeyÕ, Studies in Comparative 
International Development (SCID) 6.2 (1970), pp. 19-43. 
47 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish question (Boston, 1998); Henri 
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(Istanbul, 2008); Turkay Salim Nefes, ÔScrutinizing impacts of conspiracy theories on 
readers' political views: a rational choice perspective on anti‐semitic rhetoric in TurkeyÕ, 
The British journal of sociology 66.3 (2015), pp. 557-575; Trkay S. Nefes, ÔThe 
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Finally, there exists an abundance of work on the Glenist organization 
(Fet) and its relative infiltration of Turkish institutions both preceding 
and following the 2017 coup attempt, which the Turkish Government 
attributes to military factions associated with Glenism.49  
With regard to historical studies of conspiracy theory in Turkey, the 
literature focuses largely on anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and 
Ottoman anti-Western grand narratives of colonial contestation, many of 
which are based on existing historical grievances and traumatic events 
such as the 1683 battle of Vienna.50 There also exist a multitude of 
studies on conspiracy theories in the Middle East, although relatively little 
work has focused specifically on Turkish theories. 51 By and large there 
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does appear to be a somewhat Orientalist assumption in the literature on 
conspiracy theory that non-Western nations are particularly prone to 
conspiratorial politics, despite much evidence suggesting that conspiracy 
theories are in equal measure a feature of so-called consolidated 
democracies in the West.  
Of course there exists a wide range of literature on conspiracy that goes 
beyond Turkish or Middle Eastern studies. Such research can be roughly 
grouped into three categories: (1) the Popperian approach to conspiracy 
theory regards it as an aberration of reason, a threat to scientific 
certainty, and a corruption of society. In this approach, the accusation of 
conspiracy theory is often aligned with critiques of historicist 
interpretations, and commonly used as a pejorative for material 
determinism. (2) There exists a growing philosophical approach to 
conspiracy theory, both in the English and Continental schools of thought 
Ðthat is to say, both in positivist or Cartesian and (post)structuralist 
interpretations thereof.52  
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While the former is more aligned with psychological and political accounts 
of the functioning and circulation of conspiracy theory, the latter group 
feeds into a growing interest in conspiracy theory in cultural Studies, 
psychology, and comparative literature.53 What unites all these 
approaches is the growing consensus that conspiracy theory is a topic 
that merits serious scholarly attention. (3) And finally, a key part of the 
conspiracy literature has derived from psychological studies engaging to 
with either the verification or so-called debunking of conspiracy theories 
and the impact of the ÔbeliefÕ in conspiracy theory.54 It should also be 
added, that perhaps the most predominant texts on conspiracy theory 
are those that catalogue or summarize the most popular conspiratorial 
interpretations of historical and contemporary events. Many of these are 
political in nature, and include but are not limited to, revisionist histories 
ranging from the crusades to the 9/11 attacks.55 
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As such, the consideration of accusations of conspiracy can be seen as a 
way to move beyond the strong focus on social movements as 
organizational structures, to instead accentuate the significance of 
strategic state response in determining the relative success of mass 
public demonstrations and other forms of resistance. It has been argued 
that the extent to which conspiracy theories can be seen as relevant 
political mobilizing tools depends on a variety of factors, as proposed by 
David Coady, who has put forward that the level of expected scepticism 
regarding the veracity of conspiracy theories depends on the following 
factors in society: first, the effectiveness, or existence of, freedom of 
information legislation; secondly, the diversity of media ownership, 
followed closely by the independence of public services from government 
influence, and finally, the relative independence of different branches of 
government. 56 Conspiracy Theory in Turkey describes a political sphere in 
which the aforementioned conditions are readily met, and explores how 
conspiracy theory functions as both catalyst and outcome of what is 
therefore essentially a Ôconspiratorial societyÕ rather than a conspiracy 
theory of society. 
This means that the thesis effectively distances itself from and moves 
beyond PopperÕs critique of the so-called Ôconspiracy theory of societyÕ in 
which he argues that conspiracy theory is a simple-minded way to 
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rationalize the complexities of the political process.57 This conviction is 
then deftly repackaged in his footnotes to facilitate a rather underhanded 
critique of a supposed Marxist conspiracy of society, in which everything 
is interpreted in terms of capital and economic relations. Popper is here 
conflating too much, even if he is on the face of it simply predating a 
commonplace pejorative (even within Post-Marxism) of so-called Ôvulgar 
MarxistsÕ. On the one hand, he dismisses the notion of determinism Ðin 
this case, economic determinism- as conspiratorial, and on the other he 
argues that conspiracy theory is a vehicle for those lacking the cognitive 
facilities to comprehend the ÔtrueÕ nature of the political.  
 
This is somewhat ironic, considering PopperÕs own aversion to what he 
called essentialist knowledge, or other forms of the pursuit of the pure 
knowledge of nature. Yet, more gravely, it posits a paradox of sorts 
(again, the identification of which Popper sees as the central goal of the 
philosopher, and hence a further irony), which is that the idea of 
conspiracy theory is here both the outcome of foolish thinking, that is, 
the temptation to see organized forces where there are none; and the 
idea of the ÔtrueÕ meaning of any given system -in this case political or 
societal- as being so enormous and difficult to comprehend that it evades 
common understanding.  
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In other words, Popper suggests both that conspiracy theory is the 
mental equivalent of grasping at straws, while at the same time positing a 
seemingly overarching, sublime system that evades being interpreted by 
the common man. We can forgive Popper this inconsistency, to the 
extent that it arises precisely out of the contradictions surrounding the 
premise of conspiracy itself, its double visibility and invisibility, its reason 
and unreason. To put this in its proper context thus requires that we take 
a step back from our persistent obsession with the ÔfalsityÕ of conspiracy 
theory, to instead begin to posit how conspiracy theory contains a 
contestation of truth through strategic misinformation.   
 
Thinking of conspiracy theory in Turkey as a form of Ôpopular knowledgeÕ 
through the lens of the national psyche  
Gezi can also be seen through the lens of mounting historical dissidence 
and social protest since the 1960s. Consider, for example, the following 
description from Arzu zturkmen, a Turkish academic who studied the 
performative aspects of the Gezi protests: 
ÒFor those of us born in the 1960s, TurkeyÕs traumatic political events 
have been inextricable from our daily lives. From 1960 up to the late 
1970s, student and labor protests along with anticommunist 
demonstrations were widespread, not only in urban centers, but across 
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Turkey as well. In the postÐmilitary coup years of the 1980s, however, our 
generation grew up away from street terror, holding nevertheless a strong 
awareness about TurkeyÕs insecure international status. Though they were 
not explicit activists, the youth of the 1980s had a solid memory and 
awareness of a political past. For my generation, these were also the years 
to enjoy consumerism, as a long-awaited outcome of new liberal policies, 
while at the same time feeling defensive about TurkeyÕs poor human rights 
records, the Armenian genocide issue, and the oppression of women.Ó58 
 
This memory is shaped not just by the mere realization that the Turkish 
authorities had covered up these crimes, but that despite the availability 
of the facts, even the truth could not touch the forces that upheld the 
State. This leads to the popular suspicion of a deep State. 
 
ÒMany of these murders remained unsolved, not because it was impossible 
to get the facts on them, but because official authorities stopped 
pursuing the cases at a certain point during the investigations. This made 
people skeptical about the stateÕs involvement in the process, often 
referred to as the Òdeep state,Ó meaning a hidden structural unit within 
the state.Ó 
 
This tension between the remembered experience of political turmoil and 
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the enduring futility of justice, in particular the ways in which a paranoid 
interpretation of the StateÕs role begins to emerge, provides what to me 
seems like the most accurate description of the stage that had been set 
for the Gezi protests. It is not just that Gezi existed on the level of 
political resistance to both current and historical political injustices or 
outrages, but rather that Gezi contained within it already an internalized 
notion of the futility of fact, or, of the ways In which institutional 
resistance could not longer stand up to the government. The reason I 
begin with this quote, is therefore not to reject the more common 
interpretation that Gezi occurred as a particular blend of concerns 
regarding urban spaces, environmentalism, and the creeping 
religion/authoritarianism of the ruling party, but rather it is to say that the 
history underlining Gezi was already one in which the regular modes of 
democratic and institutional dissent had proven to be unfruitful. This 
insight should help us to avoid overly normative assessments of the 
ÔuniquenessÕ of a ÔGezi GenerationÕ, and allow us instead to think of Gezi as 
both distinctly new and yet mired in the ÔhistoryÕ of Turkish resistance in 
the lead up thereto. This will have important bearings on the thesis as 
well, since it can help us understand both how Gezi becomes attributed 
with certain transformative, as well as antagonistic, features. This is 
related to the way(s) in which Gezi is taken either as a historical 
continuation, or as a radical contingency (I will argue later that it is in fact 
both); in other words, Gezi as both a likely and unlikely event. 
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There are however also accounts of the Gezi protests that are more 
critical of the idea of a ÔconvergenceÕ theory of the Gezi protests. In their 
eyes, Gezi may have presented a surprising political event, but cannot be 
attributed to phenomenological factors, overarching solidarities, and hence 
should not be considered as a so-called Ôrainbow movementÕ at all. These 
arguments do not only stem from anti-Gezi authors and pro-government 
opinions, but revolve rather around a debate on the (false) attribution of 
force to the mobilization of the movement. In other words, the question is 
not just ÔwhoÕ participated in Gezi, nor ÔwhyÕ, but rather ho the 
interpretation of Gezi itself retroactively shapes the way the uprising is 
known. One such argument comes from Siyaves Azeri, who emphasizes 
Gezi primarily as class struggle. He writes ÒThe June 2013 uprising in 
Turkey that shook the foundations of the AKP ÔmoderateÕ political Islamic 
government in Turkey was not a rainbow movement consisting of 
heterogeneous elements; rather, it was an all-encompassing political 
movement and the manifestation of class struggle in Turkey.Ó59 The main 
crux of this argument revolves around the tension between the ÔessenceÕ 
and the ÔappearanceÕ of the movement. The critique is here therefore one 
of the ways in which Gezi has been conceptualized in either a normative, 
or phenomenal sense, in which the complexities of Gezi are generalized to 
fit into a predictable narrative of generational revolt. Employing the 
Marxist idea of historical explanation, Azeri writes on the correct Ð
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according to him- relationship between theory and practice: 
 
ÒTheory is not conceptualization in the sense of forming a mere 
Ôreflection/imageÕ of the real, rather it is a reflection upon the real; thus, it 
is the logical reconstruction of the real that inevitably amounts to 
changing reality. Similarly, revolutionary politics is not a reflection of the 
physical reality of a revolutionary class; rather, it is the reflecting upon the 
revolutionary conditions that emancipates the class and the society in 
general. Just as reality of the society should strive to reach up to the 
point of theory, so the same can be said with regard to revolutionary 
politics and practices.Ó60 
 
This argument needs to be taken in two ways. First, it is a criticism of the 
sociological and anthropological approach to studying Gezi. The accusation 
is that what is being studied occurs on the level of experience, but not on 
explanation; or, in other words, that the root conditions of the event are 
being left unexplained, while the outward manifestations (discourse, 
strategies, mobilization etc.) are heralded as the keys to understanding 
Gezi. (To be fair, one might here also observe that AzeriÕs own approach, 
and in particular the focus on a ÔcontinuingÕ class struggle, may well fall 
prey to an overtly determinist interpretation of Gezi, which might be 
remedied precisely by those ÔoutwardÕ accounts). Secondly, we can 
determine here an attempt to conceptualize the idea of the 
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Ôreflection/image of the realÕ, neither just in the way in which Gezi both 
holds up a mirror to the ruling party, nor in the warping of reality that 
occurs through the Gezi disruption: Instead, the ÔrealÕ is here subject to 
various assaults. First, the protests that challenge the ÔrealÕ narrative of 
the exponentially successful Turkish model; secondly, the new reality 
within the performative and politicizes (utopian) spaces during GeziÕs 
occupation; and finally, the ÔrealÕ of the way in which Gezi becomes 
ÔhistoryÕ, that is, subject to historical and sociological interpretation rather 
than as an event in being as such. In this thesis, I intend to add another 
level or layer of the ÔrealÕ relating to Gezi, and this takes on the 
counterintuitive function of the seeming ÔunrealÕ. In other words, I want to 
take into consideration the way in which the State response, and in 
particular the accusations of conspiracy against Gezi, mark yet another 
way in which the ÔrealityÕ of Gezi park becomes contested. 
 
To put this in a somewhat less abstract sense, this also means that in 
order to understand the political function of conspiracy theory in Turkey 
we must consider the ways in which forms of Ôpopular thoughtÕ can have 
very real political outcomes, or indeed become embraced by the political 
elite. In this sense Turkey may not be a unique case. Alfred Moore 
suggests that ÔinternalÕ conspiracy theories have become popularized in 
the 20th century above ÔexternalÕ ones. In other words, conspiracy theory 
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becomes more integrated into the popular interpretation of the State and 
less used as a means by which to antagonize ÔforeignÕ conspirators.61 
In order to think of conspiracy theory in Turkey along the lines of Ôpopular 
knowledgeÕ production one might think of Clare BirchallÕs book ÕKnowledge 
Goes PopÕ she introduces a chart of sorts by which to create a cross-
section of the various ways in which (popular) knowledge becomes 
legitimized. I would like to use the same graph here, so as to suggest 




In the above chart, there is a distinction between four ÔtypesÕ of 
knowledge: Official, Popular, Legitimate and Illegitimate. These are divided 
into two axes, one revolving around the antinomies between 
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popular/official knowledge, and the other divided between 
illegitimate/legitimate knowledge. The implication is that knowledge can 
therefore exist as a form of Ôillegitimate/legitimate popular knowledgeÕ or 
as Ôillegitimate/legitimate official knowledge. The question, then, is where 
to place conspiracy theory. According to the above chart, it might be best 
located in the grey zone of ÔCÕ; that is to say, between illegitimate and 
popular knowledge. However this is where I think one can best see 
conspiracy theory as a type of knowledge that subverts the 
illegitimate/legitimate antinomy, being rather by its very nature intensely 
occupied with the notion of a contested Ðand anticipated- refutation of its 
own legitimacy, thereby achieving a sort of non-sanctioned, consensual 
legitimacy. In this sense, conspiracy theory plays the binaries of 
official/popular knowledge against each other. This is particularly true 
when conspiracy theory takes on the mantle of a paranoid form of Ôofficial 
knowledgeÕ. Such narratives almost always build on the perception of 
contested legitimacy, diminished sovereignty, and of Ðdare we say it in 
this supposedly post-ideological era- a return to the forceful sway of 
(competing) ideologies. This, in turn, means that conspiracy theory also 
problematizes the idea of ÔideologyÕ or Ôrevolutionary knowledgeÕ as 
situated in the chart between official and illegitimate knowledge. Indeed, 
this is where the chart is at its least convincing. Official, yet illegitimate 
forms of knowledge are precisely those that claim to know of 
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revolutionary activity and thereby seek to legitimize forms of political 
persecution.  
As a secondary critique, one might also cite the postmodern attitude that 
all knowledge is ideological, thereby denying the possibility of ideology as 
a categorical form of knowledge. The problem therefore is that these 
narratives are all too readily repackaged as xenophobic, discriminatory and 
racist accusations; usually against already vulnerable sections of the 
population. That is to say, conspiracy theory is all too often a weapon 
used by the strong to persecute the weak. Conspiracy theory therefore 
functions on a similar level as populist rhetoric. It is both employed as a 
form of elite framing (official knowledge) as well as bowing towards 
popular fears and anxieties (popular knowledge). What this means is that 
when we speak here of ÔknowledgeÕ, what is really meant is a signifier (or, 
to put this in the post-structuralist terminology, as a Ôfloating signifierÕ62), 
detached from the sign, and deriving resonance from this uncertain truth-
content. In sum, it can mean many things to many people, yet meanwhile 
remains nigh on indeterminable in any positive sense. 
To apply the above chart to the Turkish case requires a certain level of 
generalization. In terms of official knowledge one might cite, for example, 
the educational tools distributed by the government following the coup, 
so as to ensure that schools will begin historicizing the coup attempt as a 
historical instance of Turkish martyrdom to preserve democracy. Yet in 
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this case such an attempt deliberately tries to render the coup into a 
symbolic rather than purely descriptive event, thereby quickly merging 
towards a form of illegitimate knowledge (or, according to the logic of the 
chart, ideological or revolutionary knowledge). On the other hand, we can 
identify in a popular response to the coup Ðfor example the notion that 
the Government may have orchestrated it- two different iterations of 
popular knowledge. The illegitimate version being that which is strictly 
speaking conspiratorial; the other, that of Ôcommon senseÕ or ÔtabloidÕ 
knowledge, which lauds the Government for its decisive action to purge 
society from those it believes associated with the coup. 
One might achieve a similar such split when regarding the Gezi protests. 
The official narrative, and hence knowledge, (or at least attempt to 
produce a form of knowledge) holds that Gezi is either the result of 
nefarious conspirators (illegitimate official knowledge), or, that it was the 
result of a youth-revolt which may have had its reasons but nevertheless 
was repressed for political reasons (legitimate official knowledge). On the 
other hand, one can identify two forms of popular knowledge of Gezi, one 
which identifies Gezi as being the result of grassroots organizing mixed 
with a common-sense revulsion towards the police violence (legitimate 
popular knowledge), or alternately, to view Gezi as an unidentifiable, 
multifaceted, purely contingent Ðperhaps even conspiratorial-event 
(illegitimate popular knowledge). Again, these four categories are by no 
means in and of themselves sufficient. But as a starting point they can 
 78 
help us set out the conditions by which to demonstrate how the notion of 
conspiracy theory Ðand the framing of conspiracy theory- blurs the lines, 
and benefits from the ultimate disparity of such lines, to create alternate 
forms of the ÔrealityÕ of these events. 
In order to trace how these four points of knowledge can be related to the 
case-specific knowledge production in Turkey following Gezi and the coup, 
I would like to employ another table; again inspired by what Birchall refers 
to as a Ôknowledge-scapeÕ of competing forms of truth. 
In the second application of the knowledge-scape chart, Birchall begins to 
break down the various ways in which popular knowledge is produced, 
legitimized and disseminated. This final element is categorized as ÔcriteriaÕ, 
which examines the use function (i.e. the motivation for its production); 
hence also giving us an insight into the conditions of its (anticipated) 
dissemination. Below I have included BirchallÕs version of this table, so that 
we can think of how this might be applied to the Turkish case. To begin 
with, she distinguished between four categories of knowledge: (1) the 
knowledge economy; (2) knowledge within the humanities; (3) popular 
knowledge; (4) and indigenous knowledge. This final form of knowledge is 
part of a ÔlocalizedÕ knowledge, that is to say, regional or culturally specific 
forms of knowledge, which can also include certain prejudices, and 
(historical) paranoia of given communities. 
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Let us briefly summarize. The general category of the knowledge economy 
is that which produces knowledge within the private sector. It legitimizes 
this knowledge through the process of dissemination, which is therefore 
the criterion of Ôcommercial useÕ. This is unique to this category. That is to 
say, only in the knowledge economy is the legitimacy of the knowledge 
produced by means of the dissemination through commercial means itself. 
This is the stark opposite of knowledge in the humanities (i.e. universities), 
in which the legitimization occurs entirely within the interior institution and 
the affiliated gatekeepers; through which then a hierarchy emerges that 
produces certain criteria. This can therefore occur to a high degree with 
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relatively low dissemination. Dissemination therefore often being a result 
rather than a precondition of legitimized work. 
Popular knowledge functions differently again. Here there is no clearly 
defined site of production, although the internet may be one of the 
broadest areas from which popular knowledge stems. This means that a 
different sort of knowledge ÔcurrencyÕ has to legitimize the production of 
knowledge without the existence of an overarching institution. The way 
this takes place is through (press) accreditation, expert opinions, online 
personalities and various other forms of social legitimization. Oftentimes 
what this means is that the legitimacy of popular knowledge becomes 
dependent on its rejection through the other categories of knowledge 
production. This is where popular knowledge quickly becomes 
conspiratorial.  So, for example, if a particular expression of popular 
knowledge cannot be expressed in the academe or in the mainstream 
media, then this makes other avenues Ðusually the internet- a viable way 
for it to be (re)produced and disseminated. As we shall see in this thesis, 
sometimes the fact that a particular form of knowledge (usually 
conspiratorial) is considered unpublishable within the mainstream, only 
further lends it credence Ðits non-consensual, illegitimate information 
therefore becoming a form of legitimization in and of itself. Finally, Birchall 
includes Ôindigenous knowledgeÕ as an umbrella term for Ôlocalized sitesÕ of 
knowledge production. In the study of conspiracy theories these forms of 
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knowledge can be particularly revealing, because they often show 
generalizable suspicions and prejudices among certain communities. 
Of course it is necessary to add here that these four ÔspheresÕ of 
knowledge production are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, 
it is viable to argue that universities are now also subject to the 
(neoliberal) knowledge economy, inasmuch as popular knowledge now 
informs mainstream news (think, for example, how the BBC features 
tweets from its audience, etc.). And finally, when one considers what 
media what consumes, often this choice is already to some extent 
predetermined by various forms of what Birchall terms ÔindigenousÕ 
knowledge. To that extent none of these sphere can be seen to function in 
strict isolation. The separation of each of these categories allows rather 
for a higher degree of specificity within the broader examination of 
knowledge production. In the first chapter I will further theorize these 
sphere of knowledge production by employing the Foucauldian approach 
to different conditions for the production of knowledge (in her own book, 
Birchall also follows this table with a discussion of FoucaultÕs formulation 
of the signifier power/knowledge to examine how certain knowledgeÕs 
flourish why others remain relatively marginal. I will return to this in 
chapter one, in which I provide a more in-depth theoretical account of the 
theories of conspiracy theory. 
For now the question is whether these fairly general categories can be 
applied to the Turkish case, and whether this can tell us anything about 
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the functioning of conspiracy theory as a political narrative. Interestingly, 
in the Turkish case we can see conspiratorial narratives being produced in 
all four of these categories barring one: Turkish universities. This is not to 
say that there is absolutely no evidence of conspiratorial or paranoid 
narratives within Turkish universities. However, universities do not by and 
large appear to distribute conspiratorial ÔcontentÕ. This may be due to the 
highly internal, and circular dissemination of information and knowledge 
production within the academe. In other words, it is not just that 
universities have higher standards of verification and gate keeping, but 
since their dissemination does not influence their legitimacy and there is 
no direct financial incentive for enhanced dissemination (as, say, in the 
media), conspiracy theories remain relatively rare. That is to say, we can 
identify conspiratorial narratives proliferating in the knowledge economy, 
in popular knowledge, and in indigenous knowledge(s).63 
 
Adding to this, the thesis situates conspiracy theory within the broader 
contentions of social movements, resistance, and state response, which 
begets the question where one might choose to locate a correlation 
between the literature on conspiracy theory and social protest. Among 
rationalist scholars of social movements, such as Zald and McCarthy, who 
based their ideas on the 1960s understanding of Ôvalue-addedÕ theoryÕ, 
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the main focus of social and political mobilization was grievance-based.64 
With the evolution of social movements in the 1980s and Ô90s, the 
influence of formal Social Movement Organizations (SMO) and 
transnational issues incorporated issues of global strategic mobilization 
beyond clear grievances. This resulted in the closer study of networks, 
contentious action, and resource mobilization.65 One can identify a similar 
development, a broadening of scope as it were, in the study of conspiracy 
theory. In this case, conspiracy theory goes from constituting specific 
case-oriented grievances, prejudices, and suspicions, towards a more 
holistic understanding of the way in which conspiracy theories serve to 
underline shifting opportunity structures and perceived 
inequalities/uncertainties with regards to the production of knowledge, 
which in turn, is closely associated with access to power.  
 
There has also been a revision of the strategy-heavy approach of SMO 
analysis with inclusive views of SMOs re-emphasizing the cultural, 
ideological and identity-driven processes that shape SMO interaction and 
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development.66 Moving away from the idea of movement activities as 
purely voluntary need-based associations, the study of SMOs argued that 
the characteristics, variations, in formalization and professionalization 
including paid leadership and formal structures were vital to 
understanding SMOs. What these studies failed to take into consideration 
was how state response itself also underwent significant changes, 
particularly in regard to framing and international expectations. State 
response is not a mere normative issue, and is vital to the culture, 
symbolism, and success of social movements. The inclusion of categories 
of state response should therefore be considered as a logical addition to 
the continuation of social movement theory, instead of being treated as a 
static phenomenon. The attempt to bring the state back into the core 
literature, beyond the traditional focus on three forms of state repression 
- state-sponsored terrorism, human rights violations, and political purges - 
builds upon scholarship regarding the so-called Ôrepression decision 
processÕ but is deserving of a broader analytical consideration.67 
                                     
66 Doug, McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.), Comparative perspectives 
on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings 
(Cambridge, 1996); Jack L. Walker, Mobilizing interest groups in America: Patrons, 
professions, and social movements (Detroit, 1991); Mayer Zald, ÔIdeologically structured 
action: An enlarged agenda for social movement researchÕ, Mobilization: An International 
Quarterly 5.1 (2000), pp. 1-16; 
67 Christian Davenport, ÔThe weight of the past: Exploring lagged determinants of 
political repressionÕ, Political Research Quarterly 49.2 (1996), pp. 377-403; Francesca 
Polletta and James M. Jasper, ÔCollective identity and social movementsÕ, Annual review 
of Sociology 27.1 (2001), pp. 283-305; Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, ÔRepression of 
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In this thesis I do not equate the study of conspiracy theory directly with 
that of social movements, nor for that matter do I provide a taxonomical 
account of conspiracy narratives appertaining to protest causes and 
outcomes. Instead I have attempted to situate the study of conspiracy 
within the interaction and contestation of forces that provide the 
meaning (or lack thereof) of the state/protest contestation itself. The 
central innovation here, with regard to studies of resistance and 
democratization, is an emphasis on conspiracy theory as process, rather 
than as a distinctive normative phenomenon. 
 
Original Contribution and Research Objectives 
 
My original contribution to research in the area consists of the analysis of 
conspiracy theory as elite framing in the post-Gezi political landscape in 
Turkey. My study of conspiracy theory in Turkey differs from others in 
the field because it looks at conspiracy theory as a mode of elite framing, 
and as part of a systemic state response to social protest and societal 
contentions rather than examining it as a one-sided reactionary 
mechanism to diminishing political opportunity structures or fringe 
political convictions. In turn, it offers a reversal of sorts of the social-
                                                                                                           
human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysisÕ, American Political 
Science Review 88.4 (1994), pp. 853-872. 
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movement oriented literature on resistance in Turkey, and instead 
situates framing as part of a state response to (contingent) resistance.  
 
The topic of conspiracy theory as part of a broader politics of paranoid 
misinformation has attracted much speculation and popular attention in 
the past year, but has not merited rigorous scholarly analysis, certainly so 
far as Turkish politics is concerned. Nor, for that matter, have the existing 
popular tracts on the idea of Ôpost-truthÕ given rise to any theoretically 
consistent definition or application of such a term. My study provides the 
beginnings of a critical examination of the circumstances under which a 
conspiracy theory becomes popularized to illustrate a specific form of 
contentious and/or paranoid politics, and situates this within the case 
study of contemporary Turkish political rhetoric. 
 
The most original parts of my thesis are those that discuss the 2016 
failed coup attempt. While there has been a slow increase in studies 
acknowledging the impact of the coup attempt on the future of Turkish 
democracy, my approach here is original to the extent that it links the 
state response to the Gezi protests with that of the response to the coup 
attempt to provide original insights into the relationship between the two 
events, the state response thereto, and the role that conspiracy theory 









Chapter 1  
Frames and Boundaries of Conspiracy Theory  
 
Turkey is undergoing an era of sustained political upheaval. Amidst 
divergent manifestations of adversarial framing, conspiracy theories, and 
political repression, political narratives of the unreal merge with real 
political decision-making processes. In the first chapter of this thesis I 
argue that to understand the discursive content of (elite) conspiratorial 
framing requires us to first examine conspiracy theoryÕs uniquely 
ambiguous relationship towards the idea of a truly definable truth 
content. In other words, this chapter begins with an analysis of the 
relative ÔcontentÕ of conspiratorial discourse. 
An interesting puzzle animates the contemporary discussion of conspiracy 
theory. On the one hand, the general assumption exists that it is a fringe 
phenomenon, whose adherents border on the spectrum of derangement 
or neurosis. Yet on the other hand Ð as becomes evident from consuming 
all manner of contemporary media Ð conspiratorial narratives and 
interpretations have become a mainstream, even popular, form of rhetoric 
(or, as this chapter would have it, logic) with which to mobilize support 
for, or opposition to, seemingly interchangeable political positions. This is 
certainly true in the Turkish context, where conspiratorial accusations fuel 
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a veritable political purge of governmental, legislative and academic 
institutions, but before we delve more deeply into a discussion of 
conspiracy theory in Turkey, this thesis proposes a rethinking of 
conspiracy theory that challenges the following assumptions: (1) that it is 
an interpretative mechanism of the politically marginalized, (2) that it is 
an illogical system of beliefs, and (3) that it cannot but result in eventual 
ÔdebunkingÕ. In other words, this chapter posits that (a) conspiracy theory 
is gainfully employed by the political elite in Turkey; (b) that there is a 
distinctive and discernible ÔlogicÕ to the functioning of conspiracy theory, 
and (c), that this belies a system of thought, and even a strategic 
necessity for the reconsolidation of narrative agency following resistance 
such as the Gezi protests. 
In academic and popular literature the term Ôconspiracy theoryÕ is 
associated with the fantastical, the paranoid or even mental illness.68 
Subscribing to conspiratorial beliefs is seen as a sign of irrationality, 
                                     
 
68 Charles Pigden, ÔComplots of MischiefÕ, in David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories 
(Farnham, 2006). See also Susan Feldman, ÔCounterfact Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (2011), pp. 15Ð24; Neil Levy, ÔRadically 
Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, Episteme 2 (2007), pp. 181Ð92; Juha 
Rikk, ÔOn Political Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2009), pp. 
185Ð201; S. Clarke, ÔConspiracy Theories and Conspiracy TheorizingÕ, Philosophy of the 




mental instability, social exclusion or even (religious) fundamentalism.69 
Yet both on a sociological level and in a more theoretical context, this 
does not seem to make sense. If belief in conspiracy is such a fringe 
conviction, then why does it enjoy such mass popularity? Cultural studies 
have already questioned this premise, focusing instead on how conspiracy 
theories can be read as a reflection of traumatic events and a breakdown 
of meaning in the body politic. Yet such studies perpetuate the 
assumption that conspiracy theory can be explained as a reactionary 
impulse, a coping mechanism as it were, to comprehend a complex global 
politics.  
This type of argument is mired in the mistaken assumption that 
conspiracy theories are an indicator of the relatively weak cognitive 
capacities of certain individuals. And by extension, they are seen as 
indicative of a societal failure to eradicate such irrational beliefs from the 
public sphere. This is not only an unfair assumption, it is ultimately an 
invalid one.70 This chapter argues that conspiracy theory does not exist 
primarily as a breakdown of reason in a supposedly confused populace. 
Instead, conspiracy theory, and conspiratorial politics, should be seen as 
                                     
69 Brian L. Keeley, ÔGod as the Ultimate Conspiracy TheoryÕ, Episteme 2 (2007), pp. 
135Ð49. See also Michael Baumann, ÔRational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of 
Fundamentalist BeliefsÕ, Episteme 2 (2007), pp. 150Ð66. 
 
70 David Coady broached a similar argument, when he asked Ôare conspiracy theorists 
irrational?Õ. See David Coady, ÔAre Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?Õ, Episteme 2 (2007), 
pp. 193Ð204. Here, I propose we go one step further and ask whether conspiracy theory 
is perhaps even more rational than the supposedly pure empirical ideas upheld against it.  
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an active agent of authoritarian politics and creeping totalitarianism, a 
palimpsest in which an ill-informed citizenry have been blamed for their 
suspension of disbelief, when all evidence points towards a wholesale 
erasure of rational politics by the political class itself.  
There exists indeed an internalized notion in the literature on conspiracy 
theory that a ÔhealthyÕ, ÔthrivingÕ civil society is one that shares a rational, 
non-conspiratorial consensus. In other words, mass adherence to 
conspiratorial beliefs is equated with a failure of civic participation, 
education, etc. This makes sense when one considers the reverse 
position, that a conspiratorial society can be a healthy one, begetting 
vigilant citizens practicing a healthy scepticism about power. But do we 
take MillÕs tract on the value of scepticism as an indicator of the healthy 
progression of a civil society as an argument in favour of conspiracy 
theory or against? After all, it is easy to be sceptical as to the veracity of 
a conspiracy theory. The answer to this question should be that since the 
conspiracy theory is actively meant to provoke disbelief, the scepticism 
implicit in such theories is in fact itself the driving force, not the 
outcome, of the process. To put this somewhat more simply, the idea of 
conspiracy theory, whether verifiable or not, already contains an explicit 
challenge to the possibility of agreeable truths, and points towards the 
agency implicit in ÔconsensualÕ forms of truth. In other words, conspiracy 
theory effectively posits an attack on any given system of truth, but 
seeks to disrupt and repeal it, not replace it. Conspiracy theory must 
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therefore always hang in the balance, in anticipation of its fulfillment or 
disavowal, but pregnant with meaning and impact nonetheless. 
The counter-question we might therefore ask ourselves is one that keeps 
in mind MillÕs premise of certainty as requiring absolute certainty.71 With 
conspiracy theory, on the other hand, we must keep in mind that it 
remains forever fixed in a type of reasoning that remains inherent to the 
doubt-centric Cartesian Ômethod of doubtÕ, which effectively casts the 
individual or the human subject as the sole arbiter of his morality, choice 
and will, demonstrates also the limits of such an approach. In other words, 
the ÔcertaintyÕ of the conspiratorial mode of thought derives precisely 
from its lack of absolute certainty. It is the concept of absolute certainty 
itself that raises the specter of the conspiratorial possibility. This effect is 
only increased when the conspiratorial framing occurs as part of an elite 
framing mechanism. In this, the conspiratorial frame, when employed by 
political elites, takes on the guise of being both insider and outsider. After 
all, in our study of conspiracy theory it has proven senseless to simply 
dismiss conspiracy theorists as outsiders, now that some of TurkeyÕs 
leading politicians are ardent and vocal supporters of such theories 
themselves. In this mode, to view the study of conspiracy as one of 
binary opposites between certainty and doubt means that we remain 
stuck between scepticism and cynicism, rather than situating the claims 
themselves within their oppositional relation. Therefore, my suggestion 
                                     
71 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859), p. 37. 
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here would be that we should not think of conspiracy as an indicator of 
the relative ÔhealthÕ or ÔailmentÕ of any given society. Instead, we should 
inquire into the power relations that allow such normative assumptions to 
gain traction in the first place. 
To put this figuratively, we would be better served considering conspiracy 
theory as a primal instinct of the strong, rather than as a last resort of 
the weak. For if political elites can employ conspiratorial framing to justify 
the repression of their opponents, then surely it cannot suffice to argue 
that belief in conspiracy theory is correlative with being a marginalized or 
irrational member of society.  
When the Turkish political elite invokes conspiracy theories, one is 
supposed to assume the existence of hidden machinations of a de facto 
hostile intent, the so-called parallel state or anti-Turkish ÔlobbyÕ. The idea 
that the conspiratorial Other is a perpetual antagonist to Turkish politics 
means it can take on different forms, but is conveniently used to justify 
ever more repressive political action. This makes it difficult to voice 
opposition, or to present meaningful resistance within the political system 
itself. And in turn, when this resistance takes shape outside the political 
sphere, as it did during the Gezi protests or the coup, it only further 
perpetuates the idea of a conspiratorial Other. The relationship between 
conspiracy and reality thus assumes a distinctly circular, closed and self-
necessitating logic. The point, then, and this cannot be stressed enough, 
is that what is most ÔrealÕ in conspiracy theory is the theory, not the 
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conspiracy. One way to think of this is as a system of thought, and not an 
affliction. In turn, this is borne out through the systematic way in which it 
becomes incorporated into elite framing of resistance to the status quo.72 
This does not mean that the conspiratorial subject is without importance. 
On the contrary, there remains a necessary dualism between the idea of 
the friend and the enemy, and the subjectÐobject relationship that 
endows both with meaning. The conspiracy itself can remain unfulfilled, as 
long as the theory endows the paranoid politician with the constitutive 
force of his accusation. If we follow this reasoning to its logical 
conclusion, it becomes clear that the State and its strongmen have much 
                                     
72 Much like the methodology proposed here, the study of framing emerged in part from 
the social movement literature (Robert D. Benford and David Snow, ÔFraming Processes 
and Social Movements: An Overview and AssessmentÕ, Annual Review of Sociology 26 
(2000), pp. 611Ð39), but has been adapted as an analytical tool in conflict resolution 
and conflict analysis studies. Much of the focus has been on framing ethnic or minority 
relations in conflict-ridden communities and societies. The focus on framing these groups 
has been defined as the analysis of a Ôconscious strategic effort to shape shared 
understandings of an ethnic group, its recent memories, grievances, and boundariesÕ 
(Neophytos Loizides, Designing Peace: Cyprus and Institutional Innovations in Divided 
Societies (Philadelphia, 2016) p. 54. What stands out here in regard to the study of 
conspiratorial framing is the Ôconscious strategicÕ element. It is this part of the equation 
that must be examined in more detail if we are to suggest, as I do, that conspiratorial 
framing can in fact be a political strategy, or part of one, in its own right. The claim, 
then, is that the strategic element of conspiratorial framing consists of two levels of 
strategic benefit. The first is the opportunist manipulation of the protestÕs success in 
moving politics into the realm of the symbolic; the second, the capitalization upon this 
vacuum to reassert a hegemonic narrative of nationalist and majoritarian dominance as 
part of the state response thereto. This discussion of what I refer to as Ôthe conspiracy 
frameÕ is continued in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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to gain from the idea of a parallel state, as it necessitates the legitimacy 
of their power.  
In sum the stronger the State, the more aggrieved its opponents will be, 
and the more strongly they will assert themselves, at least in the 
majoritarian interpretation of democracy so common in Turkish politics 
today, in which the begetting of power justifies the repression of 
opposition, rather than the consensual politics required to sustain 
legitimacy. To this degree it is easy to see the merits of PigdenÕs counter-
intuitive insight when he describes the politico as Ôthe true devotee of 
conspiracyÕ.73 Not in the sense that an actual conspiracy exists Ð as we 
shall see, this is largely, albeit perhaps not necessarily always evidently, 
irrelevant Ð but rather that in all conceptualizations of conspiracy, the 
threat is seen as intrinsically linked to the strength of the State. The 
politico is not only the true devotee of conspiracy. He is also its main 
benefactor and even beneficiary. 
There is a difference between the theory on conspiracy theory, and the 
theory implied in conspiracy theory. This is a seemingly evident 
differentiation at first glance, but one that in the literature on conspiracy 
has gone largely uncommented upon. In turn, this means that such 
studies emphasize the former rather than the latter Ð if the latter is even 
                                     
73 Charles Pigden, ÔPopper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?Õ, 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 (1995), p. 6. 
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recognized at all. This is understandable. After all, in order to write and 
think about conspiracy in a way that does not render oneÕs own work 
conspiratorial, the distinction has to be made that it is a theory on, or of, 
conspiracy theory. The outcome of such reasoning, in effect, is that it 
neglects the theory implicit in conspiracy theory and relegates it to a 
comfortably distant position, seemingly ensuring that under no condition 
will its untruth and supposed irrationality leak out to contaminate the 
ÔpurityÕ of scholarly analysis.  
But conspiracy theory is not toxic, and should not be treated thus. To be 
sure, I do not wish to discern here how the theory in conspiracy can best 
be made to fit within rival epistemic (subjective) theories of truth (for 
example, the correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory, the 
evidence theory, and the pragmatic and instrumentalist theories), nor to 
fit conspiracy within a metalogical subjectivist position of truth. Instead I 
want to really understand the dynamics of conspiracy theory on its own 
terms. And for this we need at least to think more critically about the 
implications of what theory means in conspiracy theory.  
But what makes conspiracy theory? For one thing, it is precisely the 
unlikeliest of theories that are scientifically most viable to us as truth-
seekers in the Cartesian mode. After all, if testable, and proven to be 
(in)correct, they can change the way in which we see the world. So too 
with conspiracy theory, at least to the extent that it makes a truth 
contestation. In other words, a conspiracy theory mimics its scientific 
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namesake to the extent that it beggars belief but is just plausible enough 
to entertain our desire to know. But it also contends that the given 
parameters of the production of knowledge are insufficient to determine 
its veracity.  
Ergo, conspiracy theory is less interested in the pursuit of truth than in 
demonstrating the falsehood of knowledge production. This renders it 
essentially an anti-theory. A conspiracy theory undermines the premise of 
scientific verifiability in that it creates what is essentially a winÐwin 
dynamic, in which Ðeven if debunked Ð it can remain true in its capacity as 
a contestation of the production of knowledge. It is therefore not a 
matter of determining whether a conspiracy theory is verifiable or not. 
Rather, we must consider how it becomes parasitic on the very idea of 
objective truth and its pursuit. In turn, this makes conspiracy theory a 
radical disorientation of truth, rather than a de facto truth claim. 
Conspiracy theory thus appears a more deserving object of scrutiny than 
mere conspiracy theory.  
One way to put this is to observe a basic antinomy. Conspiracy theory 
creates a tension between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of 
the production of knowledge. As such, it exists purposefully in a state of 
possible error, creating a parallax effect and prompting the affect of 
determining the relative truthlikeness of its position, rather than 
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necessitating any truth-content (Wahrheitsgehalt) as such.74 Stephen Jay 
Gould in his meditations on the necessary untruth of some scientific 
theories cites ParetoÕs witticism, Ôgive me a fruitful error any time, full of 
seeds, bursting with its own correctionsÕ.75 But with conspiracy theory, 
we may well flip the premise of this quip around to mean the exact 
reverse. The error is not fruitful because it elicits corrections. It is 
fruitfully erroneous because it is a correction, not to truth, but to the 
production of truth.  
Its relationship to the truth is therefore not that of being testable, but it 
is that of testing truth as a regulative idea. This demands of us that we 
consider conspiracy theory not only as a reaction to the notion of a 
regulative truth, but acknowledge it as what is essentially a counter-
regulative truth. Conspiracy theory posits an untruth, precisely so as to 
negate any contesting truth that it deems structurally dangerous to its a 
priori truth claim. What can we glean from this paradox? Conspiracy 
                                     
 
74 I refer to Wahrheitsgehalt here in the Adornian sense, as the allowance of a dialectical 
aesthetic truth, rather than standard theories of correspondence/coherence/pragmatic 
truth: Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (reprint, London, 2004). See also Simon 
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AdornoÕs Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (London, 1991). 
 
75 Stephen J. Gould, HenÕs Teeth and HorseÕs Toes: Further Reflections in Natural History 
(London, 1994), p. 83. 
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theories question the production of knowledge, not simply knowledge 
itself.  
 
Conspiracy of Winners, Not Losers 
Even if conspiracy theory is sought as a mental refuge of sorts when a 
given idea, a tradition, a system of relations, or (imaginary) community is 
perceived to be under threat, this holds true not just for minority groups. 
On the contrary, conspiracy theories are invoked just as readily when 
majority groups, political parties, and even systems, see themselves 
coming under attack.  
For when majority groups, political parties and even entire political 
systems find their popularity, and even their legitimacy, cast into doubt, 
conspiratorial politics can become a strategic alternative. We need to take 
into account the very real possibility that conspiracy theory is as much a 
narrative of political elites as it is of the politically marginalized. Consider 
the following: if conspiracy theories are propounded under conditions of 
erosion, of the collapse of certainties under the pressures of modernity, 
and the confounding complexities of societal issues and the emerging 
contradictions of a globalized world, then why should this not also be at 
least as true for the political elite? Two primary observations can be made 
regarding conspiracy theory as the praxis of the political elite. One, it 
forms a contestation not of truth, but of the determining agency implicit 
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in truth. Second, it posits an (imaginary) antagonistic subject Ð one part 
of an imaginary revolutionary Ð by which to justify its agency as arbiter of 
said truth, and by proxy solidifies the justification required to secure 
continued political legitimacy. 
Our next premise should therefore be that conspiracy theory and, hence, 
accusations of conspiracy are in fact employed by ÔwinnersÕ, that is, the 
political elite, as a political strategy by which to isolate and vilify political 
opposition. As such, conspiracy theory should not be seen as the sole 
prerogative of political losers, as the literature currently suggests. I do 
concur with the literature to the extent that it seems evident that 
participation in the dissemination of conspiracy theories Ð let us not feign 
to know whether this constitutes a ÔbeliefÕ Ð correlates positively with a 
perceived yet indeterminable threat to a given way of life, or even the 
idea of unperceived agency, the so-called Ôagency panicÕ.76 But this 
cannot hold true for politically ÔweakÕ groups, political losers, alone.  
In the case of the so-called ÔNew TurkeyÕ and the political style pioneered 
by the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which achieves populist 
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support through an innovative blend of free market rhetoric, nationalism 
and religious conservatism,77 it is my contention that these attributes can 
be linked through an overarching idea of framing opposition as conspiracy, 
and setbacks Ð be they economic, social or political Ð as evidence of 
secret scheming. In a way, there is already a form of misinformation at 
work in the determinist optimism of the idea of an exponentially 
successful Turkey; a Turkey that can somehow overcome the seemingly 
insurmountable contradictions between being on the one hand a 
global(ized), liberal, free-marketeering force of secular boosterism, and on 
the other, a conservative, populist and strictly isolationist regional 
champion of Neo-Ottoman, Kemalist, or perhaps even ÔErdoğanistÕ 
politics.78  
                                     
 
77 An illustrative account of the emergence of the AK Party, and its optimistic prospects, 
, can be found in Ergu zbudun, ÔFrom Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The 
Case of the Justice and Development Party in TurkeyÕ, South European Society and 
Politics 3 (2006), pp. 543Ð57. See also Ahmet Insel, ÔThe AKP and Normalizing 
Democracy in TurkeyÕ, South Atlantic Quarterly 3 (2003), pp. 293, 308. 
 
78 This admittedly ambiguous term is sometimes used to indicate the possibility of a 
systematic Erdoğan doctrine of polarization, paranoia and popularism. While it is not 
commonly used in the analytic sense, I find it interesting because it suggests systemic 
agency rather than pop-psychological attributes of ErdoğanÕs leadership style The term 
seems to have become popular around 2015, perhaps following the Turkish general 
election. A selection of examples in which it is used can be found in Ahmet T. Kuru, 
ÔTurkeyÕs Failed Policy Towards the Arab SpringÕ, Mediterranean Quarterly 3 (2015); 
Cagdas Dedeoglu and Hasan Aksakal, ÔThe Contradictions of Erdoğanism: Political 
Triumph versus Socio-Cultural FailureÕ, in Guenes Kc and Harun Aksu (eds), Another 
Brick in the Barricade: The Gezi Resistance and Its Aftermath (Bremen, 2015); Daryl 
 102 
Of course the strength that derives from this balancing act relies 
precisely on the fact that these categories are neither mutually exclusive 
nor, for that matter, particularly clear-cut concepts. Part of the appeal of 
the conspiracy theory in Turkish politics is therefore due to the fluidity of 
these changing identities; in the social movement literature these shifts 
are somewhat ambiguously referred to as shifting Ôopportunity 
structuresÕ. If we except conspiracy theory as (a) a reaction to uncertain 
circumstances and (b) a questioning of the production of knowledge, then 
this should point us in the direction of a conspiratorial political elite, not 
solely a conspiratorial populace. 
For now, points ÔaÕ and ÔbÕ require only limited elaboration, but, to avoid 
any unnecessary confusion, I will try briefly to explain why these two very 
basic beginning principles are vital to understanding conspiracy theory as 
a tactic of the political elite. For one, I remain very critical of the merits of 
a Ôcoping mechanismÕ interpretation of conspiracy theory. I reject the idea 
that they are the sole fancy of marginalized, ÔirrationalÕ individuals. 
However, if we fixate less on the subject, to instead determine the core 
of the contextual argument being made in such an assumption, it 
becomes clear that in any conspiracy theory Ðand in this case especially 
when wielded by the political elite Ð there must be an anticipated 
                                                                                                           
McCann, ÔThe Sins of Sultan ErdoğanÕ, Quadrant 10 (2015), pp. 42Ð7; Galip Dalay, 
ÔTurkeyÕs 7 June 2015 General Election: Significance versus NarrativeÕ, Al Jazeera Centre 
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breakdown between the promises of the political class and the societal 
outcomes thereof.  
The first point at which conspiracy theory becomes a viable political 
strategy is when expectations cannot be met: that is, when the system 
must seek the cause for its failures within itself, but does not wish to do 
so, indeed, cannot do so. This is when the first specter of the 
conspiratorial enemy is brought into being, precisely at the moment that 
mass resistance begins to form in response to the perceived inadequacies 
of the current system. Following from this, the questioning referred to in 
point ÔbÕ is therefore not of the legitimacy of any given system, 
government or policy, but rather a questioning of the forces necessitated 
for conceiving what is ÔtrueÕ in the first place. In other words, when 
resistance forms that questions the legitimacy of the political elite, the 
conspiratorial fiction (or untruth) presents itself as a colonization of the 
space of truth, rather than as a verifiable or rationally plausible entity. 
Simply put, genuine resistance is not simply dismissed. It is converted into 
evidence for the existence of the conspiratorial Other. 
This questioning is not as simple as it seems. After all, if one considers 
the Gezi protests (or even the coup for that matter) as themselves an 
example of a radical act of questioning, then this renders the political 
eliteÕs conspiratorial politics a form of counter-questioning, a state 
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response as it were, rather than a constitutive claim.79 But can there be 
such a thing as a pure counter-hegemony, especially when either position 
suggests an implicit denial of the otherÕs legitimacy, in other words, a 
relationship of necessity between its truth and the contestation thereof? 
Luckily for us, the answer to this problem is more straightforward than 
one might expect. Let me put it this way. If the Ôparanoid styleÕ does not 
consist of a mere questioning of the production of knowledge, but rather 
constitutes a claim on the power to distinguish truth from falsehood, then 
this means that it is always a question cast out into nothing, into the 
ether.80  
In this sense, conspiracy theory is a pure declarative. It rejects the 
possibility of dialogue or arguments to the contrary. But this is precisely 
what renders it a perfect tool of authoritarian politics. It embodies the 
totalitarian logic in which it exists for itself yet cannot sustain itself from 
within. It necessitates its implicit rejection, and must strive towards 
overcoming that which it cannot be, a non-conspiratorial, legitimate 
system. The totalitarian element of conspiracy theory is thus that it is 
                                     
 
79 For a critical analysis of Gezi as counter-hegemonic questioning and the radical 
contingency of GeziÕs political identities, see Funda Gencoglu Onbasi, ÔGezi Park Protests 
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seminal essay, and later book, on the paranoid narratives that shaped the American 
political discourse of the 1950s and Ô60s. See: Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics (New York, 2008). 
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paradoxically both self-necessitating yet utterly reliant on the disavowal 
of the supposed ÔotherÕ system it seeks to reject. The impossibility of this 
is both inevitable and necessary. 
In Turkey this impossibility takes on the form of an optimistic expectation 
of growth despite a stagnating economy, halting trade and tourism, 
expanding wars in its southeastern regions, and increased dissatisfaction 
with the political elite in primarily urban areas. The danger is that this 
dualism, between on the one hand a progressive and secular political 
project, and on the other, that of a conservative, religious-leaning and 
inward-gazing Turkey, becomes conflated in a clichd binary Ð a false one 
Ð along the lines of that commonly invoked metaphor of Turkey as a 
bridge between West and East.81  
The EastÐWest divide is held up as reconciliatory promise, a ÔmeetingÕ of 
cultures as it were, as much as it is cast as an unalterable opposition. In 
this sense it may be exactly in the competing forces, in the impossibility 
of maintaining such a stark dualism, that a breakdown of meaning occurs; 
a breakdown that, in turn, mirrors some of the distinct warping tropes of 
the idea of conspiracy theory. To understand conspiracy theory in Turkish 
                                     
 
81 For two excellent critiques (historical and political) of this outmoded EastÐWest bridge 
metaphor, see Alan M. Greaves, ÔExamining Turkey as a Bridge between East and WestÕ, 
Anatolian Studies 57 (2007), pp. 1Ð15; Nabil Al-Tikriti, ÔTurkey: A Bridge between East 
and West?Õ, Fair Observer, 9 March 2011, available at 
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/turkey-bridge-
between-east-and-west/ (accessed 24 May 2017). 
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politics, one must also challenge the mythos behind the notion of 
Turkishness as it exists in the age of Erdoğan. This induces a perpetual 
contestation that results in paralysis, not progress. In sum, Turkish 
democracy is not moving either forward or backwards. It is consuming 
itself. And in so doing, it cannot find explanations befitting of its own 
paradoxes, other than by locating them in the conspiratorial. Conspiracy 
theory thus becomes a convenient chrysalis for the StateÕs own 
contradictions Ð not to hide them, but to transform them, to emerge fully 
formed as what might well be referred to as Ômanaged democracyÕ.82 
In the conspiratorial mode, any resistance to the notion of a Turkish 
national destiny, or, for that matter, of a Turkish determinism in which 
even its halting democratization points towards its seemingly inevitable 
success, becomes merely further evidence of the supposed necessity of 
maintaining the status quo. As such, the notion of Turkish ÔprogressÕ has 
now become so detached from reality Ð both in domestic and 
international perspectives  Ð that the conspiratorial mode, which requires 
a conspiratorial Other as the renewed and reborn mythos of its own 
necessity, takes hold. It is therefore not simply a matter of finding a 
kernel of truth embedded in the premise of conspiracy theory. What is 
required instead is the tacit acceptance that, in the post-Gezi and post-
                                     
82 The term is mostly used to refer to the political electioneering associated with PutinÕs 
Russia, in which opposition and elections are carefully managed, and in some cases even 
stage-managed, to suggest a pluralized society and democracy rather than the 
emergence of an authoritarian state. 
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coup environment of Turkish politics, what constitutes the governmentÕs 
legitimacy is this very upholding of the failures that warrant resistance to 
it in the first place.  
Consider the almost Leibnizian element to the optimism implied in the 
idea of conspiracy theory as political praxis: that of the current status 
quo being the best possible system, evidenced by its many detractors.83 
This is a bizarre inversion, a perversion even, of the common idea of 
conspiracy, in which the State is seen as the puppet-master, not the 
other way around. But once the conspiratorial state, and by proxy the 
ensuing conspiratorial society from which it derives its support, finds its 
justification in such paradoxical optimism, the idea of the hidden enemy is 
invoked to explain each and every contingency to the State, and all 
resistance becomes conspiratorial. In sum, once the State takes on 
conspiracy theory as its raison dÕtre, a self-perpetuating form of 
(un)reason follows. In this erosion of certainty the conspiratorial state 
finds its purpose reborn as constitutive, legitimizing and, ultimately, 
hegemonic. Conspiracy emerges as a language for, and of, political 
winners. 
 
                                     
 
83 I refer here to the Leibnizian problem of Evil, that is, the necessary compatibility of 
evil and the almighty. See G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the 
Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil (transl. E.M. Huggard)(New Haven, CT, 2005), 
available at www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm (accessed 24 May 
2017). 
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Exploring the Logic of Conspiracy 
 
So rather than considering conspiracy theory as a coping mechanism of 
the marginalized, we should see it as a language of winners, that is, of 
those strong enough to make conspiratorial enemies out of their 
opponents. It panders to the idea of a pre-existing, forlorn supremacy, 
and superimposes a symbolic strongman ideal of the State as a means by 
which to overcome the fictitious nebulous forces that oppose its 
resurgence. Ironically, the consensus necessitated for such a form of 
exclusion can render this conspiratorial politics seemingly consensual, a 
joining of forces to combat a common enemy. But we must once more try 
to disentangle ourselves here from a preoccupation with the 
friend/enemy dynamic. Instead, what I mean to emphasize is the implicit 
contestation of knowledge, and in turn the production of a conspiratorial 
knowledge, that such a politics begets.  
If conspiracy theory can bring about Ð and serve to justify Ð real political 
decision-making, then what does this mean for the truth content of such 
a politics? Does conspiracy theory, through its articulation in politics, 
become essentially real? To explore this requires us to focus on 
conspiracy as a constitutive truth, not just a fabrication of truth; on a 
contesting truth-process, which reflects the necessity of its political 
paranoia by emphasizing the force required to distinguish truth from non-
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truth, friend from enemy, and manifest destiny from historical hiccup. In 
other words, we must examine how conspiracy theory forms its own 
reality. Let us then descend into the depths of such a politics, the better 
to explore its spelunkular logic.  
Our first encounter in this unknown world can be put in a Popperian sense. 
The first evident characteristic of the conspiratorial logic is that it seeks 
to ÔsecureÕ truth rather than allowing its pursuit or contestation. The idea 
that Ôtruth is often hard to come by, and that once found it may easily be 
lost againÕ,84 hence goes from being an emphasis on the pursuit of 
knowledge to one on safeguarding knowledge. For conspiracy theory to 
don the mantle of truth thus requires an emphasis on the elusiveness of 
truth and so provides a justification for its forceful retention. In turn, the 
pursuit of truth-detractors who challenge this truth becomes the 
founding principle of the real itself. A self-perpetuating loop ensues. The 
truth must be guarded against conspirators, but this truth cannot be 
questioned.  
Thus the truth becomes itself a conspiracy. Such truth is conspiratorial as 
much as its conspiracy constitutes the truth. What I mean to say is that 
conspiracy theory when elevated to political praxis warrants a truth 
implicit in the pursuit of truth itself. Its modus operandi becomes the 
                                     
 
84 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 
(London, 2002), p. 10. 
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truth, rather than constituting a pursuit of truth. For like the proverbial lie 
that begets many more, so too does any truth imply a counter-truth, 
even if this is a mere awareness of the momentary exclusions required for 
any form of consensus. And these, in turn, beget the conditions for a 
revenant truth to unfold. Conspiracy as truth is thus so only to the extent 
that it emphasizes the securing of truth, and the power required to do so.  
Before we can move onwards we must resolve an unexpected navigational 
hazard. For we find ourselves faced with branching pathways, between 
the real and the contestation of the real. The logic of conspiracy is stuck, 
and so we, too, cannot move forward without resolving which way to go. 
To advance, we must consider that conspiracy theory can never be a 
completed project. It must remain hovering between the premise of its 
own possibility and its anticipated impossibility. In other words, the idea 
of conspiracy theory situates its logic perpetually in an implied position of 
motion or evolution, striving towards its idealistic fulfillment in which it is 
no longer a suspicion or a paranoid interpretation, but a statement of 
fact.  
But here another antinomy of conspiracy becomes apparent. Consider the 
following. If the conspiracy theory reaches its logical fulfillment, that is, is 
proven to be true, then there is indeed a Conspiracy (with a capital C). 
Yet equally, if it is proven to be true, and hence irrefutable, then it is not 
so much a conspiracy as it is a Theory (with capital T), that is, a factual 
observation of relations. What this means is that the notion of conspiracy 
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is perpetually stuck in its own impossibility, in its negative stance, not 
towards the truth as such, but towards the agency implied in the 
legitimization of truth. Standing in front of these divergent pathways, 
there can be no moving forward without compromising the structural 
integrity of this delicate logical balance. 
In order to solve this we must think of how this contradiction might be 
reconciled. Luckily for us, there is a way out, and we need not yet turn 
around. For the resolution of this dilemma, the tension between 
conspiracy theory as real and unreal can be disentangled with one simple 
insight, that is, the emergence of a double enemy, a doubling of 
conspiracy, as it were. This may appear counter-intuitive, but can easily 
be explained. We have so far neglected an evident problem in the idea of 
a conspiratorial politics. This is that as soon as the conspiratorial becomes 
political praxis, it takes on a doubling of real and imagined conspiracy. On 
the one hand, there is the genuine conspiracy in which increased 
executive power is sought, and justified by the existence of nebulous 
enemies along the lines of the anti-Turkey lobby or even the Glen 
movement. The true conspiracy is one in which elusive (most likely false) 
conspiratorial adversaries are invoked to justify expanding political 
powers. And the second conspiracy is that of the conspiratorial enemy as 
integral to the justification of the first.  
We thus find ourselves facing (1) the genuine conspiracy of the State, 
that is, the attempt to delegitimize opposition through accusations of 
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conspiracy, and (2) the false conspiracy made manifest in the pursuit of 
the nefarious, yet hidden, enemy of the State. But in their interrelation 
both become part of a conspiratorial dialectic. That is, they reinforce one 
another, and despite Ð or because of Ð their contradictions, they take on 
an intertwined necessity. This begets, by proxy, a veritable conspiratorial 
vision of society. Conspiracy theory as praxis thus always creates a 
necessary double antagonist to its claim:  both the conspiratorial enemy 
and the conspiratorial society required to challenge this foe. Now we can 
see the two pathways, like the doubling of lenses, converge into one. A 
third and final chamber reveals itself therein. 
Bearing the knowledge of these two interrelated levels of conspiracy, let 
us venture into the final sphere of conspiratorial logic. As we glance about 
this open space, the logical conclusion of our journey appears in the form 
of a question. That is, how can conspiracy theory become first a 
justification for securing the truth, then take on the form of a double 
conspiracy, without begetting in turn, a third conspiracy? We must 
assume that when any form of opposition to the State is cast as 
conspiratorial, then the only remaining outlet for genuine resistance to 
the status quo becomes one that can no longer be achieved by means of 
political engagement, but must instead seek manifestation in other forms. 
We can now consider how both Gezi and the coup attempt, regardless of 
their apparent differences in strategy, goal and ideology, both operate in 
the sphere of the conspiratorial Ð they become the ÔtrueÕ conspiracy 
 113 
begotten by the false conspiratorial tension of the conspiratorial society. 
That is not to say that they are merely causal events. More importantly, 
they become incorporated into the framing process of the paranoid state, 
as much as they are its product.  
As we review the findings of our exploration, we can now determine that 
the conspiratorial logic, and the politics it begets, consists of what are 
essentially three forms of conspiracy: (1) the StateÕs employment of 
conspiratorial rhetoric to justify increased executive powers, (2) the 
fictional enemy that it invokes to do so (a false conspiratorial Other), and 
(3) the reactionary conspiracy, the fulfillment of the conspiratorial society 
as begetting ÔrealÕ conspiratorial dissent along the lines of the Gezi 
protests or the coup attempt. Having reached this point, we can now 
safely exit the caverns of conspiratorial logic, bearing with us these 
precious insights. We are now well equipped to begin to decipher the 
forces that drive conspiracy theory as political praxis in Turkey today, the 
better to circumvent the logical traps laid for us by those who seek to 
capitalize on conspiracy theory.  
 
Contingent Necessity, Necessary Contingency85 
                                     
 
85 The theoretical callisthenics required to make the following constellation of 
assumptions mix the idea of contingency as conceived of in the social movement 
literature, which itself borrows from contingency theory in the social sciences, with that 
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While we can now speak of three tiers of conspiracy, we must be careful 
to avoid regarding them as distinctly separate entities. Our primary 
interest should be in examining their causes and the relationship that 
exists between them, and from what (contradictory) forces they acquire 
their potency, lest the competing affects of conspiracy disintegrate into 
their own contradictions. Their dissection is a delicate process, and one 
must be careful to avoid skipping steps out of eagerness to reach 
satisfying conclusions. I would suggest, therefore, that before we begin to 
think of the practical manifestations of this triumvirate of conspiratorial 
politics, and indeed their framing mechanisms, we must first consider 
what holds these three levels of conspiracy together.  
The glue that binds them is one of competing forces, of a tension 
between the ideas of necessity and contingency, between that of 
supposedly expected, that is, inevitable, resistance, and the necessity of 
such resistance to sustain the controls against it. Let me proffer a 
starting point. The fictional resistance invoked by the first layer of 
conspiracy (the conspiratorial enemy) contains an attempt to control the 
otherwise contingent episode of genuine resistance, while the second 
conspiracy (that of the StateÕs bid for power) brings about truly 
contingent uprisings such as the coup attempt, which in turn forms a 
                                                                                                           
of contingency in literary theory. This is not to be confused with contingency theory in 
biology, otherwise known as the Ôwonderful life theoryÕ, which employs an altogether 
different ontology of the contingent which emphasizes the unknowable and the 
accidental of life-forms, in stark contrast to the focus on intentional framing and 
subjectivity explored here.  
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necessity for the secondary conspiracy, that is, the paranoid stateÕs, 
fulfilment.  
In all three ÔstagesÕ, for lack of a better word, the idea of conspiracy 
revolves around capturing a form of the imaginary revolutionary. It seeks 
to find a way to control what is essentially an inassimilable idea, that of 
contingent resistance, and to this extent it imposes fictional renderings 
thereof to create a system of relations in which the framer can seek to 
harness otherwise contingent forces. I realize that the debate on 
contingency and its role in political thought and philosophy is a 
longstanding one. Yet for the purpose of this chapter I aim to employ a 
definition that fits within a somewhat unorthodox conceptualization. So 
when I refer to contingency, I am drawing upon what Fredric Jameson has 
described as a particular characteristic of modernist, and indeed realist, 
affect, a play on the sense of the real, popularized in modernist art and 
literature.86  
                                     
 
86 Fredric Jameson, The Antinomies of Realism (London, 2013). Here it is important to 
point out that in JamesonÕs previous work on post-modernism, he had claimed the 
Ôwaning of affectÕ. Yet here, Jameson seemingly restores the idea of affect to a central 
position, i.e. that of constituting an antinomy to realism. For a detailed account of the 
evolving idea of affect in JamesonÕs work, see Conall Cash, ÔThe Antinomies of Realism, 
ReviewÕ, Affirmations: of the Modern 1, available at 
http://affirmations.arts.unsw.edu.au/index.php?journal=aom&page=article&op=view&pat
h%5B%5D=59&path%5B%5D=112 (accessed 24 May 2017). See also Fredric Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London 1991). 
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While this may appear at first glance an unusual entry point into the 
concept of the contingent, it strikes me as useful to appropriate this 
particular form of contingency, as it fits neatly within this thesisÕs 
balancing act between framing theory and conspiracy theory, both of 
which are, after all, processes of constructing a narrative agency, 
precisely where there is a perceived flexibility in meaning and 
interpretation. In this vein, Jameson describes contingency as Ôa failure of 
the idea, the name for what is radically unintelligibleÕ. Clearly, the notion 
of such a Ôfailed ideaÕ strongly resembles the equally radical unintelligibility 
of conspiracy as political practice. 
After all, if contingency is invoked somewhat paradoxically to circumvent 
the contingent idea, then by doing so it allows JamesonÕs modernist 
author to grasp ÔpureÕ situations and truths. Whether or not the author, 
or the framer as it were, is successful in this pursuit is largely irrelevant. 
What matters is the agency involved in the manipulation of the 
contingent, and the realization that the ÔmeaningÕ takes root not merely 
deterministically, but through a contestation of interpretative powers and 
ideology. This is also where the idea of contingency relates back to that 
of conspiracy theory. For if seen through such a lens, suddenly the notion 
of hidden forces that manifest in visible structures seems to take on the 
same paradoxical features implicit in the tension between the necessary 
and the contingent. In other words, even if the conspiratorial Other is 
non-real, its narrative drive can function as a contingent event to 
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reconsolidate the legitimacy of the state in the face of narratives of 
resistance, most notably as provided by the Gezi protestors. 
What stands out, and here I go beyond the somewhat circular logic 
implied by JamesonÕs reading of contingency, is that the use of narrative 
to evade the inassimilable nature of a truly autonomous idea imbues the 
framer with the power of subjectivity, and that this allows him to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the primordial nature of his voice, a process 
which can be initiated not only by artists, but by politicians as well. In this 
way, the election adage Ôcampaign in poetry and govern in proseÕ is 
simply a commonplace for what is in essence an inevitability about the act 
of framing itself; it will always remain equally focused on emotion and 
reason. The energy, however, derives not from this false dualism itself. 
For the force of the political frame (be it adversarial or inspirational) lies 
not in the contrast between poetry and prose, but in the subjective 
authority cast by the narrative assumption itself, which is that of a 
singular voice with the power to shape a pluralist reality as supposed 
universal expression.  
In other words, there is a paradox to be observed in the conspiracy frame, 
in that it always consists of a singular figure, the political leader or 
spokesperson, seeking to affirm an individual representativeness or 
mandate, by pointing towards the existence of hidden and secretive 
multitudes Ð which, in turn are of course juxtaposed with the sine qua non 
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of the conspiratorial accusation, the ÔtrueÕ electoral majority.87 This builds 
upon what is known as the Ôparadox of political representationÕ88 by 
adding a second layer of contradiction. Not only is it the singular 
subjective figure that claims to represent the true intentions of the 
masses, but furthermore, these masses are considered a ÔsilentÕ majority 
as opposed to the supposed Ôvocal conspiratorsÕ taking to the streets in 
protest. The reason this dynamic is so important is that it goes beyond 
the assumption in the conspiracy theory literature that conspiratorial 
beliefs are a feature of political losers, when in fact the essence of 
conspiratorial framing relies on a subjugation, or attempted subjugation, 
of the underlying contradictions and hence contentions of the idea of 
political representation and its relationship to political opportunity 
structures 
Yet for all its congruency, I do not wish to make it seem as if Jameson 
employs the idea of contingency as a synonym for conspiracy. Quite the 
contrary, it is in the force implied by such an inassimilable idea that the 
temptation arises for it to be wielded as a shield against other ideas. It is 
an idea that forms its own truth that seeks to be immune to the 
                                     
87 This also helps explain the rhetorical redundancy of the so-called Ôsmall minorityÕ of 
opposition, and the Ôlarge majorityÕ of government supporters. In either case, the 
adjective points towards an affirmation of agency, or lack thereof, rather than a distinct 
numeric assessment.  
88 The quote refers to the title of David RuncimanÕs article on the Ôparadox of presenceÕ, 
which he builds upon from Hannah PitkinÕs Ôconcept of representationÕ. David Runciman, 
ÔThe Paradox of Political RepresentationÕ, The Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (2007), 
pp. 93Ð114, and Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, CA, 1967). 
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contamination of other ideas. Therefore, when Jameson refers to the 
contingent as Ôsomething that is the failure of modernisms to completely 
and unequivocally ÒmasterÓ and ÒappropriateÓ, the way in which the form 
of something is juxtaposed with realities outside its spheres of controlÕ, 
what he is pointing out is that the idea itself, through its internal 
contradictions, contributes to a dialectic which both enables and detracts 
from the ideaÕs legitimacy.  
Is this not equally true in the case of conspiracy theory as propounded by 
the State, that is, the positing of an existential threat precisely so as to 
reconsolidate the supposed universality of the eliteÕs power as perpetually 
re-necessitated? Or is this, in fact, the reverse? Is conspiracy theory the 
antithesis to the truly contingent idea, one that breaks free from the 
simplistic antagonisms of paranoid framing, to take on true emancipatory 
value? I would suggest that perhaps it is both, and that therein lies 
precisely both the dilemma and the potential for its resolution, but most 
of all, an indicator of the forceful sway that conspiracy theory holds over 
the real. 
Jameson already hints at this when he explains how, in the modernist 
mode of writing, one way to circumvent the inevitability of inassimilable 
ideas, that is, the desire to create something new and of its own kind, 
without mimicking the past, was to employ a method of Ôaesthetic 
contingencyÕ in which the idea becomes unbound of its contingent 
predecessor. One way this was done was through the use of anecdote. 
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Here Jameson points to the way in which both Nabokov and Beckett, two 
modernist writers par excellence, employed the stylistic device of 
anecdote, metaphor and so-called ÔaccessibleÕ life-worlds (in contrast to 
the fantastical life-worlds of utopian or science-fiction writing) to creative 
narratives that they could truly inhabit, and hence seek to control the 
formation of a style unbound by the parameters of what preceded it.  
But the contingent element here is twofold. One, there is the contingency 
of the anecdote, that is the simulacrum of the manufactured real. 
Secondly, there is the narrative space that is now unbound by contingent 
resistance of interfering stylistic tradition. However, both the disruption 
of the past and the disruption of the present remain in a relationship of 
necessity to one another. That is to say, the contingent real of the 
fictional is invoked only so as to prevent the equally contingent real of 
the influence of extraneous style. Contingency thus creates a 
contestation, but a necessary one, in which the real and the fictional 
coalesce. Might not the same be said of a conspiratorial politics? 
I realize this risks confusing the idea of the contingent in the positivist 
sense (an unexpected turn of events), and the theoretical notion of an 
inassimilable idea. But both are related when it comes to understanding 
the genuine contingent resistance that arises of necessity out of the non-
contingent enemy figure of conspiratorial politics. The manipulation of the 
contingent idea can be found in the systemic use of conspiratorial politics 
to render the oppositional idea obsolete, by supplanting it with false 
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renderings of a revolutionary imaginary. In other words, if we are to come 
to fully understand the internal dynamics of TurkeyÕs recent uprisings and 
the state response it invoked, we must also come to appreciate how the 
mobilization itself was not the de facto contingent element, but that in 
the struggle to define the ÔmeaningÕ of the event, a contestation of the 
relative contingency of the protests becomes the central site of 
contestation.  
In sum, this means that the idea of the contingent is not an a priori 
requirement for the supposedly inexplicable mobilization, but that the 
contestation as to this inexplicability itself constitutes the true fight over 
whether or not the movement was one of contingency or necessity. To 
put this somewhat more clearly, non-contingent resistance (fictional 
enemies) can bring about contingent resistance (real enemies), yet 
keeping both within the sphere of a conspiratorial politics.89 Think of how 
the coup was seen as ÔproofÕ of the legitimacy of the paranoid state, and 
this dynamic becomes evident.   
And this is why there is a distinctly disorienting or surreal effect to both 
the Gezi uprising and the coup. Both seem to physically embody the 
conspiratorial space, but defy its fiction and fulfil its paranoia by forming 
genuine resistance. The way this effect manifests in enrage-type protests 
such as Gezi is that the peaceful mobilization of thousands in public 




spaces is not conspiratorial as such, yet in its sheer volume succeeds in 
staging what is in essence a breakdown of the public sphere.90 Whether 
                                     
 
90 While the term is not much used outside France, it derives from the French Revolution, 
and the so-called ÔEnraged OnesÕ (les Enrags). But it should be noted that I am using it 
here in the sense of the New LeftÕs rediscovery of the term among the student populace 
in the uprising of May 1968. For a historical account, see Le Collectiv, Enrags et 
situationnistes dans le mouvement des occupations (Paris, 1968); John McMillian and 
Paul Buhle (eds.), The New Left Revisited (Philadelphia 2003); George Katsiaficas, The 
Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 70. 
I will refer to the idea of enrag protest frequently throughout the course of the thesis. 
The general problematic that I mean to describe by borrowing this term from the New 
Left of the 1960s can be summed up as follows: The problem that the protests face is 
essentially a paradox that results from their transition from an elusive moment of mass 
mobilization to the necessity of prolonging their existence without causing further 
disruption to the collective space they have now occupied. In its very success at 
disrupting the status quo, by its very definition the movement creates a self-imposed 
collective otherness that in its very elusiveness and intangibility becomes more visible 
than the trappings of the state itself. In other words, the spirit is both invisible and 
highly visible. It is effervescent, yet its resonance creates tangible power in the presence 
of mobilizing protesters. The reason this becomes a threat to the state is precisely 
because the representative power from which the government derives its own legitimacy 
can be seen to rely on its capacity to maintain its exclusive hold on such a status quo. In 
the very otherness of the movement, the possibility for a disruption begins to take root 
that not only takes over symbolic spaces, but manages to render visible the symbolic 
power structures that were at first taken for granted in the idea of political 
representation. A paradox appears, which is the one courted by this type of movement, 
and that is the distinct force of an immaterial contestation. In the movementÕs capacity 
to stage the unravelling of the symbols of power as secondary to that of the will of the 
popular collective, it achieves a reversal of the hierarchies implicit in the expectation of 
traditional,or, in this case, majoritarian governance. The occupationÕs perceived lack of 
action is therefore in essence the most radical act. The occupation of a public space 
becomes uncanny, precisely because it juxtaposed the place as a site of power with that 
of one of social determination, and from this derives the strength to engage in the 
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one interprets this as a ÔreclaimingÕ of public space, or on the other hand, 
an attempt to conspire against the State, both accounts of the event 
revolve around the playful way in which the contingent is incorporated to 
stage the real as being outside the real, inasmuch as the conspiratorial 
stages the fictional as within the real.  
I have attempted to put this into what might be deemed a ÔFormula of 
(conspiratorial) ContingencyÕ in relationship to protest and conspiratorial 
state response thereto: The formula for such a dynamic, when considered 
along the lines of a contestation of the necessary/contingent dynamic, 
takes on the following form, at least in the case of the genuine resistance 
which one might therefore think of as a Ôthird conspiracyÕ, or at least a 
third level of the conspiratorial accusation. This can be put as follows: 
ÔContingency + Anecdote = subjective reality. (C+A=R), or at least a 
meaningful ÔclaimÕ to a ÔpureÕ subjectivity (whether or not such a state 
can be achieved is of course debatable). But if we are to understand how 
                                                                                                           
ultimate impossibility: achieving change derived a state of being that is essentially 
immobile. In sum, the possibility of implementing change precisely by refusing to 
articulate the parameters of such a change is in and of itself a deeply unsettling act of 
resistance. In this light, one can see the so-called Ôstanding manÕ protests at Taksim as a 
further manifestation and escalation of this dynamic, taking a site of mass energy and 
transit and transforming it into a frozen display of immobile resistance. The use of the 
continuous tense in the notion of the Ôstand-ingÕ is here vital. The protestor is not 
frozen, but instead actively engaged in non-movement. While this may appear relative to 
the observer, the dynamic is crucial towards achieving the unsettling potential of this 
sort of disruption, and hence its capacity to elicit such forceful response. 
 
 124 
this formula features similarly in the process of enrag politics, we must 
add the contesting force to our equation: that in which the state 
response challenges the truth claim implicit in the successful mobilization 
of the Gezi protests. Seen in this light, the formula for the protest comes 
as a result of the contingency formula, Protest (P) =(C+A=R), but 
becomes so only by opening up the interpretation of ÔPÕ as either a result 
of necessary (N) or contingent (C) forces.  
In other words, the nature of ÔP=RÕ can be challenged by means of a 
conspiracy frame, which calls into question the contingent element of the 
protest by emphasizing its conspiratorial and hence structured nature, 
rather than granting it the validation of its truth claim by engaging with 
its aims directly. In sum, the contestation of the contingent element in 
the protest serves to deny the movement its authenticity, thereby 
suggesting that its motives stem not from a legitimate set of grievances, 
but are instead conspiratorial and hostile to the survival of the system 
itself. To a degree, this is of course correct, at least to the extent that 
the movement intends to challenge the status quo. Therefore, what 
finally occurs in such a contestation is that the contingent element in the 
protest is used to create the idea of necessity (legitimate grievance), 
whereas the State calls upon the non-contingent element (conspiracy Ð 
which of course is paradoxically a fiction, and thus another ÔcontingentÕ 
reality) to argue for its own necessity. This relationship can be seen to be 
paradoxical, arising out of the counter-intuitive dynamic of the contingent 
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strategy, that is, the idea that through a false contingent a pure 
objectivity could arise. This of course was already an evident dilemma in 
the modernist literature. When added to the contestation implicit in the 
state vs. protest challenge, the breakdown of meaning takes on further 
complications; these in turn foment weaknesses that the conspiracy 
frame actively preys upon. 
In other words, in seeking to achieve a sense of the ÔnewÕ in a way 
untainted by the influence of the past, the contingent effect requires an 
invocation of a contingent reality, which in turn would not exist or even 
be necessary without the initial attempt to contain resistance within a 
conspiratorial frame. In essence, however, these tensions all revolve 
around the structural way in which the idea of a conspiratorial politics 
both begets uprisings and re-contextualizes these as proof for its own 
paranoia. The circularity that ensues, is one in which even genuine 
resistance comes to exist within the parameters of this relationship of 
contingency/necessity. 
The result of this conspiratorial triumvirate of sorts is that even genuinely 
contingent resistance, such as the Gezi uprising and the coup attempt, 
begets further consolidation of the paranoid society. As the government 
calls into question the contingent element of the protest by emphasizing 
its conspiratorial and hence structured nature, rather than granting it the 
validation of contestation by engaging with its aims directly, it draws it 
into its own conspiratorial logic. In sum, the contestation of the necessity 
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implicit in such resistance serves to deny the movement its authenticity, 
thereby suggesting that its motives stem not from a legitimate set of 
grievances, but are instead conspiratorial and hostile to the survival of 
the system itself.  
To a degree, this is of course correct, at least to the extent that the 
movement intends to challenge the status quo. Therefore, what finally 
occurs in such a contestation is that the contingent element in the 
resistance is used to distract from its necessity (legitimate grievance), 
whereas the State calls upon the non-contingent element of its fictional 
conspiracy to argue for its own necessity. This relationship can be seen to 
be paradoxical. Thus, contingent resistance arises out of necessity. But 
this necessity is denied when the government responds to the 
contingency of resistance as evidence of conspiracy. The conspiratorial 
society becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is precisely in this way that 
even radically different resistance movements, such as Gezi and the coup, 
can come to be framed as part of an overarching conspiracy, despite their 
opposite aims and methods. 
This creates a seemingly confusing situation in which the contingency of 
the uprisings derives from the necessity of its relationship towards the 
conspiratorial state. In turn, the state response must emphasize the 
contingency of the uprisings as evidence of their illegitimacy. To put this 
in terms articulated by one of todayÕs most enigmatic thinkers, the 
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convergence point of this contestation is akin to what Slavoj Zizek refers 
to as a Ôcontingent mechanismÕ in the idea of conspiracy itself.  
He writes, Ôat the social level, this is what the notion of [...] conspiracy 
conceals: the horror of society as a contingent mechanism blindly 
following its path, caught in the vicious cycle of antagonismsÕ.91 Yet this 
is exactly, where the conspiratorial state, and by proxy the conspiratorial 
society, goes beyond this anxiety, by elevating it to the modus operandi 
underlying its legitimacy. When the State creates figures of contingent 
resistance, framed as secretly structured, in order to justify an increasing 
level of repression of its own citizens, this, in turn allows it to respond to 
genuine forms of resistance by accusing them of being aligned with the 
anticipated conspiratorial forces it already sought to invoke before the 
occasion of genuine conspiracy. In this confusion, both sides seek to 
achieve their own necessity, by inverting the relations of necessity and 
contingency in their relation to each other. The uprisings seek to 
challenge the conspiratorial society by conspiring against it, and the state 
response sees in their resistance the evidence of its paranoia fulfilled. 
When viewed in this way, the coup attempt, for example, can be 
considered as part of an escalation already set in motion by the Gezi 
protests. In other words, the coup provides the perceived fulfilment of 
                                     
 
91 Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London, 1997), p. 40. 
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the conspiratorial interpretation of (and state response to) the largely 
peaceful resistance of the Gezi protestors. 
Building upon this, we can thus articulate three steps that correspond to 
the contingency/necessity antinomy underlying the three stages of 
conspiracy identified earlier. These steps can be summarized as follows: 
first, the formal identification of the categories in their most unrelated 
form; secondly, the concretely ÔrealÕ way in which the categories exist in 
relation to each other; and thirdly, the ÔabsoluteÕ attempt to understand 
the relation from which emerges that necessity, and that this, instead of 
being in contrast with contingency, can instead realize itself by means of 
contingency Ð therefore emerging in the form of a double contingency as 
it were.  
The necessary and contingent as such form a totality. What emerges is 
that for the necessary to take the form of the contingent, a struggle is 
required (adding another necessity) that manifests itself through the 
interpretation of the meaning, and hence historical import, of the impact 
of the uprising itself. As we shall see, it is at this juncture that the idea of 
elite framing provides an insightful intersection for the practical 
requirements of such a process. The contestation between resistance and 
the status quo, between the State and the uprisings (whether Gezi or the 
coup), must go through a conspiratorial process in order to become 
legitimate and frame the other as conspiratorial. The state response holds 
that Gezi and the coup were evidence of conspiracy, whereas for the 
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participants in Gezi and the coup (again, I must emphasize that I am 
comparing their relation in the conspiratorial logic, not a de facto 
comparison as such), the repression of civil society and the crackdown on 
opposition constituted a state conspiracy against the people. 
Any formulation to resolve this tension must therefore seek to reconcile 
what is essentially a dialectical relationship: a system of contradictions in 
which the only possible way to reconcile between necessity and 
contingency in conspiracy theory is to observe the necessity of 
contingency itself, and in turn, the contingency of the conspiratorial 
necessity. While at first glance this may appear a mere trick of Hegelian 
sophistry, dissection of this relationship and its mechanisms can help us 
solve some of the key practical dilemmas facing the idea of paranoid 
politics in Turkey today, as well as shed light on alternatives to such a 
politics.  
Without a doubt, the military uprising consisted of a bloody breakdown of 
the freedoms and safety a democracy should guarantee its citizens. The 
Gezi protests, on the other hand, were an emancipatory contestation of 
the conspiratorial society. Yet both attempts to disrupt the status quo 
were seamlessly integrated, folded back into the paranoid politics that has 
now come to be emblematic of the Erdoğan doctrine. But how can 
resistance to the State be organized so that it does not fall prey to this 
circular and self-fulfilling conspiratorial agency? If we are to imagine a 
more legitimately progressive politics in Turkey, we must begin by asking 
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ourselves the following. Can there be a contingency that does not 
collapse into its own necessity, that is, an opposition which isnÕt reduced 
to conspiratorial treason? Can there be a stand-alone momentum, a 
comprehensive shift away from the paranoid zeitgeist that can reject the 
premise of a conspiratorial politics and the society it begets?  
To begin with, we have already taken steps towards fulfilling this goal by 
beginning to understand the way in which conspiracy theory can form a 
veritable strategy by which the political elite in Turkey can justify 
increased executive powers, and consolidate their popularity and 
representative legitimacy despite waning progress, deteriorating 
democratic norms, and increased restriction of civil society. In addition, 
the extent to which such a politics drives the development of false enemy 
figures and even leads to the rise of genuine conspiracies has indicated 
the extent to which such legitimacy must be always on the brink of its 
own collapse. The final challenge then is for us to recognize the extent to 
which this conspiratorial politics constitutes in essence a contestation, 
not of conspiracy as such, but of its negative counter-image, of the real. 
That is, in the final theoretical consideration, we must take into account 
the somewhat counter-intuitive, yet vital, characteristic of the 
contestation of conspiracy theory as essentially a fight for what may well 
be deemed the conspiracy of the real, or, the imaginary revolutionary. 
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Conclusion: Real Conspiracy, Conspiracy of the Real 
This fear of the uncanny, of the Ôparallel stateÕ, of the conspiratorial 
enemy lurking in the recesses of Turkish politics and its politiciansÕ minds, 
is thus simply another way to seize upon such a revolutionary imaginary. 
That is to say, it denies genuine resistance the embodiment of such a 
spirit, precisely by filling the space with its own paranoid conceptions. Of 
course there is no strict limit to such a concept. After all, it is hardly a 
physical space. Yet while the imaginary revolutionary exists in the 
conspiratorial mode, the very idea of resistance becomes subject to the 
StateÕs conceptualization thereof as conspiratorial, rather than forming 
the possibility of a genuine, autonomous and emancipatory challenge to 
the status quo.92  
                                     
 
92 There is, as such, a strange inversion that occurs when the political elite refer to their 
practices as being Ôin the real worldÕ, whereas protestors, dissenters and even those 
participating in the violent military uprising are accused of living in a land of dreams. The 
notion of conspiracy theory can help us understand how this reversal occurs, and what 
systematic contradictions underlie its particular appeal in seeking to determine seemingly 
hegemonic boundaries of the real. This is relevant to the stateÕs desire to seek control of 
those boundaries by determining a ÔrationalÕ plan of view, which in itself means making 
the distinction not of how things ÔareÕ in the transcendental experience, but instead how 
they ÔseemÕ in the empirical world. A revealing interpretation of Kant by Roger Scruton 
points out that, in this state, man seeks reasons instead of causes, and prefers 
imperatives to prescriptive laws, and above all (my own prioritizing) not mechanisms but 
Ôrational endsÕ. In this we have the above-mentioned ÔendÕ, the superimposition of the 
state onto the points of view that society uses Ôin order to conceive itself as practicalÕ, 
hence assimilating the revolutionary within its own justification of agency and exploiting 
KantÕs famous problem of the paradox of freedom, that of the self-assumed empirical 
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As such, both Gezi and the coup, while seeking to make claim to the 
revolutionary imaginary in order to inspire citizens to rise up against the 
State in defence of Turkish democracy, were pulled into the conspiratorial 
framing strategy. We should therefore not become hung up on whether 
Gezi or the coup presented a genuine model for a return to a progressive 
politics in Turkey (certainly in the latter case this is hardly likely), but we 
need to recognize the extent to which the state response to both events 
was to dismiss them as evidence of an (international) conspiracy, rather 
than as a genuine display of dissent against an increasingly authoritarian 
state, as they sought to portray themselves.  
Akin to someone who is fireman by day and arsonist by night, the political 
elite in Turkey has both increased domestic turmoil and subsequently won 
re-election on a promise to restore order and stability. To posit an end, 
but perhaps not a means, one might thus think of the imaginary 
revolutionary as an attempt to colonize what Kant deemed the 
Ôtranscendental objectÕ, in that it constitutes not an object of knowledge, 
but rather an a priori to knowledge.93 Conspiracy theory as political praxis 
renders any idea of resistance to the status quo as inherently 
conspiratorial. And in turn, supposedly Ônon-conspiratorialÕ participation in 
                                                                                                           
being, yet transcendentally adhering to the imperative of practical reason. In doing so, 
the state denies the opposition the reason required to prove its necessity.  
 
93 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (rev. edn, 2007). 
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such a politics begets the formation of what is no longer a conspiracy 
theory of society, but a society of conspiracy theory. 
But this is of course a perversion of the idea of conspiracy theory, which 
in its common form questions the role of the State in the production of 
knowledge, rather than the other way around. A deeply counter-intuitive 
situation arises: one in which the political elite embraces systematically a 
form of conspiracy theory that regards its own citizenry as engaged in a 
vast conspiracy against it. This can hardly be reconciled with the idea of a 
functioning democracy, one that relies on active civil and political 
participation in society. Instead, what emerges is a perpetual loop, 
evidenced by the continued state of emergency in Turkey today, in which 
the very idea of the real becomes infused with paranoid assumptions 
about the omnipresence of conspiratorial dissent. 
The positing of conspiracy theory as the central premise of Turkish 
politics also implies that the real is only ever perceived as a field of 
action, upon which the individual assumes his perspective of what 
constitutes categorical imperatives by which to justify the reason of 
acting in a certain way. That is to say, the idea of political engagement 
becomes that of a game of thrones, of a relentless pursuit of privilege to 
seize executive power. In the case of a conspiratorial politics, an 
interesting paradox ensues, which makes it particularly suitable for those 
participating in this form of contest. After all, it employs the accusation 
of conspiracy as a means by which to enact its own conspiracy, which is 
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that of necessitating further executive powers to fight the conspiratorial 
threat it perceives.  
In other words, the accusation of conspiracy serves as an exacerbation of 
the totalitarian paradox, which is that the more it fails, the more it is 
reconfirmed in the necessity of its undertaking. The same can be seen 
with accusations of conspiracy. The more they are derided and dismissed, 
the more plausible they seem to become. We can identify in this, 
therefore, a distinct affinity between the requirements for the conspiracy 
theory and that of the desire for political power. In both cases, it is a 
desire to wield the constitutive force not only of the status quo, but also 
to determine the boundaries of resistance thereto. Managed democracy 
thus entails not simply a staging of its own politics, but also an enacting 
of the resistance thereto.  
To understand how the imaginary revolutionary thus reflects on the 
status quo as much as on its opposition, one might think instead of what 
has been called the Ôparadox of political representationÕ Ð in which one 
elected official must achieve the means by which to represent the totality 
of the people.94 Of course this can never truly be achieved Ð and should 
not be, lest a form of authoritarianism emerge.95 But what this 
                                     
 
94 The quote refers to the title of David RuncimanÕs article on the Ôparadox of presenceÕ, 
which he builds upon from Hannah PitkinÕs Ôconcept of representationÕ. Runciman, ÔThe 
Paradox of Political RepresentationÕ, and Pitkin, The Concept of Representation.  
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impossibility entails, when thought through to its logical conclusion, is 
that there exists what is essentially a Ôdream-work of political 
representationÕ, an imaginary sphere of legitimate representation as the 
driving force of a democratic politics. This means that the imaginary 
revolutionary can serve as a counter-image to this equally imaginary ideal 
of a representative politics. Together, in the balance between both 
aspirations, the ÔrealÕ contestation of a liberal democracy ensues.  
To follow along such lines, and to put this in a normative context, one 
might refer to politics of conspiracy as that of a nightmare rather than a 
dreamscape of politics,96 a legitimization of political power based not on 
                                                                                                           
95 The paradox of political representation is therefore a necessity for democratic practice 
as much as it contains within it an essentially post-truth premise. The claim to represent 
the many is strengthened the more the pluralist society is repressed. As a basic premise 
Ð  and we must still seek to expand more precisely on what then is the actual possibility 
of ÔequalityÕ in the positive sense Ð this is vital to understanding the dialectical manner in 
which accusations of conspiracy function as process, not as reaction. Naturally, the 
strongmanÕs tendency to accuse opposition of conspiracy contains a specific Achilles 
heel. For one, the insertion of conspiratorial frames could itself very well bring out actual 
adversaries or, perhaps more likely, unite and raise the stakes for various opposition 
groups to come together and to play that part, as it were, of consolidated antagonists 
to the political elite.  
 
96 This is useful to the extent that it begins to demonstrate how the conspiratorial 
accusation is in fact merely a darker positing of the dreamlike quality of the protest 
event and its possibilities. But, to be precise, there is of course another doubling effect 
which occurs as soon as one posits this binary opposition between dream and nightmare. 
For the dream can also refer to the possibility of successful ÔtrueÕ political representation 
as such. In other words, and this is truly the most important insight which can be gained 
from the dream/nightmare opposition, what matters is not the relative normative 
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democratic unity, or the possibility of legitimate resistance to the status 
quo. Instead, there emerges a society (and hence a politic, and by proxy a 
political elite) that hinges on the expectation of its disintegration, and 
hence its perpetual efforts to detect the agents of its demise. While the 
saying goes that truth needs not the ornament of words, conspiracy 
theory on the other hand relies on the omnipresence of words, on the 
incessant repetition thereof, their eventual loss of meaning, and the 
perpetual dissemination of their central message: beware the 
conspiratorial enemy, and protect the State!  
This is precisely where the logical fulfilment of the idea of a paranoid 
politics emerges; that is to say, when both the imaginary revolutionary 
and the idea of genuinely representative politics no longer form opposite 
poles, but instead are juxtaposed by a politics of conspiracy theory and 
                                                                                                           
attributes of the unconscious fantasy as such (it matters little if the dream is a 
nightmare or a pleasant one), but that what remains central is the dreamlike quality of 
the idea of the collective as such. I will return to this in a more critical fashion in Chapter 
4. However, for now, what is central to the acknowledgement of the import of 
conspiracy theory is that it too, in emphasizing the dreamlike quality of the Event as 
such, contains within it equally the key to its own unravelling. To put this as simply as 
possible, in trying to render the protests as conspiratorial, the political becomes focused 
on the dreamlike elusiveness of representation in which the state seeks to reclaim the 
narrative momentum from the protest movement. However, in so doing, it creates 
precisely the conditions under which the protest movement could appear triumphant, if 
it, in turn, manages to depict the state as being nightmarish. What we can see, 
therefore, is that as soon as the contestation becomes in essence a symbolic one, the 
stakes are significantly raised. This then brings us to one of the beginning premises of 
the thesis, which is that the introduction of the conspiracy frame renders the 
contestation of protest as a mythological struggle.  
 137 
the paranoid society such a politics begets. When all political language is 
rendered inherently antagonistic, conspiratorial and paranoid, then this 
takes on a very real system of truth, a system of thought, and a system 
justifying the oppression of genuine forms of resistance or politically 
integrated opposition. We cannot square the circle of conspiracy theory, 
lest we recognize the real conspiracy as a conspiracy of the real. That is 
to say, to emancipate ourselves from the clutches of a paranoid politics, 
we must first question the conspiratorial rhetoric justifying the repression 
of free speech in Turkey today. 
The deeper issue, and the bigger threat, is that in embracing conspiracy 
theory as central to the politics of the AK Party, it may have been 
transformed unalterably into a party that can no longer justify its position 
in times of peace Ð and as such will continue to exploit the deepest of 
divides in Turkish society, no matter the cost. As such, the repeated 
Western outcry against the worsening state of civil freedoms in Turkey, 
while no doubt heartfelt, is ultimately too little, too late, if not even 
somewhat beside the point. After all, it is not the lack of civic freedoms 
alone that is keeping Turkey back from being a well-functioning 
democracy. Instead, the internalization of conspiracy theory, the 
dissemination of fake news, and a conspiracy pandering leadership are 
indicative of a political sphere that reduces democratic participation to a 
zero-sum game of malicious dictators, nationalist zealots and leftist 
(international) conspirators. The most dramatic example of this can be 
 138 
easily recognized in the total breakdown of democracy and civil order 
elicited by TurkeyÕs first military coup attempt in decades. A failed 
attempt, it must be said, but nonetheless, a sequence of dramatic and 
bloody events that fit squarely within the paranoid political experience. 
Perhaps one might even go as far as saying that this was TurkeyÕs ÔmetaÕ 
coup. Let us consider this in more detail in the following chapter. 
So if it feels as if this chapter concludes with what is in effect a 
beginning, it is for the simple reason that no matter how precarious it has 
become to express such critique in Turkey, one must start somewhere. 
And that somewhere Ð so this thesis would have it Ð might well be located 
in the critical rediscovery of conspiratorial framing, and a renewed 
appreciation of the systemic attributes of the paranoid style in Turkish 
politics. Let us therefore conspire to reconcile the conspiratorial knack, 
the better to challenge its hegemonic potential and return to its deserved 
centrality the idea of a progressive politics in Turkey. What better way to 
do this than to consider conspiracy theory not merely as a fringe 
phenomenon, but as a veritable, if negative, system of thought? That is 
to say, to situate both the failed coup and Gezi within the wider 
problematic of conspiratorial thought in Turkey, we must now consider to 
what extent the production of a paranoid political rhetoric derives from 
elite framing of conspiracy theory.  
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Chapter 2  
 




In the early summer of 2013 a small group of about 50 environmental 
activists gathered in downtown Istanbul. Their goal was to obstruct the 
planned demolition of Gezi Park.97 The park, which stands at the heart of 
IstanbulÕs now revived downtown area, is situated right next to Taksim 
Square. Its other neighbor, Istiklal Avenue, with its cinemas, Starbucks 
and supersized department stores, was to set the tone for the re-
development of one of IstanbulÕs last remaining green spaces. The Turkish 
government had just approved a plan to replace the park with a shopping 
mall, luxury flats and a replica of an old military barracks. This 
combination of new and old, a form of Ônostalgic modernityÕ was typical of 
the trend towards both free-market enthusiasm and resurgent nationalism 
that marked IstanbulÕs many redevelopment projects.98 On the morning of 
                                     
97 Murat Gl, John Dee, and Cahide Nur Cnk, ÔIstanbul's Taksim Square and Gezi Park: 
the place of protest and the ideology of placeÕ, Journal of Architecture and Urbanism 
38.1 (2014), pp. 63-72. 
98 My use of the term Ônostalgic modernityÕ owes a debt to: Esra zyrek, Nostalgia for 
the modern: State secularism and everyday politics in Turkey (Durham, 2006), p,18.   
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28 May, the activists mobilized in the park. The bulldozers were already 
on sight, as were police with tear gas, ready to forcefully evict those 
standing in their way. Neither the activists, the construction crew, nor the 
police who were present that day would have known that within less than 
twenty-four hours their actions would spark the largest protests in 
Turkish history.  As dramatic images of police violence against the Gezi 
park activists spread across social media, solidarity groups began to form 
both spontaneously and based on pre-existing activist organizations.99 As 
a result, unprecedentedly large groups were able to quickly mobilize and 
occupy Taksim square and Gezi Park. As pitched battles with police forces 
broke out across Istanbul, what began as an environmental sit-in quickly 
developed into a citywide movement. A movement that in turn 
snowballed into a national wave of anti-government mobilization as 
Turkish citizens across the country expressed their frustration by 
protesting the increasingly undemocratic and conservative politics of the 
Turkish ruling party. 
 
Following the occupation of Taksim Square and Gezi Park, TurkeyÕs Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed tens of thousands of supporters 
in a hastily convened rally at the coastal Black sea town of Samsun. The 
                                     
99Gulizar Haciyakupoglu and Weiyu Zhang, ÔSocial media and trust during the Gezi 
protests in TurkeyÕ, Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 20.4 (2015), pp. 
450-466; Yeşim Arat, ÔViolence, Resistance, and Gezi ParkÕ, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 45.4 (2013), pp. 807-809. 
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gathering was a show of numbers rather than a conciliatory gesture. In his 
speech, Erdogan emphasized the relative minority of people who 
sympathized with the Gezi movement, and sought to frame those 
protesting in Istanbul as the hapless victims of an international conspiracy 
to undermine Turkey. During his speech he alluded to the simultaneous 
outbreak of protest in Brazil (the so-called Free-Fare movement) as 
evidence of an international conspiracy to undermine both the success of 
developing nations. In the conspiratorial mode of comparison, he pointed 
out the similarities of the protests. Interestingly, the very same overlap 
that protestors used to mobilize as evidence of transnational solidarity, in 
the conspiratorial frame becomes evidence of mass conspiracy.100  ÒThe 
same game is now being played in Brazil. The symbols are the same, the 
posters are the same, twitter, facebook are the same, the international 
media is the same. They are being led from the same center.Ó Erdogan 
then elaborated on the theme of conspiracy to include the so-called 
Ôinterest-rate lobbyÕ, a mythical target of much conspiratorial rhetoric in 
Turkey, with undertones of anti-Semitism, and a fairly general reference 
to Ôforeign agentsÕ. Having identified the perpetrators as belonging to this 
obscure parallel society, Erdogan concluded ÒWho won from these three-
                                     
100 Cihan Tuğal, ÔResistance everywhere: The Cezi revolt in global perspectiveÕ, New 
Perspectives on Turkey 49 (2013), pp. 157-172; Erdem Yoruk and Murat Yuksel, ÔClass 
and Politics in Turkey's Gezi ProtestsÕ, New Left Review 89 (2014), pp. 103-123. 
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week-long demonstrations?Ó. ÒThe interest lobby won. The enemies of 
Turkey won.Ó101  
This moment stands out in terms of conspiratorial framing as it presents 
the first instance in which the state response to Gezi centers directly on 
the notion of conspiracy theory. That is to say, the primary framing 
strategy, or the diagnostic framing of Gezi, was from the outset 
conspiratorial. The narrative themes and contents of such Gezi conspiracy 
theories are manifold, with the most audacious ones featuring telepathy, 
demonic guidance, a German plot to destabilize Turkish Airlines, and of 
course, those involving CIA or Mossad involvement. And that is to name 
but a few. With regard to the way in which these ÔframesÕ constitute the 
means by which the State acts out its hegemonic positioning vis--vis the 
protestors, the definition of a frame here correlates with that of Snow 
and Benford, specifically when they write of the so-called 
Ômisunderstandings and misrepresentationsÕ that mar the often 
synonymous employment of the terms ÔframeÕ and ÔideologyÕ.102 In this 
regard, while the current chapter emphasizes the strategic element in 
state response and framing, it sees the frames as a constellation both 
indicative and constitutive of, but not synonymous with, conspiracy 
theory.  
                                     
101 Daniel Dombey, ÔErdogan says same forces behind Brazil and Turkey protestÕ, 
Financial Times (2013) June 23.  
102 David Snow and Robert Benford, ÔMaster Frames and Cycles of ProtestÕ, in Aldon D. 
Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven, 
CT, 1992), pp. 133Ð52. 
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That is to say, they are indicators of a paranoid style and interpretation 
of contingent resistance, without consisting of a cohesive or coherent 
conspiracy theory as such. This is important, as it also entails that the 
conspiracy frame should not simply be considered a vehicle of a 
systematic conspiracy as such, but is considered in its own right as a 
distorting and even exacerbating anti-framing attempt. It is a strategy 
that seeks to disrupt rather than posit a coherent conspiracy theory or, 
for that matter, to provide even the beginnings of a somewhat plausible, 
alternative interpretation of events. The conspiracy frame is one of many 
conspiracies, not one overarching interpretation. 
It has good cause to be so. After all, the multitude of exponentially 
bizarre renditions of the true ÔcauseÕ of the Gezi protests deny the 
protestors the possibility of any genuine grievance or overarching reason 
to mobilize other than that of conspiracy. The Turkish political elite have 
resorted to extreme forms of antagonistic framing in an attempt to 
debase the political discourse to that of straight-out conspiratorial 
fantasy. Rather than dismissing the protests while acknowledging the 
protestorsÕ grievances, as would be the mode of response in model liberal 
democracies, the Turkish political elite chose to fight the protests with 
absolute impossibilities, that is, fantastical accounts of conspiratorial 
intent.  
This chapter fulfils two functions. First, it comprises a case study of the 
Gezi protests, and its interpretation in elite framing of the resistance it 
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presented. As a result, the elite framing as discussed here is already a 
form of counter-framing (or, as mentioned in the introduction, a form of 
counter-counter-framing). So what is really happening here? To answer 
this I would suggest moving beyond the way in which political ideology is 
considered in the classic social movement literature,103 by instead aligning 
ourselves with a more critical approach to conspiratorial framing and 
resistance, along the lines of a Gramscian ÔstrategicÕ employment of 
hegemonic framing.104 The only way to make sense of such flagrantly 
fantastical accusations is to situate them as part of a wider paranoid 
framing strategy, one that relies on the systemic positing of deliberately 
implausible untruths, rather than seeking mere adversarial plausible 
responses to the protests. This perspective therefore considers the 
preposterous nature of conspiratorial accusations without elevating their 
veracity, but instead seeks to understand their exponential growth, their 
                                     
 
103 Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology (New York, 
1951). See also John Melbourne and Ogilvy Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements 
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(Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1957). 
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political impact and the increasingly extreme rhetoric in which such 
theories are brought to bear. 
This requires of us a certain rethinking of the state response to Gezi, one 
that demonstrates causal mechanisms between the rise of the new 
masses and the invocation of conspiracy as a deliberately destabilizing 
and theatrically conspiratorial acting-out of the divides that the protests 
sought to emphasize as reconcilable. The conspiracy frame is therefore 
more than an unlikely interpretation of chaotic events, it is a deliberate 
attempt to superimpose imaginary contentions onto the previously 
dormant socio-political divides awoken by Gezi, as part of the already 
much commented-upon polarizing style of the Erdoğan doctrine.105 Ergo, 
this chapter employs the Gezi protests as a case study for the arguments 
put forth in the preceding chapter, that is, of a polarizing strategy 
deliberately meant to distract from a fragmented society. In sum, the 
state response to Gezi sought to depict a polarized Turkey, rather than 
the more accurate portrayal of a fragmented Turkey such as existed in 
the Gezi narrative. Conspiracy theory functioned as an efficient means by 
which to achieve this effect. 
                                     
105 Metin Gurcan, ÔTurkeyÕs New Erdoğan DoctrineÕ, Al Monitor, 4 November 2014. 
available at  www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-wants-use-its-hard-
power-solve-regional-problems.html (accessed 25 May 2017). For a study focusing 
specifically on polarization and the post-Gezi transformation of the AK Party, see E. Fuat 
Keyman, ÔThe AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and PolarizationÕ, Insight Turkey 2 
(2014), available at  www.insightturkey.com/the-ak-party-dominant-party-new-turkey-
and-polarization/articles/1426 (accessed 25 May 2017).  
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As a starting point from which to understand this process, we can remain 
squarely within the commonly accepted definition of elite framing as 
consisting of two analytical elements, built upon GoffmanÕs initial 
conceptualization of framing as so-called Ôschemata of interpretationÕ.106 
First, it incorporates what is referred to as Ôlegitimized framingÕ, 
frequently interpreted as the diagnostic stage of the event, that is to say, 
the moment in which the frame consists primarily of an ordering response 
to the contingency of the event, an acknowledgement of its existence 
more than an explanation for its occurrence.107 It is here that we can 
recognize the very first clues as to the constitutive potential that this 
stage presents, specifically in terms of countering the oppositionÕs own 
ÔdiagnosticÕ stage, which arguably occurs during the very first instances 
of protest, before the supposed momentum of mass mobilization.  
The Gezi protestorsÕ own framing must remain within this diagnostic 
stage. The constant re-framing of the ÔsurpriseÕ element of the protestsÕ 
occurrence becomes its own form of ontology and reason for its 
continued existence. The importance here is that even in the first stage 
of framing, the frame is already one that contains within its conception 
                                     
106 Goffman, Erving, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience 
(Cambridge, 1974). 
 
107 For a more in-depth analysis of the diagnostic frame, see Robert D. Benford and David 
Snow, ÔFraming Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and AssessmentÕ, Annual 
Review of Sociology 26 (2000), pp. 611Ð39.  
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the expectation of a continuation of framing efforts beyond the first 
conceptual stage. It is not a static or isolated step, but one that revolves 
around competing interpretations of the contingency of the event itself. 
For the protestors, their ÔriseÕ is no surprise yet must be framed as 
unexpected in order to achieve peak mobilizing success. For the State, on 
the other hand, the event is perhaps unexpected, but must be initially 
framed as being within the ordinary, and hence undeserving of 
(international) attention or coverage. Like the policeman who gestures 
Ônothing to see hereÕ the diagnostic stage of the elite response to the 
protests is one that seeks to rob it of its contingent potential.  
The idea of a conspiratorial elite framing represents a spin on the basic 
principle of diagnostic framing. After all, it is normally invoked in the 
context of conflict resolution. A conflict or contention is ÔdiagnosedÕ in 
order to define the nature of the problem. But this is not necessarily 
different in terms of the conspiracy frame, except that the desired 
outcome is a starkly different one. Where, in the conflict resolution 
literature the diagnostic stage is but the first in a longer process towards 
resolving the conflict, in the paranoid style, the diagnostic stage already 
exists as the positing of an antagonism, one that the elite framing 
mechanism is meant to ÔresolveÕ by diminishing its emancipatory potential 
and denying it the definition of being a ÔrealÕ issue in the first place.  
To this extent, when it comes to elite framing of conspiracy, the 
diagnostic frame is essentially an anti-diagnostic frame, which diagnoses 
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the non-existence of a real contingency and suggests the positing of non-
real contingency (conspiracy) as a superimposition thereupon. The 
diagnostic stage thus becomes anticipatory of a wider conspiratorial 
framing response, rather than one that seeks to begin resolving the 
conflict by acknowledging its underlying grievances. In this sense, a 
diagnostic frame can be both interpreted as conspiratorial, and in turn, 
the conspiracy frame itself can be a version of the diagnostic frame.   
A good way to think of this is in terms of TurkeyÕs longstanding ethnic 
conflicts. In one case, the diagnostic frame would begin by acknowledging 
the existence of what has become known as the ÔKurdish QuestionÕ.108 
From there, it would have to define what the Kurdish question is, so as to 
move towards possible means of resolving it. This can be done without 
the influence of any conspiratorial framing. After all, both sides 
acknowledge that there is a genuine conflict between the Kurdistan 
WorkersÕ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. In contrast to this, it would 
be much more unlikely for the Turkish political elite to introduce a 
                                     
108 There exists a wealth of literature on the Kurdish Question, spanning from 1946 to 
the present. For a comprehensive overview over time, see Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarihan 
(eds), Understanding TurkeyÕs Kurdish Question (Plymouth, 2013); Henry J. Barkey and 
Graham E. Fuller, TurkeyÕs Kurdish Question (Boston, 1998); W.G. Elphinston, ÔThe 
Kurdish QuestionÕ, International Affairs xxii/1 (1946), pp. 91Ð103. For more recent 
discussions of the peace process under AK party rule, see: Latif Tas, ÔPeace Making or 
State Breaking? The Turkish-Kurdish Peace processes and the Role of DiasporasÕ, Review 
of Social Studies, Vol 3. No 1 (2016), pp. 25-65; Latif Tas, ÔWhat kind of peace? The 
case of the Turkish and Kurdish peace processÕ, Open Democracy 9 (2015). 
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diagnostic frame for the Armenian Genocide.109 On the one hand, that is a 
conflict that has already ended, but the issue is more complicated than 
that. First addressing it would require an official acknowledgement of the 
genocide. Since the Turkish government does not recognize the killings as 
genocide and actively antagonizes those countries or groups who do, the 
diagnostic frame cannot be posited, at least not by TurkeyÕs political elite.  
In fact, whenever there arises the possibility of a diagnostic frame for the 
Armenian Genocide, this is readily interpreted as a conspiratorial effort to 
undermine the Turkish state. Yet finally, between these two modes, we 
can view the conspiracy frame itself as a diagnostic frame. The case of 
Gezi would suggest that there exists an elite acknowledgement of the 
protest event, but not of the protestorsÕ grievances. This means that 
while there is a diagnostic frame of sorts, it is not one that can lead to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. Gezi therefore elicits an elite framing 
response, which begins with a diagnostic frame, but it is not one that 
anticipates successful reconciliation, nor, for that matter, does it actively 
pursue a reconciliatory dialogue. 
Instead it is a distinctly conspiratorial diagnostic frame, one that finds 
evidence in Gezi for the supposed existence of a mass conspiracy against 
                                     
 
109 For a historical overview of TurkeyÕs elite framing narratives regarding the Armenian 
Genocide, see Jennifer M. Dixon, ÔDefending the Nation? Maintaining TurkeyÕs Narrative 
of the Armenian GenocideÕ, South European Society and Politics 3 (2010), pp. 467Ð85. 
And for a comprehensive historical analysis of the Armenian Genocide, see Raymond 
Kvorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History (London, 2011). 
 150 
the State. As a result the first stage of the conspiracy frame Ð being the 
diagnostic frame Ð has no need to be based on factual reality, but rather 
contorts, dispels and delegitimizes the idea of a framing contestation on 
equal terms. It uses the diagnosis of conspiracy as a way to define the 
protest contestation on the framerÕs terms, thus robbing the Gezi 
movement of its sole weapon, that of its radical contestation of the 
status quo. Conspiracy is a convenient vehicle for such a narrative 
takeover. Fear is a great inventor, but its greatest invention is that of 
fictional fear. Like PlatoÕs dreaded copy of a copy, the conspiracy frame 
mimics the enthusiasm begotten by the successful mobilization of Gezi, 
to saturate it with its own paranoid double of conspiratorial nationalism.110 
Such accusations serve to superimpose fictional resistance upon actual 
resistance, and juxtapose hope with fear. Therefore, the conspiratorial 
frame is also a frame that sabotages the framing process itself. It is not 
simply a manifestation of the framerÕs paranoia. It is a rejection of the 
legitimacy of any contestation of opposing frames. It not only mocks the 
idea of adversarial framing, it poisons the political debate precisely in 
order to reconsolidate its own constitutive sphere of politics and drown 
out the challenge posed by the protest event. It raises the stakes of the 
conflict, but in so doing alters the very nature of the original contention.  
                                     
 
110 In Platonic realism, the idea of the simulacrum is a dreaded distortion of the real. For 
a theoretical analysis of PlatoÕs simulacrum and its evolving meaning, see Gilles Deleuze, 
The Logic of Sense (ed. Constantin V. Boundas) (New York, 1990), p. 235.  
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To this extent, the conspiracy frame can be understood along the lines of 
what is essentially a Foucauldian frame, that is, a Ôposition of knowledgeÕ, 
rather than constituting a genuine diagnosis of the event in its own right. 
This can help us understand how the conspiracy frame takes root in the 
diagnostic stage, and continues into what is called the prognostic stage, 
the second tier of elite framing. In this stage, the elite framing strategy 
moves away from diagnosing the problem towards seeking to formulate a 
solution to it. But evidently this need not necessarily be a consensual 
process.  
Instead, what becomes a primary characteristic of this way of looking at 
the conflict is that it must build upon the categorizations introduced in 
the diagnostic frame. But this also creates an Othering effect, a process 
by which the conflict is situated as taking place outside the influence of 
the so-called Ôin-groupÕ.111 This is meant to enable a supposedly detached 
and practical solution, but in the case of the Gezi protests, the event 
took place precisely because there was a sense that such a detachment 
had already grown without acknowledgement. The only legitimate 
prognostic frame for the peaceful resolution of the protests would have 
required at the very least an acknowledgement of the issues around which 
the movement was based. Yet since the diagnostic frame had already 
                                     
 
111 William A. Gamson, David Croteau and William Hoynes, ÔMedia Images and the Social 
Construction of RealityÕ, Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992), pp. 373Ð93. See also 
Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Oxford, 1997). 
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denoted the resistance as conspiratorial, the only possible prognosis 
could be one of a violent state response. After all, when the government 
labeled the protestors as terrorists, conspirators and traitors, this 
constituted a clear attempt to vilify, but more importantly to isolate, the 
protestors as resting squarely outside the confines of its political 
responsibility. 
But this exclusion is of course also a constitutive claim. The conspiracy 
frame Ð whether in the diagnostic or prognostic stage, achieves a 
disenfranchisement of the conflict from its very origins. In the case of 
Gezi, once the diagnostic frame rendered the mass mobilization as an 
indication of conspiracy rather than a breakdown of civic relations due to 
an exacerbation of societal tensions, grievances and (economic) 
injustices, this led to the justification of a violent crackdown. So when we 
consider how in the social movement literature there exists a somewhat 
optimistic idea regarding how the prognostic frame can help compile, 
articulate and bring into focus seemingly incoherent demands made by 
non-hierarchical, so-called ÔhorizontalÕ protests, we should be wary of the 
fact that it can also do the exact opposite.112  
                                     
 
112 For an in-depth theoretical explanation of the Gezi movementÕs relationship to 
anarchism and horizontality, see the interview with the Istanbul anarchist collective 
ÔOtonomÕ: ÔThe Commune of Gezi: Genealogy, Power, ChallengesÕ, 1 August  2013, 
available at  www.ainfos.ca/04/aug/ainfos00112.html, 
http://www.commonware.org/index.php/cartografia/35-the-commune-of-gezi (accessed 
25 May 2017). For an overview of the various anarchist movements and student 
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In other words, the conspiracy frame distorts, silences and blurs these 
very narratives by superimposing its own conspiratorial musings. A simple 
adversarial frame would not achieve this effect, but the accusation of 
conspiracy does. In other words, when the conspiracy frame takes on the 
form of both diagnostic and prognostic framing, it situates both within a 
profoundly paranoid rendering of the real conditions underlying the mass 
mobilization of anti-government protestors. Yes, the protests took the 
country by storm, but first they had to take it by surprise. The conspiracy 
frame manages to effectively mitigate this contingency. And in so doing, 
conspiracy relocates the narrative axis of the protests. 
  
Protesting the Frame, Framing the Protest 
A good way to illustrate this build-up of meaning in frames is with a well-
known Picasso anecdote. Picasso is at work in his atelier in occupied Paris. 
Suddenly, a member of the military police comes barging in. He sees a 
print of PicassoÕs Guernica standing against the wall. Admiringly, he 
exclaims ÔDid you do that?Õ ÔNo,Õ replies Picasso. ÔYou did!Õ The humour of 
the anecdote lies in the disconnect between the aesthetic experience of 
the painting and the violence underlying its creation. The intuitive 
distancing of the officer, who does not recognize his own work in the 
                                                                                                           
organizations in Turkey from 1986 to 2004, see Batur Ozdink, ÔAnarchism in TurkeyÕ, A-
Infos: a multilingual news service by, for and about anarchists (2004) (accessed 25 May 
2017).  
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painting but that of the painter, effectively illustrates the separation of 
the object of orientation within the confines of the frame.  
Simply put, the frame and its content are like the skin of a fish: delicious 
when cooked together, but better separated before consumption. In 
other words, the frame as a physical manifestation, as something that can 
be interpreted, reacted to and re-framed by others does not need to have 
a strictly synonymous relationship with the content of the frame. What 
this means for the conspiracy frame is that, despite the evident untruth 
of its content, the frame itself can take on true meaning in its 
dissemination. PicassoÕs response (that the officer was responsible for the 
event that inspired the painting) illustrates that while the artist is the 
primary framer, what he is truly framing is not the event depicted, but 
the implied agency of the event. This is what makes it such a critical 
painting. It accuses without depicting the accused. One frame builds upon 
the other, and the framer cannot wield full control over its dissemination. 
The frameÕs greatest flaw is also its greatest strength. It cannot be 
controlled, yet if it becomes hegemonic within the appropriate contextual 
setting, it is almost impossible to challenge.  
This can be applied in reverse to the idea of the conspiracy frame. After 
all, it manages to occupy a space in which the truth content of all other 
frames is cast into doubt.113 The process in which the conspiracy frame 
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takes on real meaning is one in which all other frames lose their meaning. 
Paranoid elite framing thus manages to both exploit the frameÕs weakness 
by creating a frame that is purposefully fictional, while exploiting its 
greatest strength, which is the frameÕs ability to contest, alter and, in this 
case, obscure other framing efforts such as that of the Gezi protestors. 
The conspiracy frame becomes parasitic on the idea of framing itself. 
                                                                                                           
113 The dichotomy between scepticism and cynicism, which I would cautiously suggest is 
a misleading one (at least in the current context), nonetheless offers an opportune 
starting point on which to base a theoretical reconsideration of conspiratorial accounts 
of political processes. The problem, however, that arises when one considers conspiracy 
theory in such a light is that it situates a certain revolutionary force in the notion of 
being able to establish a truth that is considered untrue by the status quo; or more 
precisely, the constitution of a truth that finds its truth content in the positing of an 
opposition to the status quo. This is in and of itself not necessarily problematic. The 
contradiction, however, becomes apparent when one argues Ð as I do here Ð that 
conspiracy theory is a language of winners. But how, then, can the winners, i.e. the 
political elite, consider themselves both revolutionary as well as being part of the status 
quo? To me, this seeming impossibility is not so much a dilemma as it is the central 
premise of the force of the conspiracy theory, when propounded by the political elite. 
For it achieves the positing of a self-internalized contestation to its own status quo, in 
which it must necessarily come out the winner. So, what the conspiracy theory in this 
mode allows is for the State to posit both the terms along which the status quo is 
framed, as well as seeking to define the (fictional) opposition to its own legitimacy. The 
implicit notion in conspiracy theory, similar to what MacDonald defined as the central 
characteristic of the revolutionary, is after all that the conspiracy theorist can see the 
real truth of things precisely because, unlike the realpolitiker, there are no taboos that 
he is not willing to break. In other words, when the idea of conspiracy theory is deprived 
of its oppositional value, it does not lose its revolutionary premise. In fact, when 
employed by the state, the idea of conspiracy theory can allow it to re-imagine itself in 
ways it could not formerly have legitimized. The suspicion therefore emerges, that there 
may well be a certain strategic element to the employment of distinctly non-rational 
antagonistic framing, precisely when framed by members of the political elite.  
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This means that the conspiracy frame becomes not only, as I put it 
earlier, a frame that frames the frame, it also distinctly subverts the very 
idea of a frame. This may seem counter-intuitive, but relies on a fairly 
simple premise, that the conspiracy frame questions the agency implicit in 
framing itself. Therefore it is less interested in the content of any given 
frame (both its own and competing frames) but instead seeks to 
undermine the legitimacy of framing tout court. In order to understand 
this better, we should return to GoffmanÕs original concept of framing as 
what he called a Ôschemata of interpretationÕ.114 
In GoffmanÕs conceptualization of the frame, it acts much as a physical 
picture frame in that it in equal measure reflects and restricts public 
perceptions. These cognitive frames then become ÔrealitiesÕ in their own 
right. This means that the frame can be employed strategically to 
influence not only the interpretation of events, but also the response to 
them, and even their outcomes. More recent studies expand upon this by 
moving towards the progressive forces such an act might entail or help 
bring about. Snow has therefore hinted at the agency inherent in the 
operationalization of frames as a liberating process, their ability to 
determine what is Ôin frameÕ and what is Ôout of frameÕ in relation to the 
object of orientation constituting an emancipation of sorts. In this sense 
the frame functions both as the Ôarticulation mechanismÕ inasmuch as it 
                                     
 
114 Erving Goffman, Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience (New 
Haven, 1974), p. 21. 
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performs a Ôtransformative functionÕ.115 Once more, the conspiracy frame 
can achieve this effect in reverse. It becomes a veritable gravitational pull 
for all other framing attempts.  
What Snow calls the Ôobject of orientationÕ therefore contains a hint as to 
the breakdown it initiates in competing framing attempts that make it so 
effective despite its implausibility or even evident untruth. In this, frames 
are always composites of meaning, both inserting themselves above and 
sifting behind the underlying construction of the frameÕs ÔrealityÕ, and 
seeking to break out of the confines of the frame at any given moment. 
Like mildew spreading through a bookshelf, one need but put a non-
conspiratorial frame next to a conspiracy frame, and the mould of its 
untruth will spread throughout. What matters most here is therefore not 
simply that the frame can be strategically invoked or employed, but that 
there can never exist a singular frame that dominates the framing process 
as a whole. This has distinct ramifications for the conspiracy frame. Since 
it can never achieve full control over the framing process as a whole, that 
is to say, it cannot eradicate contesting frames entirely (although 
repression of free speech is one attempt to do so), the closest it can get 
to achieving its goal is to tarnish the idea of framing itself. In essence, the 
conspiracy frame poisons the well from which public discourse flows. 
                                     
115 David A. Snow, ÔFraming and social movementsÕ, The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Social and Political Movements (2012) p. 470. 
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This corruption by the conspiracy frame is therefore a distinctly 
productive one, even if it does not acknowledge the legitimacy of any 
frames of resistance or even revolve around any possible reality. And in 
turn, knowing that the conspiracy frame is false does not mean that it 
can be effectively parried. Instead, all the resources of contesting frames 
become preoccupied in debating what is already evidently a falsehood. 
This is not unlike what Foucault refers to as the doubly murderous 
gesture in the Ôdeath of godÕ, wherein the knowledge that there is no god 
in and of itself drives the agnostic to seek alternate ÔlimitsÕ to this 
nothingness, thereby reproducing and acting out the very forces which 
the denial of a godly existence sought to abolish in the first place.116  
To put this more simply, the conspiracy frame takes on all the hallmarks 
of the real precisely because of the contesting forces that summon it into 
existence. The anxiety perpetuated by the conspiracy frame is one of the 
seeming disintegration of all truths, a relativism of sorts, in which all other 
frames are pulled into its orbit. It is not the evident falsehood of the 
accusation of conspiracy itself that does this, but the forces of its own 
realization, which in turn come about through its contestation. The 
debate is no longer whether Gezi is based on legitimate or non-legitimate 
grievances, but whether it constitutes evidence of conspiracy or not. This 
is no mere red herring. It is a dragnet that pulls all fish in its wake. 
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(ed. James D. Faubion) (New York, 1998). 
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But there is an evident danger in such an erosion of meaning. For in the 
same way in which those who find everything beautiful are in danger of 
finding nothing beautiful, so too does the paranoid who frames every 
opposition as treasonous run the risk of neglecting existing dangers. 
When all framing becomes conspiratorial, this cannot simply be undone by 
a (counter)-hegemonic frame. Instead, it must be perpetuated. The taint 
of the conspiracy frame spreads through the political system and its 
institutions. To this extent, the positing of an elite conspiracy frame is 
really a scorched earth tactic. If conspiracy theory is to be a successful 
political framing strategy, there is a heavy price to be paid. All political 
action comes to be subject to conspiratorial interpretations, and in turn, 
begets escalating counter-conspiratorial action. In other words, the 
conspiracy frameÕs logical conclusion is that it submerges even resistance 
thereto into what is essentially a master frame of conspiracy. 
The emergence of what is therefore essentially a conspiratorial politics (to 
which the conspiracy frame is integral) eradicates all previous political 
gains from its path. It severs ties with TurkeyÕs progressive credentials, it 
undermines fruitful relations with its allies, it corrodes the possibility of a 
peace process with the Kurds, and it antagonizes the very democratic 
rights that it sought to provide its people: the right to free speech 
(effectively the right to dissent), and the right to participate critically in 
civil society. In this regard, the politicoÕs urgency in sustaining the 
paranoia of conspiracy evokes HofstadterÕs poetic observation that the 
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conspiratorial framer Ôtraffics in the birth and death of whole political 
orders [...] He constantly lives at a turning point: it is now or never in 
organizing resistance to conspiracy.Õ117 Between now and never, there is a 
perpetual tension, an implied existential threat, but also a welcome 
opportunity to act out the heroics of the nation state. The conspiracy 
frame harnesses this distortion to its full theatrical and ultimately 
destructive effect.  
The ParanoiacÕs Problematic, Problematizing Paranoia 
The paranoiacÕs dilemma is thus that the conspiracy theory, that is, the 
anticipation of contingent resistance, must be sustained precisely so as to 
detract from ÔgenuineÕ forms of resistance. To this extent, when the 
diagnostic and prognostic stages are merged, they become properly 
dialectical, positing both a means and an end. This means that the 
conspiracy is both a form of diagnostic and prognostic framing, inasmuch 
as it links the two in a perpetual loop. It therefore becomes both at once. 
It is both the proffered diagnosis and the prognostication of a solution. 
This brings us back to the three modes of conspiracy from the previous 
chapter. First, the diagnostic frame is that of identifying a conspiratorial 
other. Second, the prognostic frame is that of expanded state powers to 
counter this supposed conspiratorial threat. Third is the emergence of 
                                     
117 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American PoliticsÕ, HarperÕs Magazine, 
November 1964, available at https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-
in-american-politics/5/ (accessed 28 May 2017). 
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new and emergent forms of resistance to the State in the form of post-
Gezi contingencies, be they successive protests or even the coup 
attempt.    
To this extent, even the framing of false conspiracy can only ever be but 
a placeholder for the unstoppable build-up of pressure such a society 
begets. In turn, this pressure must be released somehow, as the paranoid 
state begins to consume itself in the hunt for ever-revenant enemies, 
enemies it now requires for the continued enforcement and legitimization 
of its counter-conspiratorial measures. The problem this creates is that 
even otherwise democratic processes, such as the election or referendum 
vote on enhanced presidential powers, take place under the auspices of 
strongman tactics and conspiratorial fear-mongering. As Chantal Mouffe 
warns us in The Democratic Paradox, this game, of a conspiratorial 
democracy Ð a managed democracy Ð is not worth the candle. After all, it 
requires a perpetuation of the conspiratorial mode into what can only 
become a totalitarian escalation. In her analysis (drawing upon the 
Derridean notion of the constitutive outside), she argues that antagonism 
becomes Ôirreducible to a simple process of dialectical reversal: the 
ÒthemÓ is not the constitutive opposite of a concrete ÒusÓ, but the 
symbol of what makes any ÒusÓ impossibleÕ.118  
In other words, the framed and perceived friend/enemy relationship 
similar to that in the response to the coup attempt becomes inherently 
                                     
118 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London, 2009), p. 12. 
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destructive, in that it creates a framework in which the ÔpoliticalÕ is only 
so to the extent that it serves to delineate these polarities, rather than 
seeking to find common ground from which the underlying issues might 
be resolved. While on the face of it, it may seem a good thing to pull 
away from consensual or centrist deliberative politics, what happens 
instead is that any actual political opportunity structures, or what Mouffe 
calls Ôagonistic pluralismÕ, are reduced to a hardening of opposition along 
increasingly fictional and hyperbolic repercussions of accusatory framing. 
This can be seen in Turkey, where the premise of any effective 
parliamentary opposition has become increasingly unfeasible. Not because 
a consensus has been reached, but because the parameters of 
contestation, of consent and dissent, can no longer be articulated from a 
position of political reality, or indeed, from a position of reasonable 
security.  
Instead, the practice of politics takes on a distinctly Protagorean tinge, in 
which political skill is reduced to the acquisition of political virtue. Yet we 
must be careful here not to make the common error of attributing to 
Protagoras the idea that practice equals skill and skills equals practice. 
The skill evoked in the conspiracy frameÕs idea of leadership is one, not of 
democratic principles, but of paranoid intent. This is why it is more 
interesting to observe how ProtagorasÕ dictum implies essentially a 
negative acquisition of the capacity to rule. He writes that practice is 
nothing without skill, and skill is nothing without practice. This quickly 
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evolves into a proto-Stoic redundancy in which practice is nothing and 
skill is nothing, lest the two find meaning in their interrelation. This holds 
equally true for the conspiracy frameÕs relationship to the truth (apropos 
its truth content) in the articulation of political practice. So while in 
conspiratorial framing man is the measure of all things, he is more 
importantly also the measure of all that is not. In other words, the 
conspiracy frame is ÔtrueÕ to the extent that it is the result of a distinct 
statement of political virtue, as a negative statement of what it is not. In 
other words, the framer of conspiracy is the one who lays claim to the 
non-conspiratorial, righteous space. By virtue of delineating conspiracy, 
the conspiratorial framer is suggesting his own position ÔwithinÕ virtue, 
that is, within the parameters of political legitimacy.  
The dilemma for the paranoid politician is that this ÔvirtueÕ, even if 
translated into political popularity, can still only beget a democracy that is 
now rendered suspicious, a conspiratorial democracy as it were. This 
means that even future progress in terms of democratization in Turkey 
will be tarnished by the paranoid means by which it was achieved. This is a 
high price, but one that the paranoid politician and the political elite must 
be willing to pay. The conspiracy frame thus serves at once as the 
catalyst, the vehicle and the outcome of this antagonistic stance towards 
political participation (or lack thereof) and the democratic legitimacy with 
which it wishes to endow its powers. As such, the political process in 
Turkey is in essence reduced to a perpetual series of votes of confidence 
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either for or against the strongman position vis--vis the idea of 
opposition, as witnessed by the vote on expanded presidential powers, 
immediately followed by the suggestion of a possible vote on reinstating 
the death penalty. This means that it becomes impossible to return to a 
consensual, parliamentary form of democracy. After all, there is no 
consensus to be reached, only enemies to be vanquished. Democracy and 
conspiratorial politics can be wed, but it is hardly a happy marriage. 
 
Framing time: Frozen Conflicts, Peace Frames and Revolutionary Time 
 
At this stage I must address a puzzle that has so far been purposely 
neglected. The framing of Gezi, be it conspiratorial or on behalf of the 
protestors, becomes essentially a temporal contestation. This is evident 
in the typical enrag style of protest, which has the disruption of public 
perceptions of time and space as its main goal. So we would do well to 
consider the state response to Gezi and the conspiracy frame invoked to 
do so along similar such lines of temporal manipulation. Simply put, if we 
are to understand the full impact of the conspiracy frame, this requires an 
exploration of the central role that its perception of ÔtimeÕ plays in its bid 
to regain control over the protest frame.  
If even the diagnostic frame is one that suggests a long-lurking 
conspiracy, this means that there is a contestation of temporality at the 
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heart of the conspiracy frame. This poses certain challenges. First, the 
anti-Gezi framing ÔstrategyÕ is one that exists beyond the temporal 
boundaries of the event. Its impact continues years after the protests 
ended. Secondly, it can therefore be seen how the conspiracy frame 
deliberately warps time and conflates frames of resistance to negate their 
own temporal contestations. What this means for us is that we need to 
consider the conspiracy frame not merely as a manipulator of agency, but 
also of temporality, of the experience of time. 
Of course the reason the conspiracy frame situates the protests quite 
literally as being Ôthe greatest battle of our timeÕ is that it only does so to 
the extent that the Gezi protestÕs framing strategy hinges on a 
destabilization of temporal elements. The occupation of public spaces and 
the lengthy and radical exemption from participating in society 
contributes not only to the emancipatory potential of the movement, but 
was also instrumental in provoking the conspiracy frame. After all, how 
could these youthful protestors be anything but conspirators if they could 
afford to exempt themselves from their professional responsibilities to 
instead loiter in a park? Or so the state response would have it.  
In the previous chapter we briefly touched upon this by considering the 
contingent element in the idea of conspiratorial resistance, and the extent 
to which contingency becomes a de facto necessity in the paranoid style. 
In the following sections, therefore, let us consider this problem through 
the framing of (1) the ÔfrozenÕ nature of the Gezi conflict and how this 
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correlates with and detracts from the technical term in the conflict 
literature. Then (2) I suggest we consider how the conspiracy frame can 
posit itself as a so-called Ôpeace frameÕ. And finally, (3) we should 
consider how the notion of ÔmomentumÕ, that is to say, the escalation of 
GeziÕs grassroots mobilization, both raised and altered the stakes of the 
conflict in a way that came to be framed as conspiratorial. To add to the 
list of the conspiracy frameÕs manifold capabilities, we can now consider it 
as a time-traveler, a manipulator of time and space. This is not an 
accidental outcome of conspiratorial framing. Instead, the contestation of 
time lies at the very heart of its paranoid allure. 
So if we are going to think about, for want of a better word, 
Ôconspiratorial timeÕ, what better way to begin than with the perceived 
absence of time altogether? Let us begin by addressing the concept of 
Ôfrozen conflictÕ. There is, of course, already the implication of a certain a 
priori paradox here. For a conflict to be frozen entails the passing of time 
without any prospect of its resolution. But this is a continuation of 
hegemony, an imposed freezing, not a natural state. And in reverse, to do 
so requires a state of repressed conflict, a society that cannot move 
forward without resolving the contention that lies seemingly dormant. 
This means that the very idea of a frozen conflict contains conflicting 
interpretations of its relationship with time. For a conflict to be frozen, it 
must be actively kept frozen, which in turn implies a state of rigor mortis 
for the progression of the society preoccupied with so doing.  
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A conflict can never simply be frozen, in a pure state of suspension. It 
must either actively be kept frozen, or be unfrozen. It is not a neutral 
state. This implies agency, which in turn implies temporality. Even a 
frozen conflict is a contested one. The conflict we speak of here, that of 
the Gezi protests, is of itself an attempt to ÔunfreezeÕ a society: a frozen 
state, as it were. In frozen conflict, temporality emerges as problem and 
solution, both means and end. In this, it is not unlike the paralysis induced 
by the conspiracy frame, in which the perceived unpredictability and 
irrationality of political behaviour renders the political suspended yet 
exposed to perpetual turmoil. 
The way this works is simple, but relies to a great degree on whether or 
not one considers Gezi a ÔconflictÕ. On the one hand, the social movement 
and conflict literature posit Ð rather optimistically to my mind Ð that 
protest can serve as a means by which frozen conflicts can be unfrozen, 
or defrosted (to stretch the metaphor). In this interpretation, if protests 
generate a resurgent awareness of the conflict, and if this then leads to a 
Ônational conversationÕ, and if this realigns attitudes towards the conflict, 
and if this results in a newfound desire to seek political solutions to the 
conflict, then the conflict can be resolved.  
On the other hand, there are evidently an abundance of ÔifsÕ in this 
equation, which is why I find it doubtful that protest can be considered in 
such terms. And there is another blind spot to be determined here, for 
this interpretation neglects the seemingly obvious dilemma that the 
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protests themselves might be considered a conflict, and that in their 
repression a secondary frozen conflict becomes perpetuated. So to be 
clear, I do employ the concept of frozen conflict as it exists in the social 
movement literature, but only to the extent that it situates the protest 
as the catalyst for a radical shift in the perception of conflict, not as a 
possible ÔunfreezingÕ or even solution thereof. In the case of Gezi, the 
protests certainly did not serve to ÔthawÕ any one given frozen conflict. 
They were an attempt to address what the protestors perceived to be a 
frozen society, a contemporary Turkey that was not working for its 
citizens. To bring this back to the contestation of temporality, what this 
means is that the idea of a frozen conflict, a frozen society or even a 
frozen resistance becomes linked to practices that can be deftly 
dismissed as conspiratorial, rather than being recognized as born out of 
genuine grievances. 
This means that instead of constituting a thawing of frozen time, the Gezi 
protests actively sought to freeze time and create a frozen conflict within 
the confines of the occupation of the park. In other words, the Gezi 
protestors effectively froze a non-conflict situation, thereby seeking to 
emphasize that for them the status quo as it existed was already a form 
of frozen conflict. This is a doubling trick, a mirror image as it were, that 
sits at the very heart of the enrag-style protest. It achieves the 
disruption of a public space, not by uprooting it, but by exacerbating its 
given function, hence emphasizing its importance.  
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There is a certain irony here, which becomes apparent when one considers 
one of the most often cited criticisms of the Gezi movement. This went 
somewhat along the lines of Ôwhy do they seek to protect a park that was 
never popular in the first place? Now that it will be demolished, they are 
gathering where they never used to. They suddenly care so much about 
its existence, when just a week ago no young person would ever spend 
their day, let alone the night, there!Õ But this should not be a mitigating 
factor. On the contrary, it only emphasizes what I have described as the 
exacerbation of the enrag protest. Such protest takes an existing place 
and exaggerates its function. In this case, the effect was thus the 
stronger, as Gezi went from a practically empty green space to that of 
the central symbol of TurkeyÕs progressive factions, its hopes, dreams 
and contentions. This did not take place in Gezi despite the parkÕs relative 
unpopularity. It took place because of it. The movement therefore 
effectively seized upon the ÔideaÕ of a thriving city centre, staging its own 
carnivalesque version thereof, precisely so as to protest its deterioration 
as a communal gathering place, and indeed its imminent destruction. 
In sum, such protest does not ÔunfreezeÕ a frozen conflict. It dramatizes 
the idea of a status quo that is frozen in time by seeking a public space 
to freeze in time. In other words, the notion of frozen conflict is not a 
mere binary state between conflict and resolution. Instead, the protests 
suggest a freeze-frame of sorts, one that exists in parallel to the notion 
of a frozen conflict. Of course, it is precisely in this space that it can be 
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both at its most emancipatory, yet equally at its most vulnerable to 
conspiratorial counter-framing. So ultimately it is not even that important 
whether Gezi is, strictly speaking, a frozen conflict or not. More important 
is that in seeking to counter the protests, the Turkish state must also 
ÔfreezeÕ itself in time, by creating a state of emergency, a repression of 
civil liberties and introducing a violent police response. But in both 
framing attempts, be they conspiratorial or emancipatory, the idea of a 
frozen temporality is key to the process underlying either position. In 
other words, while the Gezi protestors ÔfrozeÕ the park so as to unfreeze 
Turkish democracy, the Turkish government responded by effectively 
freezing the civil liberties of the people.  
The irony of course is that the very impossibility of peacefully resolving 
this contestation leads to what is essentially a veritable frozen conflict, 
that of the post-Gezi purges, the consolidation of executive power, and 
the post-coup crackdown.119 Yet this does not yield a thriving democratic 
                                     
 
119 This is where I feel obliged to point out an inconsistency commonly invoked by anti-
government commentators and Gezi-sympathizers, which is to lament why a majority of 
the population would rally in support of the AK Party despite numerous political 
scandals, ranging from the pettily fraudulent to the outright criminal. The inconsistency 
lies in the fact that critics would have it that somehow the Gezi protests should have 
arisen, not out of the inherent contradictions of the current political system in Turkey, 
but out of disgruntlement with their own political inefficacy. In other words, they would 
deny that it was the very logical breaks ensuing from the current political status quo 
that led to the grievances, which fuelled the protests. In essence, the onlooker who 
cries, ÔWhy do these people vote for the AK Party!? Even after Gezi?Õ neglects the fact 
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society, nor is it necessarily a frozen conflict. Be it managed democracy 
or outright authoritarianism, the foundations of Turkish democracy are no 
longer as sound as they once seemed, and many of its citizens now live in 
a situation more akin to a frozen conflict than they did during the Gezi 
protests. For now the Turkish government prefers the hammer to the 
anvil. But in the contest for democracy, it is the anvil and not the hammer 
that constitutes the true prize. 
  
The Conspiratorial Peace Frame 
There is a final reversal that occurs in the temporal play of the conspiracy 
frame. This can be summed up simply, but includes two further elements 
(dormant time and momentum), which for the sake of clarity should be 
considered separately.120 To begin with, this can be put as follows. In the 
                                                                                                           
that it was this discrepancy between the partyÕs popularity and shortcomings that led to 
the protests in the first place. And even though the AK Party further aggravated this 
perceived inequality, for example by providing free transport to mobilize counter-
protests, it should come as no surprise that Gezi only fuelled the righteousness of AK 
Party loyalists, rather than dissuading them. In this sense, proponents of a Gezi spirit 
have touched upon at least one fundamental truth: that the demolition of Gezi Park itself 
was never a sufficiently inflammatory issue to justify the scale and outsized proportions 
of the ensuing nationwide protests in comparison to other local demonstrations that 
took place just weeks before. Instead, the issue of the park became a rallying ground, 
not in order to form an electoral majority, but to focus on a collectivity that could 
challenge the narrative of AK Party majoritarianism. 
 
120 That being said, they are of course clearly related. I separate them in the main body 
of the text simply for the purpose of maximizing the comprehensiveness of the 
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state response to Gezi the conspiracy frame, pace its fantastical 
politicians, takes on the deceptive form of a so-called peace frame. This 
may seem to run counter to my earlier suggestion that the conspiracy 
frame is in essence an infectious adversarial frame. But on closer 
inspection, it reveals itself to be both.  
Yes, the conspiracy frame is adversarial, and indeed it creates a fictional 
adversary to superimpose upon the real contingent resistance. However, 
the way it does this is by being posited as a peace frame. That is to say, 
in the paranoid style the diagnosis of conspiracy, and the prognosis of a 
violent state response, leads to the formation of a deeply subverted 
manifestation of what can then be thought of, in an admittedly clunky-
sounding syllogism, as the conspiratorial peace frame. A good way to 
                                                                                                           
argument. But their relationship, and the problematic that exists therein, can be 
characterized as follows: the conceptualization of momentum as existing in contrast to, 
and hence in tandem with, the idea of dormant time does not adequately explain its 
relevance. Instead, what is more important than the Ôactive but unacknowledgedÕ versus 
the Ôinactive but acknowledgedÕ dichotomy of the mechanisms implicit in dormant time 
and momentum is the implied contingency that leaves the movement vulnerable to 
adversarial framing. Here the critique of momentum follows the same pattern, as is the 
case with dormant time. Firstly, the reliance on an ambiguous notion of both the 
supposed inevitability and the necessity of a momentum ÔmomentÕ for social movement 
success, creates a narrative of events that is conditional on the unpredictable, almost 
magically elusive instance in which the protests ÔeruptÕ, and hence reach the public 




think of this is in terms of a typically Brechtian inversion. ÔPlease, donÕt 
tell me peace has broken out!Õ121 
But what does this mean, for peace to Ôbreak outÕ? The humour of 
BrechtÕs quip clearly lies in its ironic reversal of war and peace. After all, 
we tend to see peace as a celebratory end to war, not as something to be 
lamented. Yet the warning implied in BrechtÕs jibe is precisely that of the 
effect embodied by the conspiracy frameÕs own reversal. That is to say, 
when protest is seen as evidence of conspiracy, as a conflict begotten by 
enemies of the State, then the solution to it must be one of restoring the 
peace by oppressing the movement. It is therefore a peace that denies 
the Gezi movementÕs pacifism, as much as it is an implicit way of saying 
that the State must retain what is commonly referred to in the literature 
as a Ômonopoly of violenceÕ.  
Yet isnÕt this yet another paradox? To frame the protest movement as 
anti-peace, but to forcefully respond with police violence to restore the 
peace appears to be a contradiction in terms. This is, then, exactly what 
the conspiracy frame as peace frame achieves. It can be both, and yet 
remains neither. In keeping with our focus on temporality, the conspiracy 
frame as peace frame thus suggests that the protests form an aberration, 
an isolated moment in time, a deviation from the peace otherwise secured 
                                     
121 I am referring to the character of Mutter CourageÕs exclamation in Scene 8, ÔSagen 
Sie mir nicht, da§ Friede ausgebrochen istÕ (ÔDo not tell me that peace has broken outÕ; 
translation my own) in: Bertolt Brecht, Mutter Courage und Ihre Kinder (Berlin, 1996), p. 
77. 
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by the State; whereas for the protestors it is the exact opposite. They 
must frame the movement as the true continuation of the democratic 
promise of modern Turkey, and the Erdoğan government as the exception 
to the rule. In other words, when one sees how the conspiratorial frame 
takes on the facets of the peace frame, which in turn justifies an 
escalation of the conflict, it becomes apparent that this invariably leads 
back to the very hegemony the protestors sought to resist in the first 
place. Or, to put this differently, the conspiracy frame as peace frame 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy inasmuch as it is a self-perpetuating 
one. It is but another way to delegitimize the protests, and in so doing 
robs them of the narrative agency required for sustained resistance, let 
alone lasting change. 
The relationship between the peace frame and the conspiratorial frame 
thus appears to be circular, and therein lies the premise of its temporal 
claim. Seen in this light, the peace frame comes to represent a stagnated 
time, a dormant time as it were.122 And it is this form of peace, one in 
which there is a hegemony rather than a consensus that the conspiracy 
frame seeks to impose on all resistance to the State; a peace in which 
                                     
122 Take for example the well-known pax Augusta, otherwise known as the pax Romana. 
The peace, in this case, lasted a lengthy 206 years, two centuries marked by a cessation 
of hostilities between the Roman Empire and its enemies. But of course this was only a 
relatively peaceful period, not an absolutely peaceful one. It was an enforced peace, not 
a complete lack of resistance. But it remains a notable peace precisely because of the 
Roman success in sustaining the relative weakness of their adversaries to effect a 
creeping expansion of the Roman Empire, rather than the outright warmongering that 
had preceded it. 
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there can be no genuine resistance. For even if there is the occasional 
skirmish, protest or uprising, this will be dismissed as evidence of 
conspiracy, not as a failure to sustain the peace. The peace posited by 
the conspiracy frame is therefore effectively a potent banality. It speaks 
to the imagination, but at heart it is a distinctly temporal framing 
contestation situating the status quo as enduring, and the protest as 
occurring outside of time, a deterrent to this enforced peace. 
I began this section by putting aside two further elements of what 
constitutes the conspiratorial peace frame. It is now time to incorporate 
these into the idea of the peace frame. The first underlying factor is that 
of a so-called Ôdormant timeÕ. The second is that of ÔmomentumÕ. Indeed 
the two cannot be entirely separated, for they both revolve around the 
central axis of a contested temporality. To put this differently, both the 
ideas of dormant time and momentum are crucial to the relative success 
of either the protest movementÕs or the state responseÕs framing 
strategy.  
The concept of dormant time has become increasingly crucial to the 
study of frozen conflict. The concept refers to that elusive moment in a 
peace process during which the possibility of a resolution seems least 
likely. In a protracted conflict this can also be a moment, or time-span for 
that matter, during which there is a cessation of direct forms of hostility, 
but nevertheless very little desire, and hence opportunity, for the 
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negotiation of a settlement.123 Naturally, dormant time can itself be 
subject to framing,124 and/or provide the mantle under which preparations 
for negotiations can take place, so does not exist outside the framing 
process in some sort of objective ether. Instead, dormant time, and the 
contestation of whether or not the dormant time is one that favours the 
protest or the state response are vital components of the temporal 
contestation of the peace frame.  
Of particular importance here is the process by which the contest appears 
as a ÔmomentÕ, a contingent event, rather than as an inevitable and 
urgent outcome of a crisis of realization and representation. And while 
the emphasis on ÔmomentumÕ appears crucial to capture the imagination 
of the public and the (inter)national media, the dilemma that presents 
itself is how to frame the protests as inevitable, rather than as arbitrary 
events. In this sense, dormant time and momentum are not merely 
opposites, they reaffirm the elements in each other that validate them in 
the first place. Specifically, the ambiguous temporality of dormant time 
                                     
 
123 Edward Azar, ÔProtracted International Conflicts: Ten PropositionsÕ, International 
Interactions 1 (1985), pp. 59Ð70; John Paul Lederach, ÔConflict Transformation in 
Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive FrameworkÕ, in Kumar 
Rupesinghe (ed.), Protracted Internal Conflicts (London, 1995), pp. 201Ð22; Tozun 
Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebnik, De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty 
(London, 2004).   
 
124 Neophytos Loizides, Designing Peace: Cyprus and Institutional Innovations in Divided 
Societies (Philadelphia, 2016), p. 155. 
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could not be accepted as real without the promise of the elusive golden 
egg of momentum. And in reverse, momentum would not have the 
potential to capture the imagination in the way it does, were it not for the 
incorporeal way in which dormant time is encapsulated in the mobilization 
process.  
The problem that presents itself here can be stated in fairly simple terms. 
In the conflict analysis literature, dormant time is essentially a negative 
period. That is to say, there is little to no likelihood of resolving the 
conflict. Again, protest is here seen as a way to move beyond dormant 
time into an active time, a reframing of sorts. But the problem is that for 
any protest to be successful in achieving this requires a manipulation of 
the idea of dormant time in the first place. If one considers the Gezi 
protests as a form of enrag protest, then this suggests that its 
successful mobilization can only be achieved by creating a sense of 
stagnant time, a staging of frozen time in public places. If the entire goal 
is to disrupt, to force awareness of the status quo, this can only be 
achieved by essentially pulling the subject out of its ordinary relationship 
to the real. In other words, while the Gezi protests do not posit a 
conspiracy theory of society as such, they do rely on a strategic effect 
achieved by mass mobilization, which shifts the perception of the real.  
This is where the idea of dormant time remains too inflexible. Its 
movement into a more active time of reconciliation can only take place 
precisely when the protest and, in turn, the state response to it take on 
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the uncanny hallmarks of being both wildly active and deeply dormant. 
This is not to say that there exists no true dormant stage as such, but 
allowing it to be framed as dormant ÔtimeÕ negates the potential to prove 
any notion of a structural and long-term contentiousness that is not 
singular or frozen in time, but embodies both to their maximum theatrical, 
and hopefully emancipatory, potential. The danger, then, is that this 
doubling of dormant and active time can be equally achieved by means of 
a conspiratorial framing strategy. The conspiratorial peace frame is one 
way to achieve this, and from therein, similar forces are implored, but to 
repressive rather than progressive ends. 
So the idea of a dormant time is as crucial to understanding the 
temporality implied in the peace frame as it is to the resolution of a given 
conflict. In the mode of the conspiracy frame, dormant time is but further 
evidence of hidden enemies waiting to rise up. The reader will no doubt 
have come to realize that all forms of the conspiracy frame boil down to 
this paranoiac suffusion. But for the Gezi framing strategy, the resistance 
frame as it were, the idea of a dormant time is a vital component of the 
process by which it achieves momentum. This, in turn, is vital to its 
success, or at the very least, crucial to its mobilization strategy.  
This perceived distinction between ÔdormantÕ and ÔactiveÕ periods of time 
is therefore a cornerstone in both the state response to the protests, and 
the protests themselves. Indeed, if one looks closely, the entirety of the 
competing framing strategies seek to establish the protest event as 
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taking place either outside, or within, time. In the framing of the state 
response, the protestors are always evading or corrupting time. Their 
protest takes precious time out of peopleÕs daily lives. They are behind 
the times, out of time, then arrested to serve time. Yet in the eyes of the 
protestors themselves, they are having a great time, not giving the State 
the time of day. They enjoy the time of their lives in a Gezi Park rendered 
timeless. For them the best time is now. So the point I mean to make is 
that the conspiracy frame, at its core, makes a temporal distinction 
between the legitimacy (or not) of the resistance to the status quo, and 
hence posits itself as essentially ÔtimelessÕ, whereas the protests seek the 
reverse effect, by emphasizing the collective ÔfreezingÕ of a public space 




This means that we can make the following assumption about the power 
relation implied in the act of (elite) framing. First, there is always an 
implied hierarchy in the positing of a frame. From this it follows that the 
hierarchy is based on the perceived legitimacy of the frame. But this is a 
paradoxical legitimacy. After all, it can only be achieved through struggle, 
through the after-the-fact assertion that the dominant frame is the 
legitimate one. Subsequently, we need to ask ourselves what such 
dominance consists of. How can it be measured? One way of doing this, 
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as I have sought to suggest here, is by making claims to a contested 
temporality. This can be adequately summarized in the Orwellian maxim 
that whoever controls the past controls the present, and who controls 
the present controls the future. In the case of the Gezi contention, 
however, there is a deliberate freezing of time in an attempt to wrest the 
movement free of this stifling temporal control. The desired result is a 
liberated time. But this, unfortunately, is also the movementÕs Achilles 
heel. Its greatest strength is its greatest weakness.125 
For at the heart of a liberated time is the mechanism of momentum. This 
is necessary for the movement to achieve its maximum mobilizing 
potential, yet its nebulous process, its seemingly inexplicable 
mushrooming, provides fertile soil for counter-framing attempts such as 
the accusation of conspiracy. I will engage with this in more detail in the 
                                     
 
125 As we shall see, this holds equally true for the idea of the so-called Gezi spirit. But 
there is an evident danger that the triumphal rhetoric implied by the invocation of such a 
spirit lends itself equally to accusations of conspiracy, thereby robbing it of its 
emancipatiory potential. However, this is not simply a strategic matter, in which one 
might re-frame this issue in some other way so as to avert such accusations. Instead, 
the idea of a Gezi spirit warrants further inquiry precisely because it contains both the 
movementÕs greatest strength and its greatest weakness. This contradiction, in turn, can 
be identified in the conspiracy frame and the way it is employed in the state response to 
Gezi. As such, despite the temptation to integrate the impact of the protests in some 
form of either negative or positive historicist understanding of TurkeyÕs trajectory either 
towards or away from democracy, it should remain imperative to focus equally on the 
process by which the ÔideaÕ of Gezi has been integrated into a larger conceptualization of 
paranoid politics and conspiratorial framing beyond the confines of the protest event 
itself. I will return to this in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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next chapter, specifically with regard to the problems implicit in the idea 
of a so-called ÔGezi spiritÕ (Gezi Ruhu).126 In this sense, the idea of 
momentum becomes an accessory to the liberation of Turkish democracy, 
while critics consider it a threat to the status quo. In this, it effectively 
takes on a dynamic that is the very opposite to the previously discussed 
dormant time, to the degree that dormant time relies on the idea of 
invisible activity whereas the idea of momentum suggests visible 
inactivity. And what else is conspiracy theory if not a paranoid suffusion 
of the perceived omnipresence of invisible activity vs. visible inactivity? 
At this stage therefore, and following a careful consideration of the 
importance of framing momentum and time, it is important to note that 
the contestation of the protest event is not merely one of opposed 
ideological stances, but also one of agency, temporality and ownership, 
that is, the constitutive force, which makes the event an ÔEventÕ in the 
first place. In this way, the capacity to frame ÔrevolutionaryÕ time is of at 
least equal importance, and certainly part of the same process, in which 
                                     
 
126 David Selim Sayers, ÔGezi Spirit: The Possibility of an ImpossibilityÕ, Roar Magazine, 8 
January 2014, available at https://roarmag.org/essays/gezi-ottoman-turkish-
nationalism/ (accessed 25 May 2017); Gzde Bc, ÔThe ÒGezi GenerationÓ: Youth, 
Polarization and the ÒNew TurkeyÓÕ, in Isabel Schfer (ed.), Youth, Revolt, Recognition: 
The Young Generation during and after the ÔArab SpringÕ (Berlin, 2015), p. 52; Blair 
Taylor, ÔFrom alterglobalization to Occupy Wall Street: Neoanarchism and the new spirit 
of the leftÕ, City 17.6 (2013), pp. 729-747. Ali Bilgic, ÔTurkeyÕs other ÒGeziÓ MomentÕ, 
OpenDemocracy, 15 February 2016. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ali-
bilgi/turkey-s-other-gezi-moment. 
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the imaginary revolutionary (from the preceding chapter) becomes 
contested. It therefore appears that a deeper understanding of the 
contingent element of protest can only be approximated by 
acknowledging that the ways in which time is framed constitute a key 
stage in the determination of whether state response to protest succeeds 
in mitigating its impact, or, on the contrary, whether the protest 
movement succeeds in achieving political change.  
So if we are to consider time as an object of contestation in the framing 
of protest, then surely there must be something to be gained by ÔwinningÕ 
this time? Yet perhaps it is not so much a question of winning the contest 
of framing protest as within or outside of the times, but rather one of 
ÔliberatingÕ time in terms of discovering its revolutionary potential, the 
ÔmomentÕ in which change becomes possible. This is where dormant time, 
frozen time, and momentum seemingly become reconciled. That is to say, 
in the idea of a liberated time, the emancipatory potential of the 
movement can evolve from relying on the contingency of its momentum, 
to the longevity of lasting change.  
Here one might best think of the term Ôliberated timeÕ, or for that matter 
Ôrevolutionary timeÕ, in line with Antonio NegriÕs momentous study of the 
radical role of the experience of time in theories of resistance, but also 
how it can be integrated into the conceptualization of time in protest 
movements, and their positing of a Ômass of versatile, multilateral, 
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universal relationsÕ.127 As opposed to the fixed meaning of the status quo 
such a framing strategy would seek to resist. Negri points out that 
liberated time cannot be measured, exactly because its liberation rests on 
the premise of its resistance to such measurement. This may sound 
somewhat esoteric Ð after all what is the difference between measured or 
liberated time, and how can time be subject to freedom in the first place? 
For is not time the great equalizer? Yes, and no. Time can be considered 
an equalizer, hence its potential to square the circle of contingent 
resistance being cast as inevitable, as necessary. But on the other hand, 
time is ever subject to framing. It is an alternative way of seeking to 
introduce hierarchy and the legitimacy of political action.  
Between the protest and the state response, both seek to infer that it is 
their time, their moment, and that their actions will resonate through time 
as one of historic progress for the Turkish nation. Yet it must be stressed 
that this is not merely a rhetorical claim. It is not simply a way of framing 
either the StateÕs importance over that of the protests or vice versa. 
Rather, time becomes at once the mechanism, the central site and the 
outcome of the contestation. It is both vital yet incorporeal, both 
manifest yet practically impossible to delineate. It is the struggle for 
political legitimacy in its purest form. 
                                     
 
127 Antonio Negri, Time for Revolution (transl. Matteo Mandarini, London, 2003), p. 120. 
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Momentum, on the other hand, is a way of subverting the experience of 
time, of amassing a show of resistance that defies the relatively low 
outcome one would otherwise expect from (progressive) mobilization. In 
equal measure, the conspiracy frame is an attempt to tarnish this 
momentum as one occurring outside the time of peopleÕs lived 
experience, as a way of stopping the clock for TurkeyÕs progress, and 
undermining its capacity to move forward. The idea of momentum is as 
much a weapon in the arsenal of protestorsÕ resistance as conspiracy is 
for the defence of the status quo. They are two sides of the same coin, 
two interrelated poles of what is in effect a temporal contestation.  
At the heart of the protestÕs appeal is therefore the seeming manipulation 
of ÔrevolutionaryÕ time (the potential of achieving a liberated time), not 
unlike that of the paranoid framing strategy, which equally subverts the 
experience of time to posit the State as being under attack. Liberated 
time forms an antinomy to conspiratorial time. And within the sustained 
balance of contest between the two sides, the wider framing mechanisms 
of the Gezi protests and the state response to them must seek to force 
an exit lest they become entangled in the straightjacket of the paranoid 
society. And while the Gezi protests have come to an end, a true sense of 
calm has not yet returned. The pursuit of conspiratorial foes, the 
continued repression of all but the most placid forms of dissent, and the 
staggeringly antagonistic state of Turkish democracy, betray a simmering 
tension in which the impact of Gezi continues to be keenly felt. This is the 
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true legacy of the introduction of the conspiracy frame in response to the 
Gezi protests. 
 
Conditions of, not for, Access to Truth 
At this point, to simply posit that the Turkish elite employs framing 
remains somewhat of an empty statement. Instead, what should be 
emphasized is that conspiracy theory can form an elite framing strategy 
that can be employed as a reaction to contingent forms of resistance 
such as the Gezi protests, dismissing them as but the product of a grand 
conspiracy against the Turkish state. But this by itself cannot be 
satisfactory. After all, the protestors considered the repressive measures 
against them as equal evidence of a conspiracy to corrupt the State from 
within. That is, in the protest encounter, there is a double conspiracy 
theory of society. It is a zero-sum game in which the mutual resistance 
reinforces either position. The protest momentum builds inasmuch as 
populist support for reactionary government measures grows.  
To think of conspiracy in this vein becomes an inquiry not only into the 
production of truth, or the politics of the production of truth, but into the 
production of a system that is the production of the politics of truth. This 
is key to the functioning of the conspiracy frame. In other words, it is the 
embrace of the narrative exception to the status quo (the protest 
contestation) as the central premise underlying the truth claim of either 
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the State or the protest, rather than seeing both as a breakdown of an 
original possibility of a truthful politics, one of inclusive and participatory 
democracy.  
A good way to think about this is to refrain from viewing the Gezi 
protests in a normative manner, that is to say, to resist interpreting them 
simply along the lines of their historical outlierdom, their unique 
mobilization of the so-called new masses, or even their relationship to 
other enrag-style protests such as Occupy Wall Street or perhaps even, 
to a lesser degree, the Arab Spring. Instead, I would suggest we consider 
the Gezi encounter along the lines of the emergence of a new 
conspiratorial mode in Turkey, as a physical embodiment of the growing 
tensions and contradictions born of rapid growth and a dizzying pace of 
modernization.  
Or, to put this in a Foucauldian sense, we might best consider the Gezi 
protests as the emergence of an event in thought (histoire 
vnementielle) that enables us to understand the conspiratorial framing 
process. Therefore, the rather long-winded formula I posited above (that 
of the Ôproduction of a system that is the production of the politics of 
truthÕ) may merit in fact three levels of inquiry: (1) the production, (2) 
the politics, and the (3) systemic forces produced by their 
intertwinement, in order to reveal the dynamics of conspiratorial framing. 
One can think of this in terms of what is essentially a distinctly critical 
orientation to the problem of access to truth. In this, I think we can build 
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upon FoucaultÕs handy summary of what in his eyes constitutes the 
purpose of philosophy.  
We will call, if you like, ÔphilosophyÕ, the form of thought that asks, 
not of course what is true and what is false, but what determines 
that there is and can be truth and falsehood and that one can or 
cannot separate the true and the false. We will call ÔphilosophyÕ the 
form of thought that asks what it is that allows the subject to have 
access to the truth and which attempts to determine the 
conditions and limits of the subjectÕs access to the truth [italics my 
own].128 
This should hold equally true in the context of political thought. After all, 
if we are to suggest that conspiracy theory serves as a truth ÔactÕ rather 
than a Ôtruth claim (in that its import lies in the relation of forces it 
implies and reinforces, rather than any empirical truth process as such) 
then this must inherently be a discussion of relative ÔconditionsÕ created 
not through access to truth, but rather by their relative position vis--vis 
the truth claimÕs content. In other words, FoucaultÕs preoccupation with 
the truth is not so much one of determining the classical origins of truth 
in either the Aristotelian or Cartesian method. Rather, it is an attempt to 
think of the subjectÕs access to truth(s) and to question the systems and 
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forces by which access to truth, or even the production, dissemination 
and legitimization of truth is ratified. Does this mean that Foucault is 
himself a conspiracy theorist? Quite the contrary, while he does posit that 
there should be no such thing as what had formerly been deemed a 
Ôformal ontology of truthÕ, he asserts that the very idea that such an 
analytic of truth had taken shape was evidence of the attempts to 
enshrine the Hellenistic doxa of truth as inherently bound to the subject.  
Foucault seeks to question not the truth itself, but the process by which 
truth takes on the affect of truthfulness, and how this reflects back on 
the subject. As an a priori suggestion, I warrant it will be fruitful to adopt 
this stance towards our own approach to conspiracy theory as we move 
forward. It should remind us that despite the apparent exclusion of the 
competing frame in our analysis (that is, we are focusing on the state 
response and not the Gezi framing itself), this will ensure that the goal of 
the exercise retains its progressive potential, rather than producing a 
manual of sorts for the repression of future protest. That, of course, 
would simply not do. 
Of course this also requires a certain caution, as the Gezi protests and the 
coup attempt are not equatable events. However, for the purpose of our 
understanding of the conspiracy frame, both can be seen to have elicited, 
and reacted upon, a deeply conspiratorial framing process and narratives 
of conspiracy. In this, they are inextricably intertwined, yet in significant 
ways also unrelated. In a way, this contradictory imagery fits the notion 
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of the conspiracy frame rather well, as it sheds light on its deliberate 
warping of the possibilities and impact of resistance to the State. After 
all, conspiracy theory sees events as evidence of a motive force and a 
vast system of interconnectedness, and in turn, the paranoid style 
therefore suggests that all resistance is created equally, that it forms part 
of a grand overarching conspiracy. For us this means that while the 
events are not strictly speaking comparable, we must acknowledge that 
as part of the conspiracy frame, they are elevated to evidence of a 
supposed master-conspiracy, a conflation of all forms of resistance to the 
Turkish state. In the next chapter we shall see how this manifests, and is 
exemplified, through the emergence of a ÔstrongmanÕ political leadership 
style. 
Conclusion: Conspiracy theory, the frame that frames the frame 
Frames have the power to bind us, as much as they can free us. They 
must always toe the line between the real and the created, between their 
constitutive power and the agency implicit in their own construction. 
Framing is vital to the understanding of how we perceive the real, 
because it facilitates the process of depicting, shaping and, yes, 
manipulating the way in which we perceive the boundaries of the real. As 
such, framing conspiracy can help us solve a tantalizing puzzle, that of 
framing the non-real as real.  
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Of course the framing that IÕve had in mind in this chapter is hardly of the 
artistic variety. Instead, the chapter sought to re-think the ways in which 
the Turkish political elite frames resistance. To put this in terms of a 
follow-up question, we might ask, what are the practical implications of 
framing political discourse in the mode of conspiracy theory? Or, to 
invoke the positivist sense of the term, who and what can be framed 
using conspiratorial accusations? In this, and in the aforementioned 
analysis, we find essentially three tiers of framing. (1) There is the frame 
as in the painting, the physical boundary of an image, or, in a textual 
sense, the structure or style of a given text or utterance.129 (2) Then 
there is ÔframingÕ as per the political science literature,130 which we can 
find resonating throughout conflict analysis and social movement studies; 
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hence also, its evident relevance to the case at hand. (3) And finally, we 
might even consider framing as a frame-up or set-up, where false 
evidence is provided to accuse someone of a crime; that is to say, 
framing as a process by which one produces false evidence against a 
presumably innocent person.  
This latter definition of framing is rarely if ever invoked in the literature on 
framing, but given our current fixation on the paranoid and the 
conspiratorial, it seems we can hardly move forward without at least 
acknowledging it. There may yet be some playful use for it in the end. 
Uniquely, and unlike other framing studies, in logic of conspiracy theory 
we must therefore take all three such interpretations of framing into 
account. In other words, the conspiracy frame frames the frame. (Or, to 
put this in the above taxonomy: (2)Ð(3)Ð(1).) 
By now I believe we can safely say that writing about conspiracy theory is 
also a circumventive way of writing about the production of the real; or, 
to be precise, the positing of the unreal as real. I use the term ÔunrealÕ 
here as a substitute for a process or relationship more frequently referred 
to here as that of the Ônon-realÕ Ð which better emphasizes its necessary 
contestation to the real as such. After all, it does not exist in a state of 
becoming real, as the ÔunÕ might imply. In the non-real, reality is both real 
and non-real in its inflection towards an antinomy of the real. But for the 
purpose of concluding this chapter, ÔunrealÕ should suffice, as it provides a 
useful imagery for the entirety, the outcome as it were, of the 
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conspiratorial framing process, rather than forming part of its process, 
and will help us as we progress to the next chapter. 
So for that matter, writing about conspiracy theory is simply another way 
to think about a specific critique of the production of truth,131 a situation 
in which politicians themselves become the purveyors of conspiracy yet 
justify their paranoid convictions by enforcing real political action. In sum, 
not only is conspiracy theory a contestation of the production of truth, it 
is also a deliberation on the politics of the production of truth. Like 
Nietzsche before us, who warned of the deceptive Ôheroism of the 
truthfulÕ (Heroismus des Wahrhaftigen132), we would do well to be 
suspicious of the dubious heroism of the untruthful. 
 But after reviewing our findings from this chapter, it becomes clear that 
conspiracy is not simply unreal, nor for that matter is it purely real in an 
empirical sense. It takes on real impact when harnessed in the form of a 
conspiratorial politics, such as has arisen in Turkey today. This is only 
exacerbated when conspiracy theory becomes a driving force of political 
rhetoric, of the political imagination (which I have referred to as the 
imaginary revolutionary) and political decision-making. If what defines a 
                                     
 
131 That is not to say, however, that all critiques of the production of truth, and hence 
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132 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Unzeitgem§e Betrachtungen (Berlin 1981), ch. 28. 
Available at http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/unzeitgemasse-betrachtungen-3244/1 
(accessed 25 May 2017). 
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conspiracy theory is its criticism of how a given truth is produced, then 
for us to think critically about conspiracy theory means that what we are 
really talking about is the contested production of (a) truth, not the 
conspiracy claim itself.  
While I have not mentioned them earlier, I am sympathetic to Hardt and 
NegriÕs polemical invocation (even if it was devised with truth processes 
in mind rather than processes of truth) that Ôthe truth will not make us 
free, but taking control of the production of truth willÕ.133 A powerful idea, 
no doubt, but the reason it is worth isolating here is because it effectively 
demonstrates the extent to which the idea of ÔcontrolÕ of the production 
of truth is seen as fixed between a supposedly binary progressive and 
regressive pole. Yes, it emphasizes the possibility of seizing control 
thereof for some as yet undefined emancipatory purpose. But it does not, 
indeed cannot, acknowledge that maybe the tension implicit in this 
struggle to sustain control is equally what allows the hegemon (the 
ÔcontrollerÕ, as it were, of truth) to frame this struggle as in and of itself 
necessary to his power.  
Yes we must take control of the production of truth, but not simply by 
contesting the truth claim of the status quo. This means, once again, that 
the debunking method cannot help us formulate an appropriate response 
to the effect of the conspiracy frame. Instead, we must articulate how 
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even the resistance to the status quo becomes embedded in the truth 
production thereof. Simply put, and to make a vital return here to the 
Turkish context, we must understand how even genuinely contingent 
resistance such as Gezi (or, for that matter, the coup) can be made to fit 
within the justification of the paranoid style, of the slip into 
authoritarianism that the ruling partyÕs production of a conspiratorial 
truth implies134. 
I realize there is a risk here of succumbing to a paradox. After all, how can 
the unreal be an outcome of the production of truth? And more 
importantly, how can this ever be systemic if the notion of truth relies on 
the very contingency of challenges thereto? But I would also suggest that 
it is precisely in this very paradoxical relationship that we can find the 
tools required for its dismantling. In order to do so, we should always 
keep in mind the conspiracy frameÕs necessary tension between its truth 
content (Wahrheitsgehalt) and the justifications or legitimacy it requires 
and must maintain to produce such a truth. Admittedly, there is a puzzle 
here, which can be summed up as follows: Can non-real visions of society 
transmogrify into real ones? Can the conspiracy frame beget a 
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conspiratorial society? And do protests such as Gezi contribute to or 
detract from this process? This chapter has made the case that an 
interesting and relevant way to consider this puzzle is to look at it 
through the lens of (elite) framing theory, and to introduce the idea of 
the conspiracy frame as a means by which to do so. The following 
chapters will consider these themes in more detail apropos the idea of a 





Chapter 3  
Conspiratorial Discourse and the 2016 Coup Attempt 
 
Introduction 
On 15 July 2016, Erdoğan faced what may have been the most direct 
challenge to his rule since the Gezi protests. Within the span of less than 
24 hours, factions of the Turkish military attempted a military coup, 
taking to the streets of Istanbul and Ankara with tanks and artillery, 
storming broadcasting and media centres, bombing the Turkish parliament 
with fighter jets, and patrolling the streets with helicopters and armoured 
vehicles. In turn, supporters of the ruling party took to the streets, many 
of them only armed with sticks and stones, in an attempt to fight off the 
military insurgency. Skirmishes continued throughout the night, but by 
morning it became apparent that the coup had been unsuccessful. The 
participants were rounded up, and the government announced that it 
blamed Glenists and foreign conspirators for infiltrating the military in 
order to depose the ruling party. In a sense, it seemed as if a prevalent 
conspiracy theory had come true. One of the most persistent 
conspiratorial accusations had been one that targeted the military, 
accusing it of secretly conspiring against the State. Yet in equal measure, 
a new conspiratorial interpretation of the coup emerged, one that 
accused the ruling party of having staged the coup as a false-flag 
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attempt in order to consolidate its power.135 Conspiracy theorists pointed 
to ErdoğanÕs first public statement following the coup, in which he 
reportedly described the coup as Ôa gift from AllahÕ and announced his 
intention to cleanse the military of what he described as Ômembers of the 
gangÕ.136 In sum, the coup elicited both pro- and anti-government 
conspiracy theories. In either case, they were unique, to the extent that 
they were conspiratorial interpretations of a genuinely conspiratorial 
event, namely the coup attempt. 
The governmentÕs response, and its crackdown on opponents, particularly 
the speed with which it began to round up its detractors, spawned 
counter-conspiracy theories. The real coup, critics argued, was playing 
out in the purge of Turkish civil society, now associated with the 
righteous cause of weeding out secret conspirators.137 Where the military 
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failed, Erdoğan succeeded. But the reality is somewhat more complicated 
than such explanations suggest. This chapter discusses how the coup 
might be seen to have constituted a conspiracy Event, and how this 
represents what is effectively a transformation from conspiracy theory to 
a praxis of conspiracy. 
This requires that we ask ourselves a follow-up question. What makes a 
coup real, and in turn, what makes a coup ÔunrealÕ? More specifically, to 
what extent does the experience of the failed Turkish coup of 2016 as 
real, unreal, surreal or conspiratorial, affect the way in which the Turkish 
government has been able to consolidate its powers following the military 
uprising? To begin to answer such admittedly large questions, this 
chapter investigates that most dramatic of conspiratorial outcomes, the 
recent coup attempt. Or, to be precise, the failed coup attempt that took 
Turkey and the world by surprise on the evening of 15 July 2016, three 
summers after the Gezi protests.  
 
Not all Coups are Created Equal 
There is a common conviction that one of the defining characteristics of a 
coup is that it requires public and urban displays of violence. The origin of 
the word coup betrays the longevity of this association. Deriving from the 
                                                                                                           
www.independent.co.uk/voices/turkey-coup-attempt-president-Erdoğan-benefit-from-
crackdown-a7150931.html (accessed 24 May 2017). 
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Latin colpus (blow), which in turn came to Latin from the Greek kolaphos 
(blow with fist), it was converted into old French as cop (a blow), 
featured in Middle English as Ôto meet in battle, come to blowsÕ, and today 
is known to us in the contemporary meaning of the verb to cope.  
Finally, the word coup, as we know it, is simply a shortened loanword from 
the French coup dÕtat Ð literally, a Ôblow of stateÕ or a blow to the State. 
Interestingly, when one seeks the definition of coup dÕtat in the 
academic literature, the key addition to this ontology is the focus on the 
conspiratorial element. Consider, for example, the following definition, 
which I have taken from Gene Shark and Bruce JenkinsÕs thesis The Anti-
Coup: ÔA coup dÕtat is a rapid seizure of physical and political control of 
the state apparatus by illegal action of a conspiratorial group backed by 
the threat or use of violence [italics my own].Õ138 
This fixation on the violent episode implicit in the idea of a coup is so 
strong that, without it, one has to note it as an exception to the rule. 
Think of TurkeyÕs 1997 so-called Ôpost-modern coupÕ,139 or PortugalÕs 
Ôpeaceful coupÕ in 1974, or, in the academic literature, the notion of a so-
called ÔsoftÕ coup. In all cases we see a debate regarding the ÔrealnessÕ of 
a perceived coup, and a confusion regarding the impact a coup is 
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supposed to have. Not all coups are created equal, and a coup is not 
always a coup. Seen in this light, it is easy to empathize with one Turkish-
American journalistÕs initial confusion as she sought to take in the 
dramatic events unfolding on the evening of 15 July, when the Turkish 
military began its assault on Ankara and Istanbul. 
 
 Many of us, during the coupÕs early hours, didnÕt believe it was 
real; we thought the all-powerful Erdoğan must have arranged it 
himself. What kind of coup is this? Everyone said. Quickly, 
however, as the military began shooting civilians on the 
Bosphorus Bridge, what seemed like a farce became a trauma.140 
 
What is striking here is that what makes the coup feel ÔunrealÕ is its initial 
and momentary lack of violence. Once the fighting erupts, there can be 
no more doubt as to its realness. In other words, in the mode of the coup, 
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the experience of the real relies on the violent disruption of the real. In 
turn, the coup only becomes ÔtraumaticÕ once this violence erupts. At 
first, sans violence, the journalist quoted above experiences the event as 
farcical or somehow incompetent. In an inversion of MarxÕs observation 
that history takes place first as tragedy, then as farce,141 in the 
experience of the coup it is arguably the exact opposite: what seems like 
farce, becomes a tragedy. Yet this tragic element Ð the violence Ð is 
apparently also the key ingredient, Ôthe spice of lifeÕ that renders it real. 
The farcical coup is thus so only to the extent that it appears to us as 
unreal. A pacifist coup, then, becomes a farcical one, and in so doing 
seems detached from reality, becomes surreal. So today, when one writes 
of the coup, it seemingly requires the prefix of being a failed coup, as if 
only successful coups might be worthy of consideration.  
This most recent coup attempt Ð Turks have now experienced five (if one 
counts the post-modern coup) since 1960 alone Ð it was not ÔsuccessfulÕ, 
in that it dealt a blow to the government but did not succeed in replacing 
it. In the time since the coup, and the ensuing purges, one question 
stands out: Ôwas this really a coup, and can the crackdown be considered 
a counter-coup?Õ This question is not as simple to answer as it seems. 
Nor, perhaps, is it the right one to ask. Instead, might we not better ask 
ourselves Ð like the old problem of the tree that falls silently (or not!) in 
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the forest Ð can a failed coup still be considered a coup? And does this 
failure subsequently entail a victory for Turkish democracy? Certainly, the 
following text, sent to every mobile phone registered in Turkey on 16 
July, indicated that the coup was already being framed as an opportunity 
for a heroic national awakening, a rallying cry for Turks to stage a 
counter-coup. The message, sent on behalf of President Erdoğan, was 
recorded by the VICE journalist David Jegerlehner. 
Dear children of the Turkish nation. This action is a coup against 
the nation, commandeering armored vehicles and weapons in 
Ankara and Istanbul, behaving as if it were the 1970s. Honorable 
Turkish nation, claim democracy and peace: I am calling you to 
the streets against this action of a narrow cadre that has fallen 
against the Turkish nation. Claim the state, claim the nation.142 
 
As the political fallout has included a widespread governmental purge of 
bureaucratic institutions, higher education, media organizations and other 
corporate entities, not to mention the military, the coup seems to have 
constituted a wish fulfillment along the lines of the conspiratorial paranoia 
                                     
 
142 David Jegerlehner, ÔÒI Have a Bad feeling About ThisÓ: My Experience of the Failed 
Military Coup in TurkeyÕ, VICE, 23 July 2016. Available at 
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touted for so long by the countryÕs political elite.143 But does this truly 
mean that we should consider the political response to the coup a 
veritable counter-coup? On the fringes of such interpretations, some have 
even insinuated that the coup was nothing but an elaborate false-flag 
operation, engineered by the ruling party to justify the ensuing 
crackdown. While there is little or no evidence that this was the case, 
clearly there is much to be untangled here, especially with regard to the 
coupÕs relationship to the real, and hence, alternately, to the 
conspiratorial.  
Not all coups are created equal, or so one is tempted to think. After all, 
following the coup attempt, it seems as if Turkish democracy continues 
to be held under siege. Not by the military, but by its political leadership, 
and the conspiratorial purging it implausibly argues is required to protect 
the State. Of course paranoid politics are neither new, nor unique to 
Turkey. Still, the influx of conspiratorial rhetoric has escalated into what 
might well be deemed a veritable system of conspiratorial rhetoric as per 
Richard HofstadterÕs polemic on the paranoid style. In the case of the 
failed coup, we need to rethink our previous understanding of what we 
understand by conspiracy in Turkey. 
                                     
 
143 Up-to-date estimates can be found at www.turkeypurge.com (accessed 22 May 
2017). 
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And while the coup may at first appear to be for once a bona fide 
conspiracy Ð seemingly in contrast to the overwhelmingly fictional 
narratives described in the preceding chapters Ð it is my contention that 
it cannot but be understood as a result of the mechanisms and outcomes 
of a prolonged strategy of conspiratorial framing and that the experience 
thereof remains squarely within conspiratorial framing, not as a counter-
example, but as a direct result of the paranoid style invoked by such 
contentions. As such the failed coup becomes not a form of proof for 
conspiracy theorists, as much as it is a veritable logical Ð if not necessarily 
predictable Ð outcome of the contingent space created by the persistent 
employment of the conspiracy frame.   
Rather than accusing the Turkish state of having somehow engineered the 
coup, I would therefore argue that it makes more sense to view the coup 
as indicative of a broader internalization of conspiratorial framing. So 
when I suggest thinking of it in terms of a conspiracy Event, I mean to say 
that the coup fulfilled a process already begun with the introduction of 
the conspiracy frame, namely the formation of ÔgenuineÕ conspiratorial 
activity. To this extent, the military coup can be considered a particularly 
dramatic demonstration of a gradual process of internalizing conspiracy 
and political paranoia. In addition, the coup exists as a conspiracy Event 
precisely because it cements the idea of an urgent necessity for a 
continued conspiratorial politics and justifies the aggressive state 
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response required to combat it. It does this not exclusively against the 
perpetrators, but looks instead for culprits within its own institutions.  
The coup Event might therefore well be described as essentially 
constituting a Ôconspiracy EventÕ, as it cements and vividly dramatizes the 
notion of a conspiratorial Other as plausibly real. After the coup, 
conspiracy theory thus becomes the new normal, at least in terms of how 
one interprets the political process in Turkey. This is clearly problematic 
for at least two reasons. First, it renders Turkish democracy as hostage to 
the whims of conspiratorial forces. Second, it situates participation in 
democracy as comprising perpetual vigilance against such forces. The 
logical outcome of this is the deterioration of Turkish democracy. Politics 
becomes the praxis of conspiracy, and conspiracy theory the praxis of 
politics. 
In turn, the spectre of the enemy becomes both public and private, no 
longer simply constituting an outside threat. Yet clearly this constitutes a 
logical impossibility. So instead, the idea of a parallel enemy comes to 
fulfil the necessity of being both at once. As such, the enemy is framed 
along the lines of an internalized conspiratorial adversary and ceases to 
exist either within or without, but inhabits instead a necessarily 
contradictory dynamic. When it is a private enemy, it needs to be 
exposed in public, whereas when it is a public enemy, it must be 
confronted through the strength of private efforts.  
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To frame this in a more straightforward manner, what I mean to suggest 
is merely that the fictitious nature of the conspiratorial accusation is 
secondary to the opposing forces required to both combat and keep alive 
this impossible dualism. But even more importantly, the acknowledgement 
of this effervescence is therefore not contingent, but instead forms a 
founding mechanism upon which the justification of extended state 
powers relies. To put this more succinctly yet, the accusation of the 
parallel state is so effective not despite its logical flaws, but because of 
them. Its inconsistencies arise from the way in which the coup provides 
the embodiment of a ÔrealÕ conspiracy to fuel further such theories. To 
this extent, while the coup attempt is evidently a dramatic manifestation 
of conspiratorial intent, it also engenders the transcendence of conspiracy 
theory into a seemingly justifiable politics of conspiratorial praxis. 
Henceforth, a secondary dilemma begins to take root. It becomes difficult 
to distinguish conspiratorial politics from conspiracy theory. In turn, 
conspiracy theories seem to explain not the ÔhiddenÕ rationale of political 
action, but instead become its driving force. A good indication of this 
confusion, which, at first, appears to be an aesthetic one (at least to the 
degree that it relies on an aesthetic or observatory, and non-participatory 
judgement), can be found in one of the predominant early interpretations 
of the coup attempt. According to this particular version of events, the 
conspiracy was triggered by increasing indications of a renewed 
crackdown on opposition elements within the military. That is to say, such 
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an interpretation would have the coup be a form of ÔpreventiveÕ military 
intervention against a continued assault on its integrity.144   
Fearing an impending loss of influence Ð so the narrative goes Ð dissidents 
in the military rose up against the government in a last-ditch attempt to 
thwart the sweeping reforms proposed under the mantle of an expanded 
array of presidential powers. Despite the dubious veracity of such 
accounts Ð and indeed, evidence has since emerged that indicates a far 
greater level of structural organization Ð the former interpretation is 
deeply revealing. First it readily assumes the existence and 
implementation of a political strategy of the accusation of conspiracy 
(the drawing-up of lists of names of political enemies even without 
evidence of a de facto conspiracy). Secondly, and even more importantly, 
it demonstrates an intuitive understanding of the relationship between 
political practice and conspiratorial practice.  
The possibility of a ÔpureÕ coup Ð to the extent that it arose organically 
from within and due to genuine grievances Ð is thus never even taken into 
account. As such, this interpretation of the coup takes us straight back 
to one of the beginning principles of this thesis, namely, the idea, derived 
from McAdamÕs observations on colonial uprisings, that accusations of 
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overarching conspiracies can in effect trigger such an event taking 
place.145 There exists therefore a curious affinity between the imagined 
conspiracy and the actual conspiracy, in particular in the way in which 
they coalesce in the state response to the coup as well as in the public 
response and immediate reaction, which was one of disbelief.  
Through the experience of the governmentÕs consistent strategy of 
conspiratorial framing, the possibility of a military purge was considered 
plausible enough to give rise to a genuine conspiracy attempt. Even if it 
turns out that this account of events was false, this would in and of itself 
remain of interest, as it posits what is essentially a conspiratorial reading 
of the coup. In other words, the assumption of the existence of a 
conspiracy behind the conspiracy runs through the very experience of the 
coup. Indeed, this expectation, in which the coup was itself not 
conspiratorial enough to be plausible, features in most of the various 
accounts of the coup.  
In effect, the failed coup only exacerbates this framing strategy, as now 
every accusation of conspiracy is rendered plausible in light of the military 
action against the State. In this scenario, might we not as well ask 
ourselves whether a coup is still a coup, even if it fails in its goal to 
overthrow the State. The answer to this question should be a resounding 
yes. And beyond this, one might even go as far as to say that the failed 
                                     
145 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, 
2001). 
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coup is even more a coup in the conspiratorial mode, as it renders all 
other accusations of conspiracy increasingly ÔrealÕ. For despite all the 
popular jubilation following the resilient survival of TurkeyÕs ÔdemocracyÕ, 
the Turkish government has since launched a campaign of conspiratorial 
accusations that further perpetuates the notion of a State continuously 
under siege.  
Is this not tantamount to a coup on behalf of the State? Arguably, it is 
the very failure of the coup that allows the conspiracy frame to achieve 
its full dramatic potential. It is a potential that, even when challenged, 
only justifies all the more its paranoia and the political repression that 
ensues. Here too, we can observe a similar question that resonates with 
the hypothesis of the current thesis: is it in fact the idea of (non-)existing 
conspiracies that gives rise to real grievances, political dynamics, and 
social tensions that affect conspiratorial change? The failed coup is 
therefore not a post-modern coup, but a sort of meta-coup.  
Seen in this light, it becomes tremendously important to observe that, in 
the authoritarian mode, political paranoia does not ensue from the 
political project. Rather, the project itself depends on the paranoiac 
suffusion behind the idea of the parallel state. The reason this difference 
requires such careful distinguishing is that it challenges the predominant 
narrative of TurkeyÕs post-coup politics. The coup, despite its very real 
ramifications, was in and of itself not proof of the existence of a parallel 
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state, nor did it need to be, as the conspiracy frame thrives perfectly well 
without a physical manifestation of the paranoid conception of the Other.  
Instead, the coup attempt, and the ensuing political repression on behalf 
of the State, can be considered the successful culmination of the 
narrative drive Ð or indeed, arc Ð underlying the conspiratorial necessity of 
such an existential threat. Here the future of the State is no longer 
determined by means of democratic process or participation, but instead 
a state of affairs (which, at the time of writing, remains that of a 
continued state of emergency) emerges in which the political, and the 
contestation of political beliefs, can no longer take place through societal 
participation, but becomes relegated to the underground. The irony here 
is that where the negative image of the underground was first invoked to 
depict a conspiratorial adversary, the very real coup attempt has now 
forced genuine dissent and activism into an actual underground.  
What ensues is that legitimate political participation, and such freedom of 
expression befitting a free society, becomes relegated, and indeed 
regulated, under the same auspices of curbing the parallel state, and 
hence the experience of democracy itself becomes one of a paranoid 
necessity. In this internalized conspiracy, to engage in any form of 
criticism of the State hence becomes genuinely conspiratorial, in that it is 
no longer acceptable within the rigidity of the paranoid society. In effect, 
the systematic use of the conspiracy frame, and the ensuing conspiracy 
Event in the form of the coup, thus gives rise first to the expectation of Ð 
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then the manifestation of Ð conspiracy as an internalized and self-
censoring state of being, and the erosion of genuine political participation 
into the realm of the conspiratorial.  
In sum, what was once democratic participation (free speech, the arts, 
journalism, public service) becomes a form of conspiracy, whereas the 
State itself conspires to root out dissent from within its own ranks. This 
paradox is the logical end result, and the fulfilment, of the conspiratorial 
framing process and the conspiracy Event. The fact that there was a ÔrealÕ 
conspiracy within factions of the military deserves to be considered as 
part of a wider escalation of conspiratorial framing, not as de facto ÔproofÕ 
of the veracity of all conspiracy theories peddled by paranoid politicians. 
In effect, the coup therefore takes on a distinctly Ômeta quality; it is both 
a genuine conspiracy against the State, but in turn it takes place in an 
environment in which opposition to the status quo has been rendered 
inherently conspiratorial by the successful implementation of the 
conspiracy frame in response to Gezi. This means, then, that we must 
also consider the coup as distinctly different from preceding coups, in 
that it took place in an environment in which the idea of conspiracy was 
ÔalreadyÕ internalized. The coup presents itself almost as a form of meta-
resistance, an exacerbation and indeed escalation of the conspiratorial 
framing strategy.  
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New Turkey, Old Enemies 
At the time of writing, thousands of Turkish citizens have been detained 
as part of a widespread crackdown on perceived conspiratorial opposition. 
And while the targeted job sectors differ, the accusation remains largely 
the same. Any direct or indirect affiliation with the so-called Ôparallel 
stateÕ, in other words, the Glen movement, to which the government 
now refers as Fet (and which it now considers a terrorist organization), 
or any suspicion thereof, can lead to seemingly arbitrary arrest. The 
Turkish government has accused the groupÕs enigmatic leader, Fetullah 
Glen, of masterminding the coup attempt and has sought to eliminate 
so-called Glenists from every layer of society. Despite being the 
overarching figurehead of the eponymous religious and educational group, 
Glen has lived in self-imposed exile in rural Pennsylvania since the 1990s. 
This constitutes a complete reversal of the overtly friendly, and indeed 
necessary, relationship Erdoğan and Glen formerly enjoyed, as each 
helped the other consolidate influence and support in the early days of 
the AK PartyÕs rise to power. 
To many this makes him an unlikely conspiratorial mastermind. For others, 
his very distance from Turkey Ð and the exponential international growth 
of the movement, let alone his longstanding residency in the United 
States, makes him a prime suspect for the attempted usurpation of the 
government. But perhaps it is irrelevant that Glen himself emphatically 
denies any involvement in the coup attempt, or that the Turkish 
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government has not yet provided any consistent evidence of a factual link 
between the Glenists and the coup. For as the dragnet of such 
persecutions widens, so too ordinary citizens, disproportionately those 
outside the ruling partyÕs base of support, find themselves under 
suspicion. In the post-coup crackdown, every citizen is a potential enemy. 
Admittedly, there is a certain poetic appeal to the idea of a Glenist 
conspiracy. After all, the arch-enemy of TurkeyÕs post-coup paranoia is 
the very same man whose friendship was once actively courted in order 
to bring about a historic alliance during the early years of ErdoğanÕs 
political career. Add to this the cult-like worship of Glen within the 
movement that bears his name, and there is ample circumstantial, indeed 
theatrical, evidence to fuel such accusations, albeit largely of the 
anecdotal variety. This, of course, is hardly concrete evidence for 
conspiracy, yet warrants inclusion here not only for its entertainment 
value, but as an example of the quasi-ritualistic practices of the Glen 
movement. In a lengthy profile in the New Yorker, published a few months 
after the coup attempt, Dexter Filkins recorded several firsthand accounts 
of the devotion Glen inspires among his followers. It is easy to see how 
such ardent support might fuel conspiratorial interpretations. 
Inside the movement, Keleş and Alpsoy said, people often lost 
themselves in fantastical rituals. In one, a group of men gathered 
in a room would grab a comrade, pin his legs and arms, and 
remove his socks and shoes, often against his will. ÔThey would 
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hold him down, and everyone would kiss his feet,Õ Alpsoy said. 
ÔThis I witnessed hundreds of times.Õ [...] Alpsoy said that once a 
man appeared at a service with a shoe that he said had been 
worn by Glen. ÔPeople were so excitedÑthey stripped the 
leather from the shoe and boiled it for a long time. Then they cut 
the leather into pieces and ate it.146 
While there is admittedly a bizarre culinary attraction to such accounts, 
there is no evidence within them that would suggest a Glenist 
conspiracy. Yes, the kissing of the feet and eating of the shoes are a way 
of demonstrating extreme affection for what are otherwise considered 
unclean objects in the Islamic world, but they are not in and of 
themselves indicators of a plot against the State. However, in the 
apparent extremity of this affection, the seeds are sown for the 
anticipation of an equally extreme antagonism. The two exist on equal 
poles, at least in the mode of the conspiratorial State. Yet there is more 
at work here than a simple acting-out of cult-like affectations and hero-
worship.  
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For it goes to show to what extent Glen not only embodies the specter 
of the enemy in Turkish society, but that he does so precisely because he 
so strongly resembles the anointed figure of the friend. In other words, 
the very fixation on Glen as situated on either extreme Ð the worshipped 
friend or the hated enemy Ð makes him such an enigmatic example of the 
friend/enemy figure. In the fluidity of the friend/enemy dualism, which, I 
would suggest, functions equally well as a dialectic, the only other 
comparable figure is, perhaps somewhat ironically, though as we shall see, 
not coincidentally, that of Erdoğan himself. Both men, whether one 
considers them to be ardent modernizers or conspiratorial detractors, 
continue to capture the imagination of loyalists and critics alike, 
provoking both zeal and ire. 
Akin to the popular adage, that one can make peace with oneÕs enemies 
but not with oneÕs friends, the most dramatic form of antagonism is 
always that which targets the friend and not the enemy. In other words, 
the friend is a potential enemy, inasmuch as the enemy must always exist 
as a potential friend, even if this friendship is rejected. And with regard to 
the above, isnÕt the true dynamic almost always the exact opposite? 
Instead of making peace with our enemies so as to discover them as 
friends, do we not in fact incite violence against our friends exactly so as 
to determine who are, and who are not, our enemies?  
In other words, in the political realm, the ÔpublicÕ and ÔprivateÕ enemy 
serves primarily to constitute what parts of the public are deemed hostile 
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or sympathetic to this very attempt to determine the friend/enemy 
relationship. The coup, in this regard, renders the experience of being a 
Turkish citizen as a binary equation, and posits it as an either ÔforÕ or 
ÔagainstÕ universal position. One either applauds the government for its 
repressive measures or becomes one of its targets. Therefore, the 
ÔexperienceÕ of the friend/enemy dynamic in the political realm can only 
ever exist not simply as a fixed binary, or even a common duality, but as 
both a fluid, and hence dialectical, self-reinforcing, relationship. The 
enemy is as necessary to the idea of the friend, as that of the friend is to 
the enemy. 
We therefore find ourselves in a mode that emulates BlakeÕs playful jibe, 
Ôthy friendship oft has made my heart do ache. / Do be my enemy for 
friendshipÕs sake,Õ in which the necessity of the enemy encapsulates that 
of the friend. The serious underpinning of this desire for an enemy is that, 
to the political elite, the enemy may well be preferable to the 
considerably more labour-intensive process of cultivating and maintaining 
bona fide political alliances. In equal measure, political participation is thus 
rendered as participation in the purging of such forces from within. This 
means that on the one hand, the coup elevates the idea of TurkeyÕs 
political project to a binary equation, while at the same time it suggests 
that true devotees and true enemies cannot be distinguished except 
through a mass purge and disruption of the status quo, that is, the 
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conspiratorial enemy is symbiotic to the very system that seeks to 
combat it.  
In this, the uncanny of the political enemy becomes apparent, in that the 
divide can never fully be bridged, but must instead inherently rest on the 
expectation of a disintegration of the relationship. So while the coup may 
have existed as a momentary event, its afterlife suggests a much more 
permanent state of repression, seemingly to secure the State against 
future threat. The paralysis implicit in this state of affairs is hence what 
renders it uncanny, both moving and immovable, progressing and 
regressing at once. The breakdown of the friend/enemy relationship is 
therefore indicative of the wide impact of this paradoxical reality.147 
What the conspiratorial leader (or simply put, the autocrat) has in 
common with Plato is the desire to rid not just himself, but all his subjects 
of the shadow and to focus on the purity of the flame, the Ôclean slate 
scenarioÕ. But this is evidently impossible, as now the purity of the 
subject has come to rest squarely within the confines of its contrasting 
object. To ÔprotectÕ the purity of the State Ð for the paranoid leader this 
equates to the security of the State Ð thus requires enhanced executive 
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powers, which in turn only create more enemies, and so on and so forth. 
The dangerous circularity of this dynamic is evident to those witnessing 
Turkish democracy consume itself in similar fashion today.  
 
Underground, Above-ground 
The crackdown following the coup has at least two distinct repercussions 
for the idea of conspiracy. First, the subjugation of the public realm itself 
Ð which previously featured as the supposed object of the conspiratorÕs 
desire Ð becomes suspect as a hotbed of conspiratorial dissent. 
Conspirators are hence believed to be ÔamongÕ the population, rather than 
lurking ÔbelowÕ society. This, in turn, alters the sense of the conspiratorial 
underground. Ssecondly, the image of the underground becomes that of a 
parallel state, one perpendicular to the experience of the real, rather than 
confined to its murky depths. Subsequently, the idea of the enemy 
becomes an endogenous, rather than exogenous, manifestation of 
dissent.  
In other words, the enemy appears to grow within the confines of society 
rather than outside it. This alters the idea of conspiracy theory in Turkey, 
rendering it not just a curious affectation of antagonistic and adversarial 
positions. Instead conspiracy theory takes on a veritable constitutive, and 
hence necessary, force apropos the Turkish governmentÕs enduring 
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political legitimacy.148 The idea of the conspiratorial enemy fuels the very 
dynamic by which the friend, and hence, the ÔagreeableÕ citizen and 
his/her role towards society, is to be determined. In other words, the 
paranoid assumption that the more Turkey grows in strength, the more it 
will need to root out dissident elements from within its own ranks, 
suggests a symbiotic relationship with the conspiratorial Other, in which 
the enemy rides parasitically on the coat-tails of the New Turkey. 
The result of this is that the enemy becomes the necessary criterion by 
which to determine the nature of the friend. In the case of contemporary 
Turkey, this takes on the affectations of emerging nationalism and a 
fixation on the strongman persona of Erdoğan. The enemy is no longer 
simply an outside agitator, but an internalized dissenter. The outcome is 
that the identity of the Turkish state is measured not by virtue of its 
engagement with its citizens and the relative productivity of its (civil) 
society, but rather becomes synonymous with its internalized 
antagonisms, that is, with the paranoid, conspiratorial, pursuit of the 
enemy within. Hence, the coup becomes illustrative not of actual 
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contentions, but constitutes a dividing line, a singular moment of rupture, 
in which supposedly the Ôtrue coloursÕ of hidden dissent are revealed.  
That this does not correspond to the actual lived experience of 
consensual politics, in which grievances are meant to be reconciled, rather 
than existing as existentially opposed positions, fits squarely within the 
parameters of the conspiracy frame. In turn, this takes on the distinct 
qualities of what we have come to associate with the idea of a 
conspiratorial politics.149 For many Turks living under the continued 
insecurities of the extended state of emergency measures, the dangers of 
such a politics have become manifest, and may perhaps yet serve as a 
warning of the increasingly undemocratic appetites evident in the 
supposedly ÔconsolidatedÕ democracies that have so long dismissed 
Turkish politics as inherently irrational. 
The invocation of the parallel state therefore evokes the Foucauldian 
image of the necessity of a negative image of the underground as 
constitutive to the State. It even goes a step further, in that it situates 
the presence of such an enemy not as ÔundergroundÕ, but instead as 
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manifest ÔwithinÕ society, indeed parallel to it. Foucault writes that for the 
State, ÔThe underground is a realm of scoundrels, a negative image of the 
social contract. Each is a prisoner of the other, of whom he may become 
the betrayer, and the administrator of justice.Õ150 But where for Foucault 
the primary focus rests squarely on the administrative mechanisms in 
which the punitive force of the State, and hence its hegemonic potential, 
can come to fruition, in this quotation the description of the 
ÔundergroundÕ is startlingly one-dimensional, even potentially farcical.  
Yet Foucault is using this normative language in the way that it exists for 
the non-underground, that is, society-at-large. In other words, when he 
describes the underground as alternately ÔopaqueÕ, ÔliquefiedÕ, Ôdug out of 
the groundÕ and Ôtransparent to itselfÕ151 he is emphasizing the extent to 
which the underground as a concept is constituted not from within its 
own formative powers, but rather exists primarily as a negative counter-
image to the supposed purity of the State, the Ôabove-groundÕ if you like. 
In sum, as the idea of the conspiratorial underground shifts towards the 
notion of a parallel society, the role of the State becomes one of purging 
its own ranks rather than securing itself against outside antagonism.  
Another way to understand the ÔliquidityÕ Foucault mentions is to consider 
in the spirit of BaumanÕs concept of a so-called ÔLiquid ModernityÕ, a state 
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in which our conceptualization of the real has become increasingly 
determined by non-existent yet deeply meaningful manifestations and 
substitutes thereof.152 What the underground is, the State is not. And in 
turn, the underground ÔisÕ only to the extent that the State necessitates 
it to be. (Could there be anything more conspiratorial than the 
manipulation of the conspiratorial itself?) What stands out most, 
however, is that the invocation of the underground is intentionally Ð and 
hence, necessarily Ð kept in a transitory yet persistent mode of flux Ð the 
better to control its significance, and indeed its Otherness, to the 
primordial justification of the StateÕs political project and the repression it 
engenders.  
As such, it is not simply a matter of dealing with old enemies, settling 
scores or pre-existing vendettas, but of the active and ongoing discovery 
of new enemies. Here we thus find ourselves at the crucial point of 
convergence between the conspiratorial Other and the fulfilment of the 
paranoid political project. So when next the Turkish President invokes the 
murky, and semantically ever-changing concept of the so-called parallel 
state, one should not simply dismiss this as mere rhetorical scapegoating, 
but instead re-evaluate such antagonism as a framing strategy by which 
to infer the necessity of the strongman state. This equates the positing 
of a conspiratorial underground as above ground Ð a parallel state in the 
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most literal sense of the word. Seen in this light, the coup seeps into 
what was already essentially a preconditioned experience Ð an expectation 
of sorts Ð of conspiratorial resistance. 
 
Post-Coup Elite Framing of Conspiracy 
The Turkish Education Ministry has been at the forefront of the post-coup 
framing strategy. Following the coup, it produced a short video in which it 
contrasted the 1919Ð22 war of liberation with the 2016 coup attempt. 
The video features dramatic images, both contemporary and historical, of 
citizens fighting in the street. The action is set to a recital of the national 
anthem, recorded by Erdoğan himself. The PresidentÕs personal touch 
extends even to promotional materials, part of a nationwide curriculum 
revision, which include a booklet entitled ÔThe Victory of Democracy and 
our MartyrsÕ.153 This document contains a foreword penned by the 
President, and consists of a veritable glossary of the different types of 
conspirators it blames for the coup attempt. From Glen to ISIS, the 
uprising is depicted as the result of a massive international conspiracy; it 
becomes integrated into a wider framing of Turkish political destiny as 
                                     
153 As described in Mustafa Akyol, ÔNew Turkey Finds Founding Myth in Failed CoupÕ, Al-
Monitor, 22 September 2016. Available at  www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/turkey-july-15-coup-attempt-founding-myth.html 
(accessed 30 May 2017). 
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inherently subject to, and triumphant in the face of, divergent 
conspiracies against the State. 
And this is but one of many examples in which the conspiratorial strategy 
is being played out in schools across the country. One might also think, 
for example, of recent reports of organized student re-enactments, 
theatrical recreations of the coup, or how at certain schools students are 
incited to take oaths to Ônever forget this blessed sagaÕ.154 Such 
propaganda strays beyond even the usual parameters of a country 
accustomed to the omnipresence of nationalist and Kemalist imagery, 
where the face of Atatrk Ð and increasingly, Erdoğan Ð graces nearly 
every wall, let alone school. It is an attempt to merge the imagined 
communities of both the nation state and the conspiratorial society.155 
In this, the idea of conspiracy seeps into every facet of life. In so doing, it 
alters the cognitive process, and embodies a consciousness so universal 
that the citizen anticipates such resistance everywhere, and sees it 
uprooted and discovered in a growing constellation of seeming evidence 
for its existence. Indeed, the Turkish citizen adapts and learns to think of 
life, of civil society and of politics as conspiratorial. In so doing he finds 
ways to insert himself into these new strategies of paranoia that now 
inform the workplace, his religious institutions, the schools of his children, 
                                     
154 Ibid. 
155 For an in-depth analysis of Turkish public memory as a political battleground, see: 
Esra zyrek (ed.), The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey (Syracuse, 2007), pp. 114-
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and even his home and extended family gatherings. The conspiracy is 
then no longer merely something read about in the newspaper, shared by 
word of mouth or heard on television. In the final stage of the post-coup 
framing of conspiracy theory, the ordinary citizen has his own position in 
society cast into doubt, unless that individual, too, embraces and applies 
to himself and his surroundings the machinations of the conspiracy frame. 
The seemingly luminal nature of the coup attempt, at least in its opening 
moments, demonstrated the beginning of an internalized conspiracy 
frame, in which the experience of reality becomes tainted by the 
experience and expectation thereof. The result is that conspiracy theory 
becomes entrenched not merely as a societal curiosity, but as a deeply 
mythologized, yet vividly bureaucratized, orchestration of an entire nation 
raised on the experience of a conspiratorial threat to the status quo, the 
defence of which must then surely be considered in equal measure heroic 
and perpetual.  
But the Turkish government does not simply wish to settle scores with its 
enemies, be they fictional or real. Rather, in the mode of the paranoid 
style, the conspiratorial framing strategy seeks to elevate the settling of 
scores to a perpetual politics of purging. In the culmination of the 
conspiratorial mode the State can therefore never truly be completely 
ÔpurgedÕ, or scores truly settled (this would imply that the enemy could 
deal legitimate blows to the State, or stand on an even footing with it). It 
can only exist as a perpetual purge, a state of affairs in which a fresh 
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enemy looms over every horizon, and where a potential adversary lurks 
within every friend. This is what is meant by the master frame of 
conspiracy theory. It is the culmination, but also the inevitable paradox, of 
what might well be deemed the Erdoğan doctrine: a relentless focus on 
modernization and democratization, seemingly achieved through 
increased conservatism and authoritarianism. 
And here there is a difference between the response to the Gezi protests 
and the coup attempt. The politics of conspiracy quickly becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy, not by accident, but out of necessity. Its very goal is 
therefore to achieve this self-serving necessity, and by proxy to find 
continued justification for enhancing restrictive measures. To do this, it 
does not require any actual plotting of its own, and certainly need not 
initiate a false-flag operation. Indeed, the conspiracy frame functions at 
its hegemonic best precisely when it induces a general, not specific, state 
of paranoia that can remain conveniently incorporeal. All the 
interpretations of the ÔwhodunitÕ variety therefore inevitably fall prey to 
the same conspiratorial mode of thought.  
It is exactly in this stage of internalized conspiratorial musing that the 
ensuing purge becomes more than just a demonstration of political 
strength, and evolves into a sustained experience that seeps into the very 
distinction between the real and the paranoid in Turkish society tout 
court. When conspiratorial framing takes on the attributes of a master 
frame, in other words, when it harnesses the paranoid experience to the 
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extent that the public internalizes its paranoid account of reality, it 
thereby seeks to ratify, codify and ritualize the role of the State as 
essential to the perpetual purge of suspected enemies within its own 
ranks. This means that we should not busy ourselves trying to discern 
whether the coup was real or staged. As a defence against the paranoid 
state, such a debunking approach will remain ultimately ineffective.  
 
 
State of Emergency, State of Conspiracy 
 
When the current Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, speaks of ÔscaringÕ 
terrorism by means of state terrorism (ÔIf you make terrorism afraid, then 
you are safe. We all together will not fear it, but it will fear us.Õ)156, it 
becomes apparent that the confrontation with the ÔparallelÕ enemy is one 
that will be cast into perpetuity, and in which the preservation of civil 
liberties becomes at best a secondary concern in its continued campaign 
to root out its perceived enemies.157 (Indirectly, it is also an attempt to 
                                     
 
156 ÔRunning away not a solution to terrorÕ, Hurriyet Daily News, 20 September 2016. 
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157 This emphasis on the ÔimaginedÕ terrorist corresponds to recent inquiries in critical 
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relations of terrorism beyond the normative analysis of Ôwhether or not state actors 
should negotiate with terroristsÕ. Harmonie Toros, ÔWe don't negotiate with terrorists!': 
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distract from domestic claims that the coup was a ÔcontrolledÕ coup.158) In 
this then we see finally how the conspiracy Event gives rise to that final 
stage of the conspiratorial framing project; a state that does not need to 
govern, nor to democratize, but which simply exists to ensure that its 
terrorist enemies (whether real or imagined) can be demonstrated to be 
living in fear of the StateÕs tremendous power (whether they actually are 
or not remains equally elusive). The pursuit of Ôthe enemyÕ therefore 
takes the form not simply of apprehending the culprit(s), but of acting 
out of the StateÕs capacity to purge its opponents. In this pursuit, 
democracy can be readily and conveniently discarded. In other words, the 
state of emergency, which, in essence, is a state of paranoia, takes on 
the distinct characteristics of a so-called ÔMaster FrameÕ.159 That is to say, 
it informs, yet sustains, the experience of the real as inherently 
conspiratorial. 
So as the official state of emergency is extended into seeming perpetuity, 
so too does the experience of the ÔnormalÕ adapt and internalize the 
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notion of ever-lurking and pervasive threats to the system.160 But this 
effectively constitutes an impossibility. After all, if the idea of a state of 
emergency becomes the everyday lived experience, then what can still 
constitute an aberration from this norm? As such, the idea of emergency, 
which in essence is then one of Ôemergent emergencyÕ, comes to be the 
new normal.161 But what further stands out is not the abnormality of 
continued resistance, but the expected contingency of further unrest. 
Here a breakdown of meaning begins to become apparent. For as the 
emergency is no longer a temporary moment, but a sustained period of 
unrest, what becomes the determining principle of such a state is that of 
a paradoxical perpetual contingency, that is, the oxymoronic notion of a 
Ôsustained emergencyÕ.  
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As such, in the state of emergency, the embrace of conspiracy theory is 
not merely a rhetorical affectation of an authoritarian leadership style, but 
becomes the guiding principle by which political decision-making and the 
functioning of Turkish institutions come to exist in the service of a 
conspiratorial mode of being; a binary equation, in which what is in fact a 
fragmented society is cast off as a conspiratorially polarized one. The 
state of emergency thus posits a perpetual counter-collectivity upon 
which it bases its own defensive position. The idea of the Other becomes 
doubly perpetuated, both internal and external, parallel to the StateÕs 
destiny, yet vital to its legitimacy.  
In sum, the state of emergency achieves an imagined community based 
not on any founding principle of its own, but on the shared fear of the 
conspiratorial Other. A paradox ensues, in which the conspiratorial 
opposition is framed as invisible but universal, whereas the proliferation of 
actual injustices and critiques is rendered invisible and non-universal; the 
final result of this contradiction is the culmination of the conspiratorial 
framing process into that of a conspiratorial society, the perpetuation of 
the conspiracy frame, and the new normality of state of emergency 
measures. For at a certain point, this imagined community can only be 
sustained within the parameters of a uniquely self-negating expectation of 
not ever actually being a homogeneous group at all, but being already 
infiltrated by conspirators. Without this paranoia, the state of emergency 
cannot be realistically extended into perpetuity. And the subsequent 
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purge in turn becomes a new founding myth, that is, the purge as a new 
beginning along the lines of that old Platonic ideal of the clean slate.162 
After going through several such cycles of governmental purges, all that 
can ultimately remain is the solitary figure of the totalitarian leader as the 
sole embodiment of the righteousness of such a political project, the one 
figure who can determine at what point the slate has been cleaned. We 
shall further consider how this develops into a strongman politics in the 
following chapter. 
What we begin to see emerging in Turkey is therefore a perverse 
collectivity that acts not out of solidarity with any one group or cause, or 
even overarching democratic principle, but that acts out its own 
survivalist fantasies through a constant reshuffling and reorientation of 
political belonging and, more importantly, adversarial positions 
necessitated to constitute such belonging. The logical conclusion is that 
once the state of emergency becomes thus internalized as a 
conspiratorial master frame, the ÔofficialÕ period of emergency can 
effectively be ended, as it now lies embedded within society Ðone is 
tempted to say that it festers Ð and serves as a founding principle rather 
than as a contingent moment of unrest in the supposedly quietly 
democratizing New Turkey. In sum, the purpose of civil society is no 
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longer that of participation therewith, but to secure this participation 
from infiltration by supposed conspirators. The public must be enlisted to 
combat the conspiratorial Other (or to participate in the perception 
thereof), as much as it is also subject to the very purge it is supposed to 
facilitate. It is at this stage that the conspiratorial society begins to 
resemble a totalitarian one, as it assimilates pre-existing communal 
structures into the paranoid style. For example, within the traditional 
structure of the family unit, it becomes enough for one member of any 
given family to be accused of being a conspirator for the entire family to 
be rendered suspect. This holds equally true for institutions, clubs, 
dormitories, etc. The conspiratorial collective is therefore one that feeds 
upon pre-existing collectives by entrapping them in its own paranoid web.  
The ÔbelongingÕ within such a society quickly comes to take on the 
distinctive hallmarks of a totalitarian system: an imagined unity, 
mysterious powers attributed to its leaders, and a quasi-mythological 
motivation for the securing of power. The logical conclusion of conspiracy 
theory as political praxis is thus that culture, society and the experience 
of citizenship are rendered through a haze of counter-conspiratorial 
purpose. The tragic irony is apparent. Seen in this light, the idea of the 
nation state itself becomes conspiratorial. The conspiratorial politics 
therefore finds expression and becomes codified in shared norms, 
discourse, institutions and political practices that actively shape any 
rendering of the political as part of a struggle against conspiracy. The 
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experience of the real therefore becomes inherently conspiratorial, a 
subjective experience in which the citizen, or the individual, himself can no 
longer determine whether he too might be deemed a dissident, a 
conspirator or, at the very least, a terrorist sympathizer. In post-coup 
Turkey, conspiracy is no longer a rhetorical curiosity, but instead a 
touchstone of the framing of everyday experience. In other words, as the 
state of emergency becomes the new normal, the idea of conspiracy 
comes to supersede the idea of politics.  
What begins seemingly as an antagonistic fancy of paranoid politicians 
thus quickly comes to resemble a veritable system of conspiratorial 
framing Ð and in turn, a politics that relies on the notion of hidden 
resistance as its motive force. And if we are to accept that the 
conspiratorial project can only be sustained by turning its suspicion 
inwards, this requires the constitution of a de facto parasitic collectivity, 
that is to say, a perceived unity based on the necessity of an ever-
evolving threat, yet lacking any grounding beyond the goal of deterring it. 
The totalitarian logic is a self-perpetuating conspiratorial one inasmuch as 
the conspiratorial logic lends itself to totalitarianism.  
 
Questions to be Asked, Lessons to be Learned 
The goal of this chapter was to begin rethinking the coup in terms of a 
classic Popperian observation: that a general tendency exists in which Ôall 
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tyrannies justify their existence by saving the State (or the people) from 
its enemiesÕ and that for this the enemy need not necessarily be a 
tangible one. Further, Popper holds that this tendency then Ômust lead, 
whenever the old enemies have been successfully subdued, to the 
creation or invention of new onesÕ.163 It strikes me that such a state 
becomes one of inherent stasis, an uncanny state of being in which 
enemies both new and old, visible and invisible, and real as well as 
fictional, lurk behind the very premise of TurkeyÕs political necessity. In 
the synthesis between the idea of an enemy who is both old and new, and 
the ensuing temporal uncertainty of such an adversaryÕs agency, that 
conspiracy theory constitutes the dynamic by which the perpetual 
recreation of the internalized enemy can be made manifest. The coup 
provides an interesting case study because it essentially poses a genuine 
manifestation of a conspiratorial enemy following a persistent framing 
strategy of conspiratorial Othering. 
The final stage of this, it must then follow, is the identification not of 
ÔnewÕ internal enemies, but precisely of the friend as enemy, that is, the 
shift from the military as Ôprotector of the peopleÕ to that of 
conspiratorial adversary. The reader may therefore already infer the 
outcome, which logically arises from this continued state of seeking to 
root out internal enemies: that is, the formation of an increasingly 
totalitarian society. But it is a managed democracy inasmuch as it is the 
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impossibility of a truly authoritarian democracy, or vice versa, a 
democratic authoritarianism. That is to say, the idea of democracy 
develops essentially in parallel to its true functioning. Turkish society writ 
large becomes itself immersed in a parallel experience of reality, managed 
within the confines of a conspiratorial, paranoid, authoritarian but, most 
of all, parallel state. The real parallel state in Turkey is thus that of the 
impossible reconciliation of liberal democracy and totalitarianism. In the 
paranoid style, and the state of emergency following the coup, Turkey is 
not either one or the other. It is both.  
As such, debates on whether Turkey is a democratic, authoritarian or 
totalitarian society are overly simplistic. Instead, it is precisely in the 
post-coup stateÕs capacity to be all at once that the constitutive force of 
the parallel state comes to fruition. Conspiracy theory as the driving force 
of such a politics results in an internalization of the conspiracy frame as 
the de facto operating mode of political participation. Yet where the real 
paradox, and the failure of such a state, emerges Ð at least to the extent 
that it seeks to impose a sense of stasis Ð is that to keep society thus 
repressed requires a constant shifting of the experience of the enemy and 
in effect a continued cleansing motion, a purge as it were, in a perpetual 
apparatus of discovering and rediscovering old and new enemies alike. For 
if one speaks of the coup as a threat to democracy Ðwhich indeed it was Ð 
but refrains from supporting the government in its repression of it, this 
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renders one by proxy a terrorist sympathizer. Or so the logic endemic to 
the conspiracy frame, and the society it begets, would have it. 
Indeed, the outcome of the coup was to be, first and foremost, that even 
the former critics of the government now have to seemingly come out in 
its favour, lest they be deemed supportive of the coup attempt. As the 
continued state(s) of emergency begin to normalize a time of perpetual 
turmoil and civic unrest, regional conflict and deteriorating political 
opportunity structures, the exception becomes the rule, and the status 
quo becomes one of paranoia and conspiracy theory. As a result, the true 
parallel society becomes one of almost Sisyphean authoritarianism, in 
which the StateÕs institutions must be purged in cycle after cycle of 
repression. The idea of the secret conspirator, the terrorist internalized, 
has thus become a necessary component of the justification for 
increasing executive powers. Conspiracy theory becomes political praxis, 
and the idea of Turkish democracy becomes inherently conspiratorial. The 
status quo thus becomes itself a sort of parallel society. Criticism of the 
government can therefore no longer take place within civil society, but is 
cast outside it and made to be synonymous with conspiring against the 
State.  
In this it can therefore be observed how the conspiracy Event in the form 
of the coup attempt becomes consolidated in a turning inside out, a 
Moebius strip as it were, of the very possibility of political expression, and 
in so doing engenders a static society by virtue of a subversion of the 
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idea of political participation itself. It is not the coup attempt that 
ÔcausesÕ this stasis as such. Rather, it is the sum of the structural 
contradictions of such a state that leads the experience of politics to 
become inherently infused with the notion of conspiracy. I have 
suggested that this constitutes what might well be deemed a 
conspiratorial master frame (or a master frame of conspiracy), which, in 
turn, can bring about the hegemonic fulfilment of a conspiratorial master 
frame; the experience of the real as inherently conspiratorial. 
The reason I make these observations here is that it strikes me that 
within the time-span between the Gezi protests and the coup attempt 
one can identify the key components of (a) the ÔcreationÕ of new enemies, 
(b) the contradictions of the ÔnewÕ versus the ÔoldÕ enemy, and hence the 
changing experience of temporality itself, and (c) the emergence of a 
state of affairs in which the idea of the parallel state becomes effectively 
internalized, rendering each and every friend a possible enemy. Much of 
what this thesis seeks to accomplish focuses exclusively on the first (a) 
of these dynamics, the mechanisms by which the Turkish political elite 
invents conspiratorial opposition in its polemical rhetoric. More 
specifically, it has set out to demonstrate some of the conditions under 
which such a strategy could be put in motion, and how the idea of the 
conspiracy frame can help us understand the central role that conspiracy 
theory has come to play in the Turkish political arena. In light of the 
ongoing political repression in Turkey and the continued purge against all 
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manner of Ôenemies of the StateÕ, an inquiry into the two remaining 
stages (b and c) should warrant urgent consideration.164 
If we are to think in any way of a political trajectory through which to 
seek to resolve the most pressing issue of the political crisis in Turkey Ð 
the erosion of Turkish liberal democracy Ð we must do so in a way that 
goes beyond a mere reactionary volley of rhetorical polemics accusing 
Erdoğan and his cronies of political manipulation. I fear that such words, 
even if spoken or written in earnest, will only go to waste, at best falling 
on deaf ears, and at worst causing the endangerment of others. 
Therefore, at the very least as a starting point, a critical understanding of 
the coup within the parameters of conspiratorial framing should be 
considered paramount to the possibility of re-framing the idea of 
conspiracy theory in Turkish politics today.  
Conclusion 
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Finally, to what extent does the coup need to be understood through the 
lens of the Gezi protests? At first glance, the coup could not be more 
different from the progressive demonstrations of 2013. Yet on the other 
hand, the experience of the coup, and the reaction to it, has been 
distinctly bolstered by the consolidated powers derived from the 
preceding response to Gezi.165 One might argue that the crackdowns 
following the coup are but continuations of the Gezi contention, yet this 
would appear to simplify somewhat the vastly different nature of the dual 
contentions. Yet for better or worse, the coup must be considered within 
the parameters of post-Gezi politics, at least to the extent that one can 
trace a clear divide between the politics preceding and following Gezi.  
In turn, it seems more insightful to situate the coup within the same 
ÔbacklashÕ166 mechanisms of the Gezi protests, rather than simply 
equating it to TurkeyÕs other coups of the past decades.167 When 
reactions to the coup attempt see in it simply a repeat of previous coups 
in Turkey, they fail to take into account how deeply the experience of the 
coup was ingrained in the post-Gezi psychology. A good way to look at 
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this, I would argue, is to take into consideration the most comparable 
aspect of the coup and the Gezi protests, which is to say, the focus on 
the demonstrations following the coup and the protests during Gezi. This 
highlights the mobilization rather than the Event as such, and should also 
help us distinguish the overlap and incongruencies between the idea of 
social protest before and after the coup attempt. 
Since the failed coup, there have been frequent counter-mobilizations of 
pro-government protestors, with only isolated and relatively ineffective 
anti-government protests.168 But arenÕt these ÔcelebratoryÕ counter-
demonstrations following the failed uprising in fact a reversal of the 
emancipatory mobilization of Gezi? In other words, the pro-democracy 
demonstrations following the coup are problematic, at least to the extent 
that they celebrate the Turkish state as nationalist rather than liberal, as 
conservative rather than progressive. Yet this should not render the 
demonstrations inherently invalid. Rather, and in keeping with the critique 
made in this thesis, it demonstrates the extent to which the notion of a 
social movement ÔspiritÕ is subject to flexible sympathies, and has become 
integrated into the overarching conspiratorial experience, to the point 
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that even the symbolic potential of protest now serves to demonstrate 
national unity rather than to point out injustices and grievances.169  
To a certain degree these demonstrations serve as negative counter-
images to the goals of the Gezi movement. Seen in this light, these new 
mass gatherings constitute no less than a radical counter-image to the 
so-called ÔGezi spiritÕ (Gezi Ruhu). As such, any attempt to equate the 
post-coup rallies with the Gezi protests must inevitably run into a 
seemingly irresolvable dilemma. Where Gezi sought to disrupt and 
disengage the status quo, the post-coup demonstrations seek to restore 
the status quo. Ergo, the victory rallies seek to restore precisely what 
Gezi sought to disrupt. What sets these (pro-government) rallies apart 
from the Gezi protests is not their anti-liberal stance, but their opposition 
to what is in essence a conspiratorial threat rather than a concrete one. 
There is an almost oxymoronic tinge to these anti-parallel state protests. 
After all, they are hardly resisting anything at all. Instead, they call for 
enhanced executive power to uproot conspiratorial dissent. As such, a 
curious reversal occurs. The state of emergency becomes the normal 
state of affairs, and the meaning of resistance pivots to that of 
organizing popular demonstrations of national unity.  
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This means that the Turkish government has not simply ÔrepressedÕ truly 
emancipatory protest by violent means, but has instead successfully 
exploited the coup attempt and the conspiratorial divides to co-opt 
protest as a rallying cause for nationalism and pro-government sympathy, 
hence drowning out alternative forms of resistance. In effect, it is the 
final Ð and one is tempted to say ÔcompleteÕ Ð hegemonic takeover of the 
ideas and import the of the Gezi protests or, for that matter, any enrag-
style politics of resistance. It seems therefore that to do justice to the 
particularities of the conspiratorial framing strategy, and to prevent its 
interpretation as being a historicist one, the final piece of the puzzle must 
be one in which we compare Ðyet do not equate Ð the Gezi transformation 
from single grievance to mass movement and the victory demonstrations 
as both existing in the conspiratorial mode, yet not as embodiments of 
the same mobilizing dynamics.170 Instead, the following chapter contrasts 
the emergence of a strongman leadership style Ð a Ôstrongman spiritÕ of 
sorts Ð with that of the idea of the Gezi spirit. 
But if not all resistance is created equal, then does this not reflect poorly 
on the idea of GeziÕs supposed pluralist vision for society? It would seem 
that in the transition from the Gezi protests to the current wave of 
nationalist and pro-government popular mobilizations, a key demographic 
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ver and Basak Taraktaş, ÔWhen Does Repression Trigger Mass Protest? The 
2013 Gezi ProtestsÕ, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 41 (2017), 
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is being mobilized outside the Gezi spectrum. In turn, the danger here is 
that the current pro-government demonstrations seek to use the tacit 
endorsement of the political elite as a means to disenfranchise the notion 
of a progressive politics. While the current wave of nationalist 
demonstrations could not exist without the conspiratorial framework that 
spanned the frame of time between Gezi and the coup, at the same time 
they exist only in that very universe.  
In other words, they posit a version of the State that exists outside the 
confines of the Gezi contention, yet remains intrinsically aware of the 
precedent set by Gezi as a reason for its existence. In this one can 
therefore begin to distinguish a primary and organizing differential 
between the mobilizations on the one hand of the Gezi protests, and on 
the other, that of the anti-coup demonstrations, which in turn feature 
both pro- and anti-Gezi groups.171 The result is a dangerous solipsism in 
which patriotism or even Turkishness is based on conspiratorial beliefs 
rather than continued democratization. In turn, this comes to fit squarely 
within the parameters of an increasingly conspiratorial politics. 
What this means is that the coup, Gezi, and the post-coup 
demonstrations, come together as a quasi-mythological triumvirate. 
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Solidarity RallyÕ, Huffington Post, 24 July 2016. Available at  
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Instead of engaging with politics as a mode of consensual deliberation, 
the pursuit of the political becomes a conspiratorial pursuit of power. It is 
a commonly held assumption that Turkish politics is inherently 
majoritarian. Yet increasingly, it has become a game of thrones, a winner-
takes-all contestation, and in so doing drifts further away from the 
genuine experience of liberal democracy. Whether by means of a 
progressive uprising, a military uprising or a nationalist uprising, the future 
of Turkish politics detaches itself from the idea of a process of politics. It 
should come as no surprise therefore that this coincides with a 
rediscovery of conservative and Kemalist thought, poetry and politics.172 
The outcome of this is that the binary of being ÔforÕ or ÔagainstÕ a 
continuation of the current government becomes not a question of 
consensual politics, but of vastly different destinies of the Turkish state. 
So, regardless of the outcome, the idea of the Turkish state is no longer 
that of a participatory democracy, but rather becomes a prize to be won 
in the battle of grand narratives. The result is that conspiracy theory 
becomes the driving force of all political engagement, articulation and 
execution, rather than having any bearing on the day-to-day realities of 
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the Turkish people. The very idea of democracy becomes conspiratorial 
rather than representational. 
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Chapter 4 
Discursive Processes of Conspiracy: Strongman Politics and the Gezi Spirit 
 
Introduction 
In the fourth and final chapter of this thesis, I move beyond the case 
studies of Gezi and the coup, to instead highlight the emergent discursive 
processes and power relations that have come about through 
conspiratorial framing of both events. Specifically, I contrast the 
competing notions of the so-called Gezi Spirit with that of the strongman 
leader, and demonstrate how in the contestation between either position 
a counter-intuitive reinforcement of the conspiratorial framing process is 
articulated. The concrete way in which I have chosen to analyze this 
admittedly broad set of concepts is to focus specifically on the shifting 
ways in which the transformative potential of both the ÔspiritÕ of 
resistance and the ÔspiritÕ of the strongman are juxtaposed in what I here 
argued constitutes a dialectical relationship. That is, a mutually reinforcing 
relationship predicated on the inconsistencies and mutual impossibility of 
resolving the conspiratorial framing process through democratic 
participation instead of civil strife. I argue that this hinges on how the 
idea of strongman leadership needs to continuously re-conceptualize the 
shifting notion of conspiratorial resistance to delegitimize actual 
resistance and consolidate renewed state power and legitimacy. 
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As such, whether one considers Erdoğan as the triumphant father figure 
of contemporary of Turkey, a Turkish strongman or, alternately, as 
colourful sultan or despot, he undoubtedly shares all the characteristics of 
a conspiratorial figure in the public imagination. His own image is 
continuously being crafted, shaped and manipulated in the 
multidimensional interpretations that his persona engenders.173 The 
challenge therefore, and particularly in light of the coup attempt, is to 
find a mode of viewing TurkeyÕs enigmatic leader in a more systematic 
and less normative manner. So rather than simply identifying the 
symptoms of paranoid politics in Turkey as the direct outcome of 
ErdoğanÕs polemical style, this chapter demonstrates how the potential of 
the strongman ÔspiritÕ can be juxtaposed with that of the Gezi spirit, and 
in turn, argues that both renditions of either a ÔspiritÕ of resistanceÕ or of 
strongman leadership become integrated into the conspiratorial framing 
strategy. In other words, instead of considering Erdoğan as either a 
despotic figure or a magnanimous president, this final chapter seeks to 
determine what is essentially a final antinomy of conspiracy theory in 
Turkey, that of the dissonance between the Ôspirit(s)Õ of resistance and 
that of the strongman leader. 
As such, any directly normative assessments of President ErdoğanÕs 
leadership style will be largely discarded for the purpose of this chapter. 
                                     
 
173 Zafer Yilmaz, ÔThe AKP and the Spirit of the ÒNewÓ Turkey: Imagined Victim, 
Reactionary Mood, and Resentful SovereignÕ, Turkish Studies, April (2017), pp. 1Ð32. 
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Rather, what I mean to suggest is that the popular notion of a so-called 
ÔGezi spiritÕ (Gezi Ruhu) lends itself to a conspiratorial interpretation (a 
key vulnerability of the momentum-oriented mobilization strategy) 
inasmuch as the strongman leader requires the notion of a conspiratorial 
Other to act out his power vis--vis such opposition. The dialectical 
relationship these spirits thus take on, and how they both infuse each 
other with meaning, is the primary focus of this chapter.  
It is therefore not so much a matter of whether the Gezi protests or the 
coup ÔchangedÕ ErdoğanÕs leadership style, inasmuch as we should 
consider how the idea of such resistance has become integral to, and 
integrated into, the continued legitimacy (or lack thereof) of his political 
authority. So while the Gezi protests and the coup certainly reinforced 
pre-existing contentions in Turkey, they also provided a pathway for the 
consolidation of state power, and an opportunity for Erdoğan to make his 
mark on Turkish history in a way that might have not been possible 
without such resistance. And while we may speculate as to whether 
Erdoğan may have held authoritarian ambitions prior to the Gezi protests, 
it strikes me as more important, and more theoretically valid, to instead 
situate the particular appeal (and contradictions) of the strongman 
leadership style with that of the appeal (and contradictions) of 
conspiratorial framing and conspiracy theory in the wake of the Gezi 
protests.  
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In the strongman mode of leadership, opposition becomes a political 
expedient aiding the strongmanÕs success. The more resistance he faces, 
the more he is called upon to restore order, and, in turn, the more turmoil 
he can create, the more he can ensure his continued relevance. There is a 
level of self-sabotage here. But it is a self-harm that fuels, rather than 
defeats, the strongman spirit. In the same manner, invoking conspiracy 
theory as a response to such resistance deliberately escalates the 
contention; not in the sense of NixonÕs ÔmadmanÕ strategy of Cold War 
politics, in which American politicians were to lead their Soviet 
counterparts to believe that they were capable of inciting nuclear war, 
but a much more internalized irrationality.174 That is to say, in the 
relationship between the paranoid politician and the figure of the 
strongman leader, a distancing from reality must be initiated. One way to 
do this is through conspiracy theory, or for that matter, the adoption of a 
conspiratorial politics, or the conspiratorial framing strategy with which it 
is begotten.  
Yet we must be careful here not to misconstrue such a politics as both 
catalyst and outcome of the strongman spirit. Add to that the somewhat 
                                     
 
174 Nixon is quoted as saying to his chief of staff, Halderman: ÔI call it the Madman 
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vague definition of such a spirit, and one can see that there is more here 
than meets the eye. It is not simply a matter of a popular leader such as 
Erdoğan invoking controversial political measures to gain populist support, 
although certainly this is part of the process. Erdoğan, even though he is 
the most visible symbol of the paranoid style in Turkish politics, is not the 
sole proprietor of this seeming breakdown of reason. So to begin with, 
one should contrast what might be called the ÔirrelevanceÕ of the 
conspirator with the (relative) irrelevance of the strongman himself.  
This has the following consequences. Not only is the veracity of the 
conspiracy claim of relatively secondary import Ð at least in contrast to 
its very real outcomes ÐÐ the same can be considered to be true for the 
idea of the leader figure, whose ÔleadershipÕ comes to rest on his imagined 
resistance to conspiratorial threats rather than constituted by any 
tangible outcomes of his political decision making. After all, he must be 
both ÔallÕ and ÔoneÕ; he must exist in two incompatible states of being. The 
elusive possibility of achieving such a duality is of course precisely what 
creates the necessary tension between the strongman leader as hero and 
as enemy. He is never either one or the other, but posits himself as a 
necessary concatenation of the two. It is in this mode that the strongman 
spirit begins to emerge from the contradictory forces begotten by the 
antinomy of friend and enemy, leader and oppressor, victim and 
conqueror, etc. 
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Harkening back to the preceding chapter, we can think of the strongman 
leader as the logical outcome of the exacerbation of the friend/enemy 
relationship implicit in the conspiratorial society. Contradictions of his 
persona adequately embody the same dynamics of the friend as enemy, 
or for that matter, the enemy as friend. Therefore it is no surprise that a 
persistent theme in strongman rhetoric is that Ôif only one would get to 
know himÕ he would not seem so bad. In this sense, Erdoğan is not unlike 
Trump, or even Putin, in the way in which his persona lives in the public 
imagination as both saboteur and fixer, peacemaker and warmonger, and 
above all villainous yet amiable. 
One might recall one of the many anecdotes that shape AtatrkÕs legacy, 
an account illustrating the tremendous productivity attributed to the 
founder of the Turkish Republic. It goes as follows. Atatrk was known to 
stay up all night, working tirelessly around the clock. The message was 
clear. Here is a champion of the people, employing an indefatigable work 
ethic to protect the nation. At the same time, it was widely rumoured 
that Atatrk was a restless womanizer, and would spend much of his time 
bedding the wives of his associates. Whenever such rumours became too 
persistent, the police would arrest some poor soul for slander. Of course 
this only further spread the rumour that Atatrk enjoyed an insatiable 
appetite for both work and women.175  
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Such contradictions are at the heart of the strongman fantasy: a figure 
who toils day and night while still cavorting with his many mistresses,176 
his ardour for the nation matched only by his passion for sexual conquest. 
True or not, the anecdote is illustrative of a certain dynamic, which the 
reader will no doubt anticipate as being akin to that of the conspiracy 
theories the strongman so readily invokes. For is it not true that the 
ÔleaderÕ, the embodiment of the power of the State, becomes more 
interchangeable the more his strength assumes that of a universal 
symbolic power? (Interchangeable, not in the sense that his identity is 
insignificant, but on the contrary, that the project he himself has come to 
embody is so strong as to render the man, the politician, a Ôreplaceable 
                                                                                                           
175 As recounted by the outspoken Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, Trouble in 
Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism (London, 2014), p. 75. For a 
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ÔAtaturkÕs Ambiguous LegacyÕ, The Wilson Quarterly 4 (2000), pp. 88Ð96. For a 
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Danforth, ÔIdeology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatrk to the AKPÕ, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly 3 (2008), pp. 83Ð95; John F. Crossland, ÔTurkeyÕs Fundamental 
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176 For a fascinating account of how the figure of Atatrk lived in the Nazi imagination, 
being quoted by Hitler as a Ôstar in the darknessÕ, see Stefan Ihrig, Atatrk in the Nazi 
Imagination (Cambridge, 2014). It should be noted that the infatuation was not 
necessarily mutual. Hitler considered Turkish nationalism as an inspiration for Nazism, but 
not as an extension of the German Reich. For a ÔrevisionÕ of the relative reciprocity of its 
effects, see Halil Karaveli, ÔHitlerÕs Infatuation with Atatrk RevisitedÕ, The Turkey 
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objectÕ.)177 He becomes both the primary antagonist, as well as redeemer, 
the ÔheroÕ of the nation state and its institutions. The strongman leader is 
therefore subject to a strongman spirit, precisely to the extent that this 
spirit can be identified in the notion of conspiratorial framing. For the 
strongman leader, reason moves away from empirical reality, and begins 
to form its own symbolic and self-fulfilling nexus of logic. 
Erdoğan, therefore, in the moment he assumes the role of the leader 
figure rather than merely being the leader of a political party, must pay a 
price for his elevation, which is precisely that of becoming Other to 
himself. In other words, the successful politician, in assuming the role of 
strongman leader, does so only by transitioning his agency from that of 
his personal elevation into that of a sublime emergence, the cost of which 
is also his detachment from the people as such. To put this simply, there 
is something supremely conspiratorial implicit in the idea of a strongman 
spirit. Not that he is simply paranoid, or perhaps even delusional (although 
this may well be true). Instead, in the transfiguration from political figure 
to strongman leader, a paradoxical form of reverse political representation 
takes place. The strongman leader no longer seeks to mirror the publicÕs 
attitudes, but instead must impose them. Not by force, but by implying 
that he knows what is really good for them. So on the one hand, the 
strongman leader appears as a more intuitive, emotional and indeed 
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forceful embodiment of the popular will. Yet on the other, he outgrows 
yet consolidates his political mandate precisely when his actions and 
political decision-making become based on his persona rather than the 
collectives he represents.  
In other words, the leader figure exceeds even the boundaries of the 
political representative precisely by assuming the idea of becoming part 
of a larger (nationalist) ÔmanifestÕ destiny together with the people. In 
effect, it is ultimately but an exacerbation of the dilemma posed by the 
paradox of political representation Ð the question of how one figure can 
be truly representative of all Ð and the necessity of both becoming other 
to the collective populace (if there even is such a thing) while also 
seeking to represent a universal, in this case Turkish, national unity. The 
alienation of the strongman leader is therefore not simply an isolation in 
the simple sense of being detached from the daily reality he is sought to 
represent, but alienated exactly from his own necessity proper: in the 
fetishization of the politicianÐcum-strongman-leader, he becomes both 
the arbiter and embodiment of a national identity that feeds upon a 
peculiar constellation of internal contradictions, assumptions (some of 
which, indeed, are contradictory as well), conspiracy theories and 
(paranoid) conspiratorial expectations.  
 
Democracy and the Strongman Leader 
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In public statements Erdoğan vocally rejects the accusation of being a 
strongman leader, despite his frequent tirades against enemies of all sorts 
in campaign speeches and political appearances.178 He is to a degree 
correct. Turkey is not ruled by autocracy. Nor, for that matter, is it 
strictly speaking non-democratic. Like other ÔdemocraticÕ populist leaders 
such as Putin or Trump, he is, and continues to be, tremendously popular 
among his supporters. This raises the evident question: can a democracy 
still be considered democratic when it sustains the strongman leader? In 
other words, how can a democratic society give rise to a type of 
leadership one would otherwise associate with a totalitarian system? Can 
it do so without compromising its very raison dÕtre, that is, to be a 
system of government for the people and from the people? After all, 
despite its political chaos, Turkey continues to be a parliamentary 
democracy, if perhaps not a truly ÔparticipatoryÕ democracy in the fullest 
sense of the word.  
The answer, I would suggest, is that the strongman leader flourishes 
precisely in the framework of democracy. That is to say, the means by 
which the strongman can invoke both his democratic popularity, and 
simultaneously justify his authoritarian politics, is at the very heart of the 
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necessary contradiction underlying the idea of the strongman spirit. In 
this way, the idea of Turkish democracy only underscores the strength of 
the strongman position. Not only is he powerful, he is also democratically 
elected. Democracy ceases to be a representative system, and instead 
serves to justify the strongmanÕs goal of stripping away democratic rights 
and freedoms.  
In this way, the duelling forces of the spirit of resistance and the 
strongman spirit take on what appears to be a dialectical relationship. 
They feed each otherÕs reason to exist, and, in turn, reinforce the 
strength of either position. The harsher the response elicited by the 
strongman leader, the faster such opposition grows. And in turn, the 
more visible resistance becomes, the more necessary the strongman 
appears to his loyalists. So when I suggested earlier that the Gezi 
movement, at least in terms of its momentum, became trapped in a 
totalitarian ÔlogicÕ, I was referring to this dynamic, essentially a closed 
loop of negative reaffirmation. The result is a relationship of internalized 
paranoia and the self-perpetuating necessity of the strongman.  
It appears therefore that in the emergence of the strongman spirit, we 
are not talking simply about a show of force. Instead, there is an apparent 
truth claim to his very persona. That is to say, if the leader is always 
right, then any opposition to his ÔrightnessÕ can never be anything but 
untrue, illegitimate, etc. The strongman leader thus becomes a 
personification of the idea of the conspiratorial Other. He personifies the 
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truth act, yet without truth content (Wahrheitsgehalt).179 After all, to 
demand empirical rationality from the strongman leader would be to 
question his authority. The manner in which this unfolds has all the 
hallmarks of a totalitarian system. If the political system fails to provide 
for its citizens, then, due to the lack of opposition, only the State itself 
can be held responsible for the inevitable breakdown of order. Yet as the 
system relies upon the assumption that it is flawless, and can hardly 
criticize itself, it externalizes the failure onto hidden dissent and 
conspiratorial forces.  
This means that the totalitarian project, led and embodied by the 
strongman leader, inherently stands both within and outside its own 
structural fantasy, relying on a conspiratorial togetherness in opposition 
to foreign conspirators. Allegiance to the strongman and his ideals 
becomes conspiratorial in and of itself, whereas fictional conspiracy is 
invoked to justify participation in what becomes a conspiracy of society 
fuelled by a conspiracy theory of society. Hannah Arendt already 
famously referred to this process as the Ôtotalitarian dichotomyÕ.180 On 
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the one hand, the public must be enlisted as co-conspirators in the 
totalitarian project, while on the other it is told that it must be wary of 
conspirators hiding in every corner. In Chapter 3 I have already briefly 
discussed how the ensuing purges have led to the formation of what is in 
essence such a conspiratorial society. Yet it is in the characteristics of the 
strongman leadership position that we can readily see how the politics of 
such a process unfolds. It is directly linked to the spirit of the strongman 
leader and, as such, to the way in which he can manipulate resistance into 
a consolidation of his own powers. 
This can be better understood when one recognizes that the whole point 
of ArendtÕs observation is exactly that the totalitarian logic is not 
contained in the full restriction of society as such, but in the leaderÕs 
being expected and able to ensure that no legitimate opposition can be 
voiced. Totalitarian tendencies flourish precisely in systems that uphold 
the illusion of checks and balances, and of being a democratic society. Far 
from democracy simply being a ÔconvenientÕ mantle for authoritarian 
leaders, the idea of democracy is integral to the perverse appeal of the 
strongman who is both deeply attuned to the supposed will of the people, 
yet dares resist them Ðand indeed suppress opposition Ð to uphold the 
nation. The strongman leader is not simply a monstrous figure. He is a 
fatherly one. Seen in this light the notion that totalitarianism is a system 
in which everything is either prohibited or obligatory takes on a distinctly 
psychoanalytic note. After all, the strongman leader exerts control not by 
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direct oppression as such, but by wilful management of the idea that at 
some point or another the people will rise up to challenge the father. A 
peculiar conspiratorial dynamic thus begins to reveal itself already in this 
sense, before it is even borne out in the accusation of the conspiracy 
frame.  
Of course such a system can never fully and absolutely enforce either 
mandatory or prohibited acts, or even clearly designate what falls within 
and outside of these categories. The ambiguity, and the perceived 
flexibility in either stance, despite their absolute value, is of course 
precisely what forms the totalitarian experience, that of a both deeply 
arbitrary and yet simultaneously forcefully structured and controlled 
society. Rather than consisting of a failure to become an absolute 
totalitarian society as such, it is in the tension between these positions, 
and the impossibility of truly achieving such a state, that the true 
contradictory force of the totalitarian system emerges. 
And that is exactly why the obsession with conspiracy is a necessary 
element of political repression, inasmuch as it is a reflection of this 
categorical forcefulness. Whether action is prohibited or obligatory, it is a 
subjective act only to the extent that it exists within the parameters, and 
hence confines, of the state hegemony, that is, it happens under the 
ever-watchful gaze of the Ôclosed system.Õ Yet despite all this, the power 
of this relationship, or indeed the network of relationships it relies upon in 
a form of totalitarian social contract as it were, remains somewhat 
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dialectical precisely to the extent that it assumes and internalizes its own 
impossibility. The dualism of prohibited/obligatory exists only to the 
extent that the individual subject can still ÔimagineÕ his resistance, that is, 
a world in which the regulatory capacity of the State is required to 
control and maintain collective ÔfreedomsÕ. It is, however, only ever a half-
freedom, the feeling of being integrated into a group, while maintaining a 
perceived distance. Or, in other words, the scene emerges in which each 
and every individual supporter in a crowd of thousands still considers 
himself to be the only sane one, the only one who knows this is political 
theatre, yet participates nonetheless. There is, therefore, an implicit 
sense of detachment that becomes necessary for participation in the 
totalitarian collective. In turn, this detachment can be seen to mirror that 
of the strongman leader himself, and his relationship vis--vis his 
responsibilities of political representation. 
The idea that Ôthe leader is always rightÕ therefore comes to be merged 
with a secondary assumption, which is that the strongman leaderÕs 
fantastically exaggerated claims of national strength and unity (despite all 
evidence to the contrary) are rendered implicitly ÔtrueÕ in a reversal of the 
aforementioned maxim of Ôeverything that is not prohibited becomes 
compulsoryÕ. What this means, when thought through to its logical 
conclusion, is therefore that nothing is true but everything is possible. 
Crucially, the totalitarian logic then necessitates that the totalitarian 
system become a paranoid one. After all, if the strongman leader must 
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achieve the unimaginable, yet subsequently make the impossible not only 
possible, but rather compulsory, then failure to do so will out of necessity 
be displaced onto a conspiratorial Other.  
There emerges therefore a strange interconnectedness between both the 
immense possibilities of the boundless capacity Erdoğan experiences as a 
result of resistance, and the legitimate threat it poses to his political 
ambitions. One the one hand he fuels a deep paranoia regarding the 
existence and exploitation of the idea of an equally nebulous and 
nefarious counterpoint, that of the conspiratorial agitator. While on the 
other, even in the visible structure and organization of the paranoid state, 
he engineers a certain conspiratorial togetherness, which is that its 
supporters come to believe that they themselves are part of a destined 
collective, seeking to undermine the ÔordinaryÕ path of history by 
superimposing their own vision onto the nation and its seemingly 
inevitable detractors. Quickly, however, this vision becomes focused 
primarily on the expulsion of perceived detractors rather than any 
organizing principle as such.  
In turn, the all-encompassing powers attributed to the strongman leader 
only further fuel reactionary conspiracy theories attributing to him all 
manner of false-flag operations; the idea emerges that even opposition to 
the strongman might be manipulated by the leader. When one considers 
such accounts of the coup attempt that suggest it was simply a ruse by 
the State to seize enhanced executive powers, this reveals already the 
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extent to which there has been an internalization of the strongman spirit. 
To this extent, it is relatively meaningless whether or not there was a 
false-flag operation, or if the government knew of the coup in advance. 
For evidently the expectation of a strongman spirit has already been 
internalized. And this, ultimately, is the strongmanÕs greatest strength: 
the ability to detach himself both from the experience of the real, and to 
encompass what one might call the production of the real.  
Another popular tactic is for the strongman to accuse other Western 
democracies of secretly harbouring anti-democratic or even fascist 
tendencies. The most recent example of this occurred in a series of 
heated statements following the expulsion of a Turkish diplomat from the 
Netherlands, and amid a similarly heated debate regarding Turkish political 
campaigning in Germany. In both cases, Erdoğan accused his European 
counterparts of being Nazis, war criminals, etc. One might well see this as 
a darkly ironic inversion of the so-called ÔNew World OrderÕ conspiracy 
theories centred on supposed moves to form a totalitarian world 
government.181 But it is of course primarily another one of the 
contradictory manifestations of the strongman spirit. 
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Another example that clearly demonstrates the contradictory rhetoric of 
the conspiratorial strongman can be identified when Erdoğan threatens 
non-Turkish countries for harbouring supposed anti-Islamic sentiments, 
but then uses their anti-terrorism measures as a justification for 
oppressing Turkish opposition at home. Recently, in a speech to members 
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Erdoğan stated that 
ÔThere are serious plots against the Islamic World.Õ ÔWe must pay 
attention,Õ he said, Ôthe blood being shed is MuslimsÕ blood. Those who kill 
and those who die are all Muslims. The unknown terrorists Ð and we do 
not know whom they serve and whose pawns they are Ð do not represent 
us in the Islamic world.Õ182  
To put this tactic in stark contrast to the way in which subsequent 
accusations of conspiracy and justifications for conspiracy come together 
in their mutually exclusive yet evidently constitutive relationship, one 
might consider the following two quotes, in which Erdoğan refers first to 
the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks (which were committed by members 
of the radical Muslim group ISIS) in Paris, then to the French state of 
emergency initiated in response to it. First: 
                                     
 
182 ÔAnti-West Statements by Turkish President Erdoğan and PM Davutoglu: Muslim 
Countries Must ÒUnite and Defeat the Successors of Lawrence of ArabiaÓ; ÔNo One Will 
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statements-turkish-president-Erdoğan-and-pm-davutoglu-muslim-countries-must-unite 
(accessed 26 May 2017). 
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French citizens carry out such a massacre and Muslims pay the 
price [...] The WestÕs hypocrisy is obvious. As Muslims, weÕve 
never taken part in terrorist massacres. Behind these lie 
racism, hate speech and Islamophobia [...] games are being 
played with the Islamic world. We must be aware of this.183 
 
Then contrast the above with the following statement; again, referring to 
the Paris attacks, but this time using the counter-terrorism measures as 
both justification for the state of emergency in Turkey and as accusation 
against a supposedly double hypocritical, even conspiratorial West. 
Nobody tells France: ÔHow can such a practice as the state of 
emergency take place in a democratic country? How come 
such operations can be carried out without judicial permission? 
You are doing wrong!Õ But the same parties, with the notions 
of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, 
unceasingly dictate to us, who face terrorism every day, saying 
ÔDo not conduct operations against terror organizations!Õ. We 
                                     
 
183 Jon Stone, ÔTurkish President Erdoğan accuses West of Òplaying gamesÓ with Muslims 
after Paris AttacksÕ, The Independent, 14 January 2015. Available at  
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have not heard nor seen those who give us this order ever turn 
to terror organizations and say ÔDo not attack Turkey! Do not 
kill the innocent!Õ Now I ask: Why do the methods regarded as 
FranceÕs right to struggle with terror hit a wall of democracy, 
freedom, rule of law when it comes to us? Why? This is called 
hypocrisy. I say it explicitly that these expressions do not have 
value for us anymore at all.184  
 
There is a fascinating double accusation to be discerned here. First, 
Erdoğan accuses France of conspiratorial antagonism towards Muslims, 
even going as far as to suggest a mass conspiracy to undermine the 
Islamic world. Yet in the other accusation, he likens Turkey to the West, 
and demands to know why his presidency is treated with what appears to 
be a double standard. After all, if France can declare a state of 
emergency, then why should Turkey not be at liberty to do so as well? Ð 
And so on and so forth. 
Of course it is easy enough to find contrasting or even hypocritical 
statements from politicians, yet in the above case the contradiction is not 
a mere rhetorical curiosity, nor merely a case of political convenience. 
                                     
 
184 ÔClaim: Erdoğan says Òdemocracy, freedom, rule of law have no value for usÓÕ, Fact 
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Instead, I would suggest that the contradiction between the two 
conspiratorial accusations, and in which Turkey features as supposed 
victim of conspiratorial anti-Turkish intent, reveals once more the 
duplicity underlying the relationship of the strongman with conspiracy 
theory, and in particular, how the sense of the strongman spirit 
encapsulates a singular figure representing the many, who determines his 
friends by making enemies, and ensures peace by declaring war, and so on 
and so forth. The logical conclusion is that any statement from the 
strongman leader on his own position devolves into what is essentially a 
sort of constitutive banality. After all, once the figure of the strongman 
becomes detached from the ÔrealityÕ of politicking, no statement is too 
bizarre. The more contradictions he articulates, the more they place him 
outside any coherent logic or challengeable system of meaning.  
 
Carl SchmittÕs conception of the political: Is Turkish democracy consuming 
itself?  
 
In recent years there has been a resurgent interest within academic 
publications for the writings of Carl Schmitt. His work is most commonly 
associated with the theory of the friend/enemy, or Ôthe friend-enemy 
distinctionÕ. While he was a prolific writer, he is most well known for his 
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1927 work ÔThe Concept of the PoliticalÕ.185 No doubt part of his previous 
obscurity has been his affiliation with the Nazi regime.186 In particular he 
sought to provide a juridico-legal foundation to the Nazi regime, and was 
known as the Ôcrown-jurist of the Third ReichÕ. This means that any 
attempt to read his work must also occur within the split-screen of 
history; that is to say, we must both distill the relevance of his work for 
political theory, while at the same time considering the various ways in 
which his Nazism shaped his views; and perhaps more importantly, 
acknowledge how his views were constitutive to Nazism. To help me do so 
I will rely not just on a direct reading of the friend-enemy distinction, but 
also use DerridaÕs ÔThe Politics of FriendshipÕ, in which the French 
poststructuralist seeks to deconstruct the theory of the enemy by means 
of a theory of friendship.187 In turn, I believe that this friend/enemy 
distinction is highly relevant to the manner in which I discuss conspiracy 
theory in Turkey. This means that I will attempt to integrate the concepts 
introduced here within the broader discussion of conspiratorial politics in 
Turkey. While this is far from an in-depth analysis of SchmittÕs thought, I 
would nevertheless like to isolate some core concepts that will be 
applicable to the way in which I use the terms ÔfriendÕ and ÔenemyÕ in the 
thesis. I also believe that these comments can help provide theoretical 
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context to what in this thesis is referred to as Ôdemocracy consuming 
itselfÕ. In other words, I am interested in the particular conception of the 
political by which democracy becomes particularly vulnerable to a form of 
extreme (paranoid) antagonistic politics. 
Based on lectures written for the Deutsche Hochschule in Berlin, ÔThe 
Concept of the PoliticalÕ sought to conceptualize an ÔessenceÕ of politics. 
This means that the idea of the friend-enemy distinction functions as a 
prima facie for his conception of the political. Schmitt argued that the 
political is the primordial sphere upon which all other domains are based 
(religion, economics etc.) The reason that it influences all other spheres 
was its capacity to distinguish between friends and enemies, or, in other 
words, that all spheres become ÔpoliticalÕ once they have to face the 
problem of distinguishing the friend and foe. It is therefore not simply that 
all spheres of life are political, but that since the political is the most 
essential one to identity (being that by which the State determines the 
friend and enemy), that all other spheres must inherently fall within its 
sphere. In a broader sense Ðand this is where the authoritarian element of 
his argument is most apparent- the central function of the State, and 
thereby of the democratic process, is that of distinguishing between the 
political friend and the perceived Other. Through this process of 
identification, the nature of politics is rendered most concretely into the 
political. However, this function of ÔconcretenessÕ can, somewhat 
paradoxically, rest on the Ôpossibility of conflictÕ. The key point for Schmitt 
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is then that the friend/enemy distinction (which I will later theorize as an 
antinomy) can be constitutive to the political regardless of the 
manifestation of actual conflict. This should not be taken as a pacifist 
idea. Instead, what Schmitt rightly assumes, is that the possibility of such 
conflict Ðor, the potentiality for violence- becomes itself a form of real 
violence. The process of distinguishing between friend/enemy never has 
to be completed. It is in the impossibility of fully rendering conclusive this 
identity that the core of the violence existence. In sum, violence is not 
just the means to an end, it is the very foundation on which identity is 
created within the political, and hence, the only sphere of reality on which 
politics can be made manifest. 
In the friend/enemy distinction, the idea of the enemy functions as a form 
of essentialist reduction of the Other. Not simply a moral difference, or a 
racial one, but rather a sort of fundamental all-absorbing otherness to the 
sovereign individual. This means that the very notion of being the friend 
becomes reliant on the identification of what he is not: a negative 
determination so to speak. Yet this also makes the idea of the enemy 
properly constitutive in its won right, as a positive determinant of the 
friend. Carl Schmitt famous describes the enemy as: ÒThe political enemy 
need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an 
economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with 
him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the 
stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense 
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way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme 
case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a 
previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a 
disinterested and therefore neutral third party.Ó 
But this does not just mean that the identity of the subject is defined by 
the political; rather, the political becomes that process by which this 
identity is discovered, declared, and made manifest. Here we can make the 
leap to Derrida, who suggests that Schmitt takes this declarative function 
and renders it into teleology of the political. That is to say, antagonism 
and differentiation is not the abstract thing that the political must seek to 
overcome Ðpace Schmitt- but rather it becomes the origin of the political 
itself; not just its modus Vivendi, but its apologia pro vita sua. The 
political looks back on itself and finds its sovereignty legitimized by virtue 
of this differentiation. Derrida writes: 
ÒWe are constantly reminded that only a concrete, concretely determined 
enemy can awaken the political; only a real enemy can shake the political 
out of its slumber and, as we awaken to its actual/effective life (asÕ the 
living fool that I amÕ, when it bemoans the fact that there is no longer, or 
not yet, an enemy). But there is the specter, lodged within the political 
itself; the antithesis of the political dwells within, and politicizes, the 
political. (É) Negativity, disavowal and politics, haunting and dialectics. If 
there is politicism in Schmitt, it lies in the fact that it is not enough for 
him to define the political by the negativity of polemics or opposition 
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(oppositional negativity in general) Ð which is not at all the same as 
defining the political Ð as teleologically political. The political is all the more 
political for being antagonistic Ð certainly, but opposition is all the more 
oppositional Ð supreme opposition, qua the essence and telos of 
opposition, negation and contradiction Ð when it is political.188 
While Derrida is not the easiest theorist to interpret, what is important 
here is that the element of ÔpossibleÕ violence functions already as an 
implicit ÔrealityÕ of the State. This means that there does not need to be a 
ÔrealÕ enemy for the forces to manifest that allow for the determination of 
an enemy. The possibility of violence is therefore in and of itself already a 
form of violence: the ambiguity of the ÔoccurrenceÕ of the violence allows 
the State to emerge in a relationship of (potential) force towards its 
people, rather like a conspiratorial form of HobbeÕs monopoly of violence; 
or, by extension, WeberÕs notion of the State as Ôhuman community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence with a 
given territoryÕ.189 Weber is here echoing the Trotskian attitude, that is 
also reflected among the contemporary Left, and even political ÔrealistsÕ 
that all States rely on violence to enforce their position. Yet this violence 
comes in three forms. For Thomas Hobbes Ðfrom which Weber takes the 
term- it functions as a ÔGewaltsmonopolÕ, i.e. the capacity to inflict 
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violence with impunity. For Arendt, such violence Ðwhen enacted in 
practice- invariably undermines the power, and hence legitimacy of the 
State.190 For the conspiracy theorist, the symbolic power is one that 
manifests itself precisely through a lack of violence. So where power minus 
violence is otherwise considered as a sign of legitimate authority, the 
conspiracy theorist sees the common lack of resistance to the status quo 
as itself a sign of the successful implementation of violent subversion 
(through plots, secret deals, manipulations, foreign coups, etc.). This, 
then, is a non-symbolic form of violence ÔpresumedÕ to underlie the 
creation of public consensus. 
If we apply this to the Turkish case, what stands out most readily is the 
particular constitutional definition of the GovernmentÕs power to declare a 
State of Emergency. In the Turkish phrasing (Olağanst Hal)191, the term 
literally translates to a ÔState of ExceptionÕ thereby inadvertently mirroring 
SchmittÕs ÔAusnahmezustandÕ (commonly translated to Ôstate of 
exception), which serves as a fundamental concept in his legal theory. 
Pointing out the overlap between the 1982 Turkish constitution and the 
terminology employed by Carl Schmitt, Turkuler Isiksel writes: Olağanst 
Hal bears out SchmittÕs conception of the state of exception as entailing 
Òthe suspension of the entire existing order,Ó whereby Òthe norm is 
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destroyed by the exception.Ó 192he argues that the ÔspiritÕ of Emergency 
rule is embedded within the 1982 constitution. 
 
ÒFor nearly 15 years of slow-burning civil war, constitutionally mandated 
emergency rule deprived millions of citizens of basic rights protections, 
allowing rampant extra- judicial killings, disappearances, torture, ill-
treatment, forcible displacement, and countless other grave abuses. Thus, 
the 1982 Constitution has overseen the expansion and normalization of 
procedures of emergency rule in entire swaths of the country for most of 
the constitutionÕs existence. Olağanu ̈stu ̈ Hal bears out SchmittÕs 
conception of the state of exception as entailing Òthe suspension of the 







 (Adding that the Turkish scholar Blent Tanor refers to it also as the anti-
constitution because of the rights it grants the Government to potentially 
undermine democracy and democratic rights), particularly because this  
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Ònominally ÒexceptionalÓ format of authoritarian rule was internal to the 
constitution, meaning that it was ÒordinaryÓ in the sense of being a 
constitutionally mandated exemption from constitutional guarantees of 
basic rights.Ó 
I think this serves as an interesting transition to the problem of conspiracy 
in TurkeyÕs contemporary Ðand ongoing- cycle of declaring and extending 
the State of Emergency following the coup in July 2018, effectively 
making it not only the first declaration of such an emergency, but also the 
longest sustained ÔState of ExceptionÕ in modern Turkish history. As I will 
argue in this thesis, many of the attributes of the state of exception have 
been since institutionalized, leading some to suggest that Turkey now lives 
under a perpetual State of emergency, or what Amnesty International has 
described as a ÔnormalizationÕ of emergency measures. In other words, 
emergency powers risk becoming the new normal of Turkish political life as 
they become integrated both within the culture, the media, and within 
political institutions. 
 
To stay with Carl SchmittÕs concept of the enemy, what resonates most 
strongly with the Turkish case is how he argues that the pursuit of the 
enemy becomes not just the legitimization, but also the essence of the 
State. (This is why, for example, the French philosopher Jacque Ranciere 
uses the word ÔpoliceÕ instead of ÔStateÕ). In this thesis I will follow the 
argument along the lines of a political praxis of conspiracy theory. In other 
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words, the process by which accusations of conspiracy become normalized 
to the extent that the pursuit of political enemies becomes not just the 
function, but the essence, of the political. In the following quote from ÔThe 
Concept of the PoliticalÕ we can detect a foreshadowing of the same form 
of State rhetoric that underlies the common paranoid nationalist narrative 
in Turkish politics today: 
 
ÒIt would be ludicrous to believe that a defenseless people has nothing but 
friends, and it would be a deranged calculation to suppose that the enemy 
could perhaps be touched by the absence of a resistance. No one thinks it 
possible that the world could, for example, be transformed into a condition 
of pure morality by the renunciation of every aesthetic or economic 
productivity. Even less can a people hope to bring about a purely moral or 
purely economic condition of humanity by evading every political decision. 
If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in 
the sphere of politics, the latter, will not thereby vanish from the world. 
Only a weak people will disappear.Ó 
 
In other words, the only certainty of politics is the existence of the enemy. 
In the pursuit thereof a people finds its true identity, and can readily cast 
aside other ethical or institutional restraints such as democracy, human 
rights, and so on. In this form of rhetoric, we can detect for the first time 
how it is precisely democratically elected leaders Ðrather than autocrats or 
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tyrants- who can most readily harness this form of a paranoid conception 
of the political. In the thesis I refer to this as Ôdemocracy consuming 
itselfÕ. 
 
So perhaps a better way to view this problem, i.e. that of the inevitable 
relationship between the idea of the enemy and the justification for a less 
democratic politics is to adopt what Chantal Mouffe has referred to as a 
politics of agonism instead of antagonism. This mirrors to some degree 
the distinction that already existed in PlatoÕs Republic, which is that of the 
difference between the public enemy and the private one, and specifically, 
between the antithesis of ÔwarÕ on the one hand, and Ôpublic insurrectionÕ 
on the other. For Plato, the only ÔgenuineÕ war is that of international 
strife between foreign adversaries, whereas domestic conflicts count as a 
form of ÔdiscordÕ and must be treaded not as a matter or survival, but as 
a condition of society. The point being, that it is impossible to truly wage 
war upon oneself. The distinction is here one of the enemy versus the 
opponent, but can be mirrored within the public sphere as well. That is to 
say, we can fight ÔwarsÕ domestically, but only on the condition that the 
opponent becomes an enemy on categorical, rather than reasoned 
grounds. Simply put, once we forego a reasoned contestation within 
democracy, we also move beyond the sphere of agonism, towards a 
politics of antagonism. An antagonistic democracy Ðand this is where I 
break ties with Schmitt, who makes the opposite conclusion- is therefore 
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a contradiction in terms. A truly democratic society is one in which the 
opponent is conceived of as precisely that, and adversary, but not an 
enemy. Plato provides this distinction in the following terms: ÒA private 
enemy is a person who hates us, whereas a public enemy is a person who 
fights against us.Ó Of course this is an altogether too facile distinction, 
which is also why ultimately PlatoÕs Republic (as Popper already argued so 
convincingly) would be an inherently authoritarian society. Chantal 
MouffeÕs response to this overly negative conceptualization of the 
political function of the enemy, and her warning against liberalsÕ desire to 
fight fire with fire, presents a much more deliberative picture of the role 
of adversarial politics. She writes:  
 
ÒAlas, it is not enough to eliminate the political in its dimension of 
antagonism and exclusion from oneÕs theory to make it vanish from the 
real world It does come back, and with a vengeance. Once the liberal 
approach has created a framework in which its dynamics cannot be 
grasped, and where the institutions and the discourses are missing that 
could permit that potential antagonisms manifest themselves under an 
agonistic mode, the danger exists that instead of a struggle among 
adversaries, what will take place is a war between enemies. This is why, 
far from being conducive to a more reconciled society, this type of 
approach ends up by jeopardizing democracy.Ó194  
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In other words, we cannot simply wish a way the idea of the enemy in a 
more consensual, centrist, conception of truthful, ethical, normative 
politics. The friend-enemy antithesis will always feature as a distinct trope 
of authoritarian visions of society, and can only be properly reconciled 
precisely if we create the conditions in which arguments can be brought 
to bear against it. If we simply cannot accept that this is the case, and 
treat the antagonistic politics of the Erdogan Presidency as antithetical to 
Turkish politics, then we only encourage and strengthen the conditions 
under which it functions. This means that the only appropriate response 
to the Erdogan-style polemical attitude, is to both deny the premise of his 
contestation, yet simultaneously to counter him head-on with genuine 
policy-oriented debate. To simply look away is in this case just as bad as 
pouring fuel on the fire. The challenge implicit in the Erdogan Presidency 
is to embrace the most progressive elements of the progressive 
democratic platform, and to do away with the moralist, politically correct 
attitude with which liberals formerly argued in favor of, and indeed sought 
to embody, the hegemonic status quo.  
 
A liberal democracy can only function if there is a social space in which 
political opponents can reasonably compete. Consensus should here be 
the goal, not the a priori condition of the political. And in turn, once 
politics evolves into a mere contestation of antagonism, of an opponent 
who ÔhatesÕ the other side and sees them not as participatory to 
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democracy, but as its aberration, then the political can no longer function 
in any agonistic sense as such. This is therefore precisely what we risk in 
our earnest outrage and frustration with the Erdogan Presidency. His 
rhetoric poisons the well from which civic discourse flows, and we find 
ourselves incapable of reasoned debate, and instead arming ourselves for 
a war among ourselves. And this is therefore the exact point at which the 
conspiratorial logic becomes seemingly plausible. It is also, as we shall 
find, at the heart of the apocalyptic expectation within paranoid 
nationalism. Once politics can only be conceived of as a battle, a contest 
of wills rather than reason, then inherently the focus shifts away from a 
genuinely representative political space towards a much more binary and 
ultimately unreal vision of politics being strictly between winners and 
losers, friends and enemies, fascists and socialists, and so on. What is 
vital to realize, is that this is not ÔcausedÕ by the onset of conspiratorial 
thinking, and the desire for an apocalyptic societal reckoning. On the 
contrary, the aforementioned are the symptom of a deliberate attack on 
the function of Turkish politics, an erosion of trust in the deliberative 
processes of democracy, and ultimately a strategic assault on the 
discursive norms and practices that we associate with democratic politics.  
 
Democracies are surprisingly brittle things. Like sandcastles facing the 
tide, they require careful management and constant vigilance to keep the 
waves from crashing down upon them. But this is to some degree a false 
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metaphor. For the true threat to democracy is embedded in its very 
functioning. That is to say, there is a constitutive gap, a creative void or a 
social space that democracy requires in order to be truly free. And it is 
precisely in this capacity that even the strongest democracies are always 
at risk from reactionary forces, populist antidemocratic sentiment, and 
the political rhetoric of conspiracy theory. Carl Schmitt saw this weakness 
as something that could only be rooted out through force, whereas the 
deliberative model of democracy would argue that this form of violence is 
itself democracyÕs paradoxical weakness. 
 
The Uncanny of the Strongman Leader195 
                                     
 
195 While I invoke FreudÕs concept of the uncanny here, I realize that a more apt Freudian 
application to the strongman might be that of the ÔtabooÕ ruler figure, whom the 
sanctity of power makes both untouchable and all-touching. Yet for the sake of the 
current argument, which is, after all, not an orthodox Freudian one, I believe the merit of 
choosing the concept of the uncanny above that of the taboo can be summed up in the 
following way. For as we shall see, the death of the idea of the man (the political 
candidate), and the birth of the leader figure as the strongman leader, is the very 
mechanism through which the true conspiracy, the consolidation of power and the leader 
as a symbol of such power, a Ôbeing-for-itselfÕ, is actualized (see earlier note on ArendtÕs 
concept of the totalitarian collective). The irony is that it is the paranoid style of 
illegitimate rule that belies the fulfilment of the strongman symbol in the first place. The 
rise of the strongman leader only occurs due to the crisis of legitimacy of the autocrat. 
This is important, because it suggests the contradiction implicit even in the idea of the 
strongman leader and that of the autocrat. While the strongman finds the means for 
authoritarianism in his supposed democratic legitimacy, the latter experiences the exact 
opposite: the autocrat must play ÔniceÕ so as to avoid an uprising, whereas the 
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So as TurkeyÕs President becomes an ever more contentious figure, so 
too do the ensuing polemics become increasingly grand in scale. To name 
just a few: Ranting about Western conspiracies, while mending ties with 
Russia and Israel. Aiding the US in the fight against ISIS, while reigniting 
war against the PKK. Imprisoning hundreds of journalists, while boasting 
of the freest press in the world. Releasing prisoners from jail to make 
room for post-coup arrestees. Protesting Coca-Cola by drinking Fanta, and 
so on and so forth. While such contradictions prove fertile soil for liberal 
outrage, which in turn Ð to stretch the metaphor Ð only further fertilizes 
the strongmanÕs populist credentials, they should not be dismissed as 
mere curiosities or the inconsistencies and hypocrisy of an erratic 
strongman leadership style.  
Instead, and this is an argument that runs throughout the entirety of this 
thesis, the spirit of the strongman leader (or for that matter, the spirit of 
resistance thereto) arises not despite such contradictions. On the 
contrary, the strongman leader embodies these contradictions. His very 
persona comes to reflect the impossibility of the reconciliation of the 
contrasting forces he so readily invokes. The strongman leader is not 
merely a hypocritical or duplicitous politician. He is himself a result of the 
very real forces ensuing from the clash of the said incompatibilities. These 
                                                                                                           
democratically elected strongman must act as a tyrant to sustain his legitimacy. It is not 
a clean dualism of course.  
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antinomies do not exist to be resolved. They are not even necessarily 
dialectical. There is no clear thesis, antithesis, let alone synthesis. His is 
an impossible figure, precisely so as to become the only possible one. We 
have briefly explored what this means in terms of a so-called totalitarian 
logic. But one might even go a step further, and think of this as 
essentially part of the ÔuncannyÕ nature of the strongman, as 
simultaneously truthful and untruthful, erratic and static, timeless yet 
momentary, and, above all, popular yet reviled.  
This Ôdeath-birthÕ of the leader figure, his transformation from ordinary 
politician into symbolic leader, is of course hardly a tangible process. The 
stages in which the strongman evolves from a political figure into a 
mythical, symbolic entity of the State can perhaps best be likened to that 
of the idea of momentum as discussed in the previous chapter. After all, 
in the same way that momentum allows a movement to grow seemingly 
exponentially, yet without evident coercion, so too does a similar such 
process emerge with the strongman leader. Furthermore, his own 
momentum, as it were, is directly tied to his capacity to stem the tide of 
the counter-momentum, that of opposition to his rule. 
As such, the strongman leader begins to take on the distinct 
characteristics of the Freudian conceptualization of the uncanny.196 This is 
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mostly used in the psychoanalytic literature and literary criticism. While these often 
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not because he invokes malicious forces by making claims of conspiracy. 
In fact, the reverse occurs. It is not that the strongman simply invokes 
the uncanny. He becomes the uncanny. That is to say, the leader figure 
begins to take on the distinctly uncanny features of what in Freudian 
terms is referred to as the Ôanimated corpseÕ. In other words, he is both 
an inanimate, ÔdeadÕ object, while rising above his mortal form, embodying 
the nation state and determining the state of the nation. This is the 
epitome of the authoritarian balancing act. The strongman leader both 
seizes the future, promising infrastructure projects, fame and 
international recognition, all the while imposing a rigid conservatism and 
promising to bring the country back to its roots.  
If we view the uncanny as a state of being in which a force is elicited from 
an impossible contradiction, the strongman leader emerges as the perfect 
exacerbation, the logical conclusion of competing visions for Turkey. In his 
persona, one finds a reprieve from the chaos of opinion, and finds solace 
in the comfort of certainty. His falsehoods are not cloaked in truth, as 
much as his truth is not cloaked in falsehood. He becomes both 
compulsive liar and oracle of truth. Both emotive populist, and wise 
leader, he becomes friend to all and friend to none, devoted Muslim and 
champion of secular democracy, oppressor and liberator, and finally, 
                                                                                                           
describe relations of power, they do not necessarily describe political processes as such. 
For exceptions, see David Collings, Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the 
Political Uncanny (Cranbury, NJ, 2009); Yolanda Gampel, ÔReflections on the Prevalence 
of the Uncanny in Social ViolenceÕ, in Robben and Surez-Orozco (eds), Cultures under 
Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma (Cambridge, 2000). 
 284 
human, yet immortal. Of course this is devastating for Turkey as a 
democratic society, but is also clearly invigorating for the masses that 
flock to his support. The spirit of the strongman leader is like a slime that 
oozes from the cracks and contradictions of the uncanny object. 
So the strongman leader not only desires the impossible, he becomes an 
emblem of the impossible, and rides the ensuing wave of contention until 
it breaks onto the shores of resistance.197 But like the tide, the force of 
the strongman leader ebbs and flows, begetting resistance while draining 
it of its capacity to resist. When the impossibility of the strongmanÕs 
promises incurs resistance to his rule, his forceful response only further 
consolidates his position of power. Even when the strongman fails, he 
grows in strength. And the in the chaos between momentum and 
paralysis, between forceful leadership and political stasis, the strongman 
leader resembles the uncanny object in that his existence (Dasein) 
becomes detached from the impossibility of his purported purpose, that 
of legitimate political representation. In sum, the strongman leader 
becomes part of a broader dialectical movement in which (conspiratorial) 
resistance is internalized into the continued justification of strongman 
tactics. 
                                     
197 I realize this may appear somewhat esoteric. But I want to juxtapose the cadaverous 
imagery of the uncanny with that of the clear water of the breaking tide. Either way, the 
point is, after all, not which metaphor to adopt, or what simile to invoke, but rather to 
distil from such images the relationship of forces that determine the leaderÕs resurgence 
in the face of resistance; the strength of the spirit as it were. 
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The reason I find the use of the term ÔuncannyÕ relevant here is that the 
pejorative inflection of the word already implies the obvious: that this is 
not a natural state. It is a perversion of the idea of the democratically 
elected leader. Yet what should stand out most in the case of the 
strongman uncanny is its affinity to the mechanisms of conspiracy theory. 
Can there be anything more distinctly uncanny than the notion of the 
conspiratorial Other, an enemy who is both there and not there? Not only 
is the strongman leader both catalyst and outcome of his uncanny stance 
towards the politics he represents, and the system he controls, he also 
seeks the essential validation of the conspirator as a mechanism through 
which to leave behind the political and embrace the mythos of the leader 
figure.198  
                                     
198 A close to perfect illustration of the uncanny of the strongman leader (even if it does 
not appertain directly to Turkey) can be found in the plot of the original version of 
MussorgskyÕs operatic masterpiece Boris Godunov. The Tsar, ÔBorisÕ, is haunted by an 
unspeakable crime. He has risen to power by ordering the assassination of his 
predecessor, a mere child. His mortal fear is that his enemies will figure out the truth, 
and conspire against him by inciting revolution. Yet this revolution never takes place, 
even when the public inevitably hears rumours of his crime. In a wonderfully ironic scene, 
the impoverished crowds gather outside the palace walls, but show complete 
indifference to whether or not the Tsar conspired to seize the throne. What difference 
does it make to them? Either way, they remain hungry and impoverished. What they 
want is food. They couldnÕt care less about throne-room scheming.  
In the end, faced with no resistance whatsoever, the Tsar retreats into his palace, 
wracked with the anguish of the unresolved conspiracy. No one seems to care about his 
crime, and he dies a self-pitying death. It is tempting therefore, to interpret his death, 
not literally as the death of the Tsar, who had no reason to die. There was no design on 
his life. His rule was in essence, legitimized by the indifference of his subjects. It works, 
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The strongman spirit, like conspiracy theory, and even like the idea of 
momentum in resistance thereto, comes to revolve around a central axis 
of contradictory forces, of uncontrollable tensions, which in turn beget 
the chaos in which conspiratorial thought thrives. In sum, the uncanny 
characteristics of the idea of the strongman leader, his Ôdeath-birthÕ from 
being a politician to an embodiment of the nation writ large, and the 
conspiratorial tension underlying at once his legitimacy, the support and 
the resistance he requires to sustain such power, further spreads the 
uncanny dynamic, until what emerges is a conspiratorial, paranoid society; 
a Turkey paralysed by the sheer force of the conspiratorial volitions of its 
strongman leader. 
                                                                                                           
however, when one considers it as the death of the politician and the birth of the 
strongman leader. Only in this sense does the abrupt ending of the opera, and the lack 
of a confrontation, make any sense. Indeed, it is almost as if the piece works as an anti-
opera, a prelude to the events that will surely follow once the masses revolt in hunger 
and he has to repress their revolt. Boris becomes the epitome of the uncanny 
strongman. From the ashes of his revolt, and the scheming of his politics, arises the 
strongman figure as embodiment of the state, but detached from the responsibility of 
political representation. 
It is striking, when seen in this light, how the original piece was deemed unacceptable by 
critics, as it was not deemed to meet the requirements of a formal opera (due to its 
chopped structure, atonality and lack of a female lead). Following the death of the 
composer, the piece was conveniently rewritten, restructured and lengthened to fit the 
requirements of a more formal historical epic. With this knowledge, it is hard not to 
consider the revised version as a somewhat kitsch simulacrum of the original; a cleaned-
up work of art. This is undoubtedly unfortunate, as the operaÕs brilliance lay exactly in 
that it was not intended to be a Gesamtkunstwerk to suit the tastes of the Russian 
aristocracy.   
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In the case of Turkey this contradiction is expressed rather well when the 
current political elite prosecutes and imprisons critical journalists, lawyers 
and others who speak out against government policies, yet still allows the 
publication of certain types of criticisms that suggest how the State 
might for example encourage tourism, engage fruitfully with allies, and 
other forms of ÔconstructiveÕ criticism in the mode of cultural diplomacy 
but with an emphasis on Orientalist conceptualizations of ÔEastern 
hospitalityÕ and supposed ÔOttoman toleranceÕ. As such it is with a 
completely straight face that Erdoğan can claim to uphold freedom of 
speech, even boasting that Turkey has Ôthe worldÕs freest pressÕ, while 
shutting down news outlets that criticize the government. But a problem 
emerges. Since the only press that is tolerated is press that is favourable 
to the government, one becomes suspicious even of the differing ways in 
which ÔpositiveÕ news is reported. In this way, possible slights to the 
government could supposedly be buried even in seemingly uncritical 
phrases. In other words, once everything that is not prohibited becomes 
obligatory, the boundary between the two positions begins to erode, and 
paranoia must necessarily ensue. In this way, one can also think of 
TurkeyÕs press, and its relationship to the figure of Erdoğan, as being 
both free, and distinctly unfree even for government loyalists.  
The way this unfolds is as follows. If criticism can no longer be safely 
published and distributed, a paranoiac suspicion emerges, which is that 
this criticism will be encoded in seemingly uncritical news, in ways that 
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cannot easily be detected. As a result, the suspicion must inevitably be 
cast inwards, to the point that even uncritical news loses its capacity to 
express sympathy for the government, and must instead do so by 
actively antagonizing seemingly conspiratorial forces. The result is that 
the media becomes not merely a mouthpiece for the government, but 
instead a self-incentivizing platform for political witch-hunts. A good 
example of this was to be observed in the campaign for the presidential 
referendum, in which the so-called Evet (yes) vote was primarily 
articulated by its negative inversion Ð that is, the invocation of all the 
forces that supposedly sought to achieve a Hayir (no) vote. To this 
extent, activists circulated posters that depicted portraits of the ÔyesÕ-
team, a gallery of the political elite, alongside a ÔnoÕ poster presenting 
images of ISIS, Glen and the Kurdish political party HDP. The message 
was explicit as much as implicit. In a system in which criticism is no longer 
tolerated, even direct democracy is framed as a vote between the 
political elite and outside conspirators. The breakdown of political 
language is thus also a breakdown of the possibility of political 
participation. In other words, when the State fails to achieve its goals, it 
can no longer blame the constructive criticism as little as it can blame 
itself. 
When the strongman leader assumes the duplicitous characteristics of the 
uncanny, he consolidates even the opposing manifestations of his power, 
that is, the resistance his leadership style begets. Seen in this light it is 
 289 
not merely a matter of whether Erdoğan is an autocrat or a democrat, or 
even a ÔsultanÕ or a Tsar. Rather, he is necessarily both. The very 
tenaciousness surrounding TurkeyÕs current love affair (at least among 
government loyalists) with the strongman, including the resistance he 
invokes, and the damage it does to TurkeyÕs position on the international 
stage, only contributes further to the resilience of the strongman spirit. 
What renders this figure emblematic to conspiracy theory is precisely his 
implied reversal of real resistance apropos imagined agency, and in turn, 
false resistance invoked to justify political agency. 
This can be summed up in a curious paradox surrounding the persona of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. On the one hand, his government has 
mainstreamed conspiratorial accusations against ÔlobbiesÕ, ÔtraitorsÕ and 
Ôforeign agentsÕ. Yet alternately, analysts and researchers have become 
hooked to a narrative of daily outrage in which TurkeyÕs controversial 
president is described as ÔsultanÕ, ÔdictatorÕ and ÔdespotÕ. Depending on 
who one believes, the country is either on the brink of civil war, or instead 
heroically participating in a resurgence of nationalist principles. In such an 
increasingly polarized environment, with tensions escalating on both 
sides, the fringe elements of Turkish society have seen the opportunity to 
take centre stage. It is the Erdoğan doctrine in full force: denying 
dissenting voices any expression on their own terms, and instead igniting 
and awakening pre-existing social divides that have long lain dormant. In 
this race to the bottom the results are contradictory, paradoxical even. In 
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an unprecedentedly connected world we are now more isolated than ever, 
and despite unprecedented technological access to information and 
instantaneous capacity to fact-check, there has been a proliferation of 
conspiracy theories, fake news and paranoid politics. The spirit of Gezi 
and the spirit of the strongman leader, perhaps even the spirit of new 
resistance(s) such as the coup attempt, are therefore all but lost in the 
labyrinthine constellation of competing truths and untruths. Therefore, let 
us examine in equal measure the opposite to the strongman spirit: a spirit 
of resistance, the so-called Gezi spirit. Despite its emancipatory potential, 
this can be seen to harness some of the very same contradictions, 
weaknesses and susceptibility to conspiratorial framing, as what we have 
just considered appertaining to the strongman spirit. 
 
 
The Gezi Spirit 
 
 
The idea of the ÔGezi spiritÕ is on the face of it a rather appealing one. 
After all, it is difficult to explain how exactly such a seemingly innocuous 
protest could have transformed into a national movement. There will 
always be a certain mystery as to the momentum of the movement. It is 
easy to forget that some weeks before the onset of the Gezi protests, 
thousands of protestors had already sought to march to Taksim Square 
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on May Day. Yet it was not until Gezi that something changed, elevating a 
relatively minor protest to a veritable mass movement. I would like to 
suggest that pursuing an intersectional understanding of such forces 
requires returning the Gezi conflict to a similar tension to that underlying 
the conspiracy frame, that is the tension between cause and subject, 
specifically with regard to their anticipated role within Turkish society. 
The process by which the ÔspiritÕ as such is achieved has been referred to 
as a so-called Ôre-compositionÕ of people, which focuses not on a given 
identity, but on a process of collective transformation or so-called 
ÔbecomingÕ vis--vis the status quo.199 One way in which this takes 
concrete form is by means of the movementÕs emancipatory potential, 
that is, in the vacuum of meaning, a space from which non-heterogenic 
identities could be expressed and embraced. Consider for example the 
following statement, featured in a collection of online interviews with 
protestors.  
 
Finally I went there, met new friends and realized it was the 
first day of Resistance. I decide to stayed there all the time. I 
was hiding my orientation before, but I decide to have a 
coming out. I start to wear some special shorts, which were 
                                     
 
199 Serhat Karakayali and zge Yaka, ÔThe Spirit of Gezi: The Recomposition of Political 
Subjectivities in TurkeyÕ, New Formations 83 (2014), pp. 117Ð38. See also Antonio 
Negri and Michael Hardt, Commonwealth (Cambridge, 2009). 
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shorter and shorter, day by day. Now, IÕm ready to tell 
everyone that IÕm homosexual without any shame. The Gezi 
Resistance changed me.200 
 
 
What stands out here is not only the distinctly personal nature of the 
transformation attributed to Gezi Ð the focus on the individual experience 
vis--vis the collective Ð but rather, that there is no sense that this is a 
protest as such. Instead, it becomes a site of personal discovery. In this, 
the protest served as a vehicle for emancipation, rather than as an 
outright display of resistance. The grievance articulated by such protests 
is therefore not, strictly speaking, an a priori one, but rather a (to some 
degree contingent) outcome of the transformative process of 
participation in the collective. 
 
 
When viewed this way, the protests not only arise from shared 
grievances, they also allow for new identities to be formulated. This 
occurs by means of gathering outside the hetero-normative experience of 
daily life and witnessing the collective resistance of others who feel the 
                                     
 
200 Full interview and others can be found at the blog ÔMy Gezi ParkÕ, available at 
http://mygezipark.blogspot.co.uk/ (accessed 26 May 2017). 
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same.201 Of course I am not trying to say that the function of Gezi was 
simply for young people to make discoveries about themselves. Instead, 
what I mean to stress is that the transformative potential of the 
movement is not merely that it imagines a transformed society, but that 
it begins with a transformation of the self, of the subjectÕs relationship 
towards the perceived status quo.  
 
This means that the transformative potential, the nigh-on spiritual 
experience of the protest gathering, can become equally transformative 
for the paranoid state. It creates a Ôdouble OtheringÕ of sorts. Not only 
are the protestors now seen as outside the cultural, religious or sexual 
norm, they are also situated as being outside the responsibility of 
representation of the Turkish government. Tragically, the liberation makes 
possible a more extreme isolation. Finding little possibility for self-
fulfilment (in a broad sense of the term Ôpolitical opportunity structuresÕ), 
alternative expressions of identity form the Gezi spirit, as much as they 
exacerbate the status quo from which they were already considered 
exempt. Yes, the protest had a massive emancipatory impact on its 
participants, but by elevating Gezi to a semi-mythological site of 
transformation, it belied the possibility of such progress being made 
within the given politics of the time. 
                                     
 
201 Blent Eken, ÔThe Politics of the Gezi Park Resistance: Against Memory and IdentityÕ, 




Articulation of Momentum, Momentous Articulation 
 
It seems to me that the best way to think about this is to return to the 
problem of momentum, which, in turn requires the following assumption. 
There appears to be a clear limitation to the truth claim of a collective 
spirit when it is derived solely on the basis of having achieved a form of 
critical mass. If the success of the Gezi movement can only be quantified 
by measuring its relative mobilizing success, then this ultimately leads to 
a tautology of sorts, which at worst constitutes a redundancy. This 
creates a vacuum of meaning, a loss of specificity, and begets the 
emergence of a proto-spiritual articulation of the protests that makes it 
vulnerable to the conspiracy frame. Yet this, and the disruptive potential 
it implies, is of course in equal measure the protestÕs greatest strength. 
To put this in terms of a classical sophism, the idea of the Gezi spirit is 
both the ÔcarriageÕ in the mouth (the Sophists argued that to articulate 
something would inherently render it existent; hence a carriage could 
literally and figuratively be made to ÔrollÕ over oneÕs tongue) as well as 
simply another name for the very force that makes the carriage appear in 
the first place, that is, its articulation. In this mode of thinking, there is an 
emphasis on action over theory, one that draws upon the StoicsÕ 
impassivity towards suffering rather than the Christian doctrine of 
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enduring torment, and which resonated through the protests of the New 
Left and continues to be felt in the likes of Gezi or Occupy Wall Street. 
They are all movements that rely paradoxically on their perceived 
universality in the face of their minority (vis--vis the status quo) as a 
necessary condition for the self-actualization of their meaning. To 
detractors, this makes them self-perpetuating. To supporters, the focus 
on mass participation is precisely what lends them their inclusivity and 
diversity.  
To help us understand both the temptation and the pitfalls of such 
resistance, we should therefore consider the aforementioned Stoic 
principle as functioning on two levels. First, there is the idea of the Gezi 
spirit existing in relationship to its own repeated utterance, not unlike the 
Ôhuman microphoneÕ or Ôvoice of the peopleÕ tactic used in the Occupy 
movements and indeed in Gezi.202 But the emergence of such a spirit also 
occurs in a more metaphysical sense. To put this simply, the spirit 
becomes ÔrealÕ exactly at the point where the conditions for its reality can 
                                     
 
202 For a selection of texts discussing the Ôhuman micÕ technique and horizontal power 
structures in the Occupy movement, see David Graeber, The Democracy Project: A 
History, a Crisis, a Movement (London, 2014); Sasha Costanza-Chock, ÔMic Check! Media 
Cultures and the Occupy MovementÕ, Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural 
and Political Protest 11 (2012), pp. 1Ð11; Stephen Lerner, ÔHorizontal Meets Vertical; 
Occupy Meets Establishment: To grow, the occupy movement will need to connect with 
tens of millions of ordinary AmericansÕ, The Nation, 14 March 2012, available at 
https://www.thenation.com/article/horizontal-meets-vertical-occupy-meets-
establishment/ (last accessed 26 May 2017). 
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no longer be clearly conceived of, or for that matter, met. So what 
ensues is a necessary paradox between the implied motion and the stasis, 
an uncanny frozen mobility implicit in the occupation of public spaces 
such as Gezi Park or Taksim Square. 
In other words, the idea of mass occupation of public spaces becomes a 
form of a radically passive movement: inaction with the goal of forcing a 
reaction. But there is always a looming duality to such an exercise. 
Whether it is between the poles of motion/stasis, spontaneous 
momentum/active organization, or collective resistance/individual 
liberation, the Gezi spirit derives meaning from these opposite forces. In 
what is therefore essentially a reversal of the Cartesian maxim (ÔI think 
therefore I amÕ), the movement comes to embody the very reason for its 
own existence. It exists, thus it has meaning. The evident danger here is 
that this detracts from the original grievances underlying the protests in 
the first place. Quickly, the contestation between the occupiers and the 
State takes on a conspiratorial quality, a sense that either position is 
inevitable and unbound from the ÔrealÕ of the status quo. This has distinct 
ramifications for the movement, as the state response becomes more 
oppressive, often begetting counter-violence. 
In one sense, the invocation of a collective spirit by the protestors to 
describe the protests is not altogether different from the narrative of 
conspiracy employed by the State. Not only do both rely on an 
unexplained rendering ÔvisibleÕ of the ÔinvisibleÕ but they serve to detach 
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and isolate a supposed agency that has been identified as momentum. 
The occupation of Gezi Park can ultimately be seen as an escalation of the 
original contention, one that, in so doing, grew exponentially beyond a 
single-issue movement into an overarching contestation of TurkeyÕs 
political leadership, and hence its political future. It is a resistance borne 
from the articulation of momentum, which, in turn, begot a momentous 
articulation. Is this a mere circularity, a redundancy even? On the 
contrary, the dualism between GeziÕs articulation and fulfilment consists 
of one side, not two. Like a Moebius strip, turning in on itself to form a 
loop, the movementÕs potential derives its force, its thrust as it were, 
from the circularity implied by this double tension. The Gezi spiritÕs shows 
its ÔbestÕ side when it refuses to be a singular event, a singular group, and 
embraces the plurality of its meanings, and hence its truths, but also 
succumbs to a conspiratorial state response at precisely this point of 
synthesis. 
For in light of the plurality of the Gezi spirit, one can recall how, in the 
initial stages of the protest, the movement struggled to accurately frame 
the reasons for its emergent success Ð at least in that it had 
demonstrably tapped into a wider contention beyond the issue of the 
park Ð and subsequently agonized over how to present itself to the 
international media. On the one hand, the protestors could paint a picture 
of Turkey as a totalitarian society, under the assumption that the 
international media would equate it with other recent protests such as 
 298 
the Arab Spring (which in 2013, it should be noted, was still regarded 
much more favourably by the international community, before the long-
term instability in the Middle East that ensued) and, on the other hand, 
the less theatrical but to the protestors more desirable framing of Turkey 
as a modern democratic society undergoing political transitions.  
To put this in a binary of sorts: the Gezi protestors achieved their initial 
goal of mass mobilization, yet in so doing gave rise to an imagery and an 
interpretation of Turkish society that appeared to be rather more binary 
than the plurality of its collective would suggest. In the narrative of the 
international media, the movement was clearly cast as the victim of an 
oppressive state.203 As images of police brutality and news of the 
accidental killing of protestors and innocent bystanders spread across the 
globe, the Turkish government, which until then had been mostly lauded 
for its incrementally progressive policies, saw itself quickly derided in the 
international media, and worse, condemned by the very international 
political elite who had once championed the so-called ÔTurkish modelÕ. The 
Gezi protests, on the other hand, were not about religious values or 
secularism. They were about very modern contentions: identity politics, 
development, economic inequality and social injustices. In the face of 
such overwhelming anti-government sentiment, the Turkish government 
found itself isolated and vilified. 
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The consequences of this, when thought through to their logical 
conclusion, are that, even as the protests grew in visibility in the 
international media, their continued momentum became dependent on a 
version of their movement as something it was not: a battle against 
Islamo-fascism or some other such simplification of their original 
grievance, that of the demolition of a public park. I realize that this may 
sound like a critique of the protestors.204 Yet this is not my intention. 
Rather, what I mean to suggest is that the same forces that gave rise to 
this transformation enhance the potential risk of a conspiratorial framing 
strategy, a rhetoric that sees in the transformative potential of Gezi 
evidence of nefarious meddling. After all, if it is credited with the capacity 
to liberate peopleÕs experience of themselves apropos Turkish society, 
this changes them, but not society as such. This creates fertile soil for 
the strategy of adversarial framing that I have here described as the 
                                     
204 Furthermore, I realize that by not positing a means by which to counteract this 
dilemma, it may appear that I am wistful for a return to class-oriented politics of 
resistance rather than one revolving around identity politics. Again, this could not be 
further from the truth. I agree that such class-based ÔtraditionalÕ protest movements are 
no longer representatives of the shifting political opportunity structures and lived 
experiences of youth in Turkey. This should not mean, however, that we must embrace 
unquestioningly the ÔspiritÕ of Gezi as being an inherent victory. Instead, my hope is that 
in acknowledging certain problems the idea such a collective spirit poses, and how this 
relates to certain challenges of enrag-type protests, a more robust understanding of 
the conspiratorial underpinnings of the idea of momentum can be achieved; an 
understanding, which in turn might lead to the articulation of future resistance to the 
current status quo rather than a disillusionment with the merits of popular protest 
following the dissolution of the Gezi moment. 
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conspiracy frame, and which in turn contributes to the potency of the 
strongmanÕs appeal.205  
 
Exclusive focus on ÔcollectivityÕ, that is, the mobilizing success or 
otherwise of the movement, leads to a situation in which the 
indeterminacy of such an empirical evaluation becomes projected instead 
onto the idea of a Ôcollective spiritÕ, which in its nebulousness allows for 
the exploitation of its cause by conspiratorial framing strategies. 
Furthermore, the logic of the contingent necessity underlying this spirit 
has a distinct weakness. It allows the framing of accusations of conspiracy 
in response to its lack of a concrete structure, as well as the proto-
spiritual ways in which the spirit is expressed as a transformative 
experience.206 This can prevent a coherent articulation of its original 
grievances, one that is cast in generalities or even redundancies rather 
than targeting specific grievances.  
                                     
 
205 For another take on the strategic employment of adversarial framing by the AK Party 
(in which the author argues it has been unsuccessful), see Burak Bilgehan zpek, ÔTurkey 
Today: A Democracy Without OppositionÕ, Turkey Analyst, 28 February 2017. Available 
at www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/577-turkey-today-a-
democracy-without-opposition.html (accessed 26 May 2017). 
 
206 David Selim Sayers, ÔGezi Spirit: The Possibility of an ImpossibilityÕ, Roar Magazine, 8 
January 2014. Available at https://roarmag.org/essays/gezi-ottoman-turkish-
nationalism/ (accessed 26 May 2017). 
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This is not to say that there is no merit to horizontal power structures, or 
for that matter the positing of (relatively) non-hierarchical power 
structures. Neither should the movement need to make any specific 
demands, even though this is often seen as justifying a violent state 
response because there was no possibility of resolution or dialogue with a 
single representative body). However, in terms of the embrace of the idea 
of a collective spirit, it becomes important to acknowledge that it cannot 
be simultaneously catalyst, mechanism and outcome. This constitutes of 
course a necessary paradox for the success of the movement. For 
without broadening its scope, the protest begun by demonstrators 
against the demolition of a park would, in all likelihood, not have received 
any attention whatsoever. Yet in so doing, it also opened itself to a much 
more uncertain determination of its collective cause and its goals. This 
has the following detrimental effect. 
For now the protest movement falls prey to the same totalitarian logic of 
which it has already accused the State; by mythologizing its own 
ontological necessity even when its authority is based on contingency and 
despite evidence that it is not truly a representative entity, the protest 
fails to transcend the limitations demarcated by the StateÕs response. 
That is to say, it can only sustain its spirit while in contestation. It cannot 
articulate a stand-alone identity. And while proponents of the idea of a 
Gezi spirit argue that its strength lies precisely in its capacity to 
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participate in a global protest against the neo-liberal state,207 this 
provokes precisely the most ludicrous and fantastical, that is, 
conspiratorial, responses, targeting the movement as Other to Turkish 
interests.208  
As such, the concept of the spirit, while necessary for the mobilizing 
success of the movement, also opens a window for reactionary state 
framing. What ensues is that the very implication of the ÔspiritÕ leads to a 
contrasting challenge by the government that it indeed still holds sway 
over a true majority of voters, a nationalist spirit it seeks to superimpose 
on the protests. At this point the conflict devolves into a test of 
numbers, rather than one of ideology.209 As soon as the driving force of 
                                     
 
207 Efe Can Gurkan and Efe Peker, Challenging Neoliberalism at TurkeyÕs Gezi Park: From 
Private Discontent to Collective Class Action (New York, 2015). 
 
208 Karakayali and Yaka, ÔThe Spirit of GeziÕ, p. 128. 
209 Imagine, for example, what the story of David and Goliath would be like if DavidÕs 
claim to strength were on the basis of being equal in strength or numbers to Goliath. Of 
course this would negate the symbolic power of the struggle, which is that of the 
underdog against an overwhelming force. And more to the point, the fact that David 
succeeds in slaying the giant adversary is precisely because of his relative inferiority, not 
in spite of it. The protest contestation is therefore not between equals. In turn, the 
premise on which the idea of momentum hinges is that David-and-Goliath moment, the 
emerging possibility of prevailing despite all evidence to the contrary. The problem, 
however, is that when this momentum takes place, that is, when the protests become a 
nationwide insurgency, a role reversal takes place. Suddenly, the government can invoke 
a so-called Ôsilent majorityÕ. David and Goliath effectively swap roles. Now the state casts 
itself as David, as the misrepresented yet righteous underdog, and the protest 
momentum becomes conspiratorial evidence of an existential threat to the state.  
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the movement shifts away from its radical challenge to instead base its 
challenge on the claim that it presents a more accurate representation of 
society, it loses part of what made its mobilization so effective in the first 
place. 
In this reversal, we thus find ourselves at a paradoxical juncture. And a 
new problematic emerges. If the movementÕs ÔsuccessÕ relies on its 
collective mobilizing power to demonstrate its relevance outside 
institutional politics, how then can it maintain the underdog status 
required for its appeal in the first place? This was already an evident 
problem for the New Left and other youth movements of the 1960s, and 
the topic has provoked much debate since then.210 But the question 
remains, how can a movement seek to become part of the status quo 
without losing its ontological necessity thereto; or, in turn, how can it 
remain outside the status quo once it starts to become the status quo?  
 
Redeeming the Gezi Spirit 
 
To begin answering this question, of how far the Gezi spirit can be 
ÔredeemedÕ if it falls prey to the paradox of its own success (by becoming 
                                                                                                           
 
 
210 Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis, 1965). 
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estranged from its founding contentions), we must return to the key 
moment in which the movement effectively transforms from a single-issue 
protest to a mass movement. For while the momentum implied by the 
transformation from a small-scale protest to a nationwide resistance 
movement certainly merits a certain amount of legitimacy, perhaps even 
triumphalism, we must keep in mind that the idea of the Gezi spirit as 
underlying this success was not only an outcome, but also a condition for 
its emergence. At its heart, therefore, one should regard the Gezi spiritÕs 
reliance on repeated enunciation not only as a sign of its lack of 
corporeality, and hence of its weakness, but also as an indicator of both 
its emancipatory and conspiratorial potential. Indeed, if we are to add but 
one more antinomy then this would reasonably be one of 
emancipation/conspiracy. After all, the elite framing response to the spirit 
relies in equal measure on repetition and the incessant redistribution of 
adversarial frames, with the added element that it seeks to repress 
framing attempts that utter messages that offer a pluralist 
conceptualization of society.  
So to the extent that the moment, or momentum, of the spirit can be 
considered successful, it is in its capacity to elicit a forceful state 
response, which it necessitates for the continued presence of its 
momentum, and the depiction of the protests in the international media 
as between a simplified binary of progressive versus repressive forces. 
What follows is that both the Gezi spirit and the strongman spirit 
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(evidenced by the forceful state response) become essentially more 
totalitarian in relationship to their own legitimacy, ontology and posited 
necessity? And in their relationship there comes to be in essence a 
somewhat conspiratorial intertwinement of the forces underlying their 
contestation. This, then, is the central problem of the Gezi spirit: that it 
can only exist, and continue to exist, by being juxtaposed with an 
increasingly repressive counter-image, that of the authoritarian state, 
embodied by the paranoid leader. Like the irresistible force paradox, in 
which an unstoppable force meets an immovable object, the idea of a 
Gezi spirit ultimately distances the protests from their original 
contentions, and contributes, however tragically, and indeed with a dark 
irony, to the constitution of a more authoritarian Turkey. 
In sum, thinking of Gezi as either contributing to or deterring from todayÕs 
repressive politics in Turkey, neglects the simple fact that such normative 
attributing of the movementÕs impact contributes to the very political 
paralysis being criticized. The solution to this dilemma, and our way out of 
what at first seems an irreconcilable logical snare, is to view Gezi through 
the lens of its own contradictions, that is to say, to unwind the Moebius 
loop mentioned earlier, so as to bring into focus the universal premise of 
the movementÕs appeal, which is still that of a more open, more 
democratic, more free, and most of all, more inclusive, Turkish society. 
This can be articulated in ways that do not rely on the anti-state 
narrative, nor on the idea of momentum, as the origin of their conception. 
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That is to say, for the Gezi movement to be truly ÔsuccessfulÕ in the long 
term, it must also fade away, but leave in its wake spores of resistance, 
trace quantities of its original spirit, that can grow towards a more 
progressive politics, without succumbing to the paranoia and repression 
surrounding the idea of social protest in Turkey today. 
This means that any attempt to theorize the Gezi spirit must lead first to 
a somewhat counter-intuitive outcome. The idea of the Gezi spirit 
becomes the most potent symbol of the movementÕs momentum, as 
much as its resistance drives its vulnerability to accusations of 
conspiracy. Naturally, this is not the movementÕs ÔfaultÕ, nor, for that 
matter, is it strictly correlative with the relative harshness of the state 
response. But like a catch in a machine that prevents motion until 
released, or like the detent in a clock that regulates striking, the idea of a 
Gezi spirit is both what moves and stops the movementÕs progression. 
The spirit, therefore, becomes in a sense uncanny, both alive and 
distinctly elusive, bursting with the tension of its own possibility, but 
nevertheless ultimately repressed when expressed.  
So finally, let us consider whether the duelling characteristics of 
force/resistance and momentum/stasis can be reconciled. Can there be a 
way for the Gezi spirit to move beyond the boundaries of its dualities, or, 
for that matter, can it gainfully employ them in a way that does not elicit 
an authoritarian logic of self-perpetuating necessity? Before we conclude 
the analysis of the Gezi spirit, we owe it to ourselves to consider its 
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particular strengths, and their emancipatory potential, rather than merely 
acknowledging its apparent weaknesses.  
This can be difficult to determine, considering how the idea of the spirit 
appears to follow the law of diminishing returns. Once the protests reach 
a peak point of momentum, it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, for 
them to keep growing. On the other hand, if we consider the spirit merely 
as a contingent narrative moment based on an unidentifiable phalanx of 
contextual circumstance, this hardly warrants celebration either. The irony 
that ensues is a paradoxical one. The idea of momentum is both touted as 
the inexplicable formula for successful consolidation of the spirit as such, 
while its very seeming contingency simultaneously gives rise to the state 
response, which seeks to frame it as non-contingent in the paranoid 
sense.  
In other words, there takes place what appears to be a dialectical 
relationship between the contingency of the spirit as reliant on successful 
momentum rather than actual grievances, and the subsequent 
acknowledgement of non-contingent structures precisely due to the 
inexplicability of this momentum. But this, of course, is the very same 
contradictory mechanism that lends the movement meaning. In sum, while 
the momentum obscures the original or individual grievances, the state 
response it elicits is one that targets this ÔassumedÕ spirit but not the 
grievance with which the movement originated (the park), nor for that 
matter the grievance that led to momentum (the disproportionately 
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violent police response). In this sense, the spirit can essentially be 
considered ÔexpendableÕ. In other words, counter to the idea that the Gezi 
spirit remains the lasting legacy of the movement, the exact reverse is in 
fact the case. The spirit served to demonstrate the validity of the notion 
that Turkey had not yet fully democratized, and in light of the burning out 
of the Gezi spirit the original contention remains much more convincing. In 
the fallout of Gezi, the progressive credentials of the AK Party were 
shattered. To achieve this reveal, the idea of a Gezi spirit was therefore 
both vital and yet expendable: vital to the degree that it forms an 
overarching narrative of resistance, and expendable in that it could never 
last, yet in its melting away it revealed the long-term legitimacy of the 
original grievances underlying the protests Ð the destruction of public 
spaces, the erosion of civil liberties, and the social injustices undermining 
political participation (and hence representation) in Turkey. 
So what at first seems to resemble a closed totalitarian logic, a 
momentum that justifies its own meaning by means of catalytic necessity, 
turns out to be a safety mechanism for the underlying grievances. By this 
I mean to say that both conceptualizations of the ontology of such 
resistance, whether contingent or necessary, come to rely on their own 
negation, and indeed their own perceived failure, to extend the grounds 
and the logic for their own justification. We have already seen how this 
creates what is essentially a toxic logic, a closed loop. That is to say, yes 
the spirit is flawed, but it is a deliberately flawed strategy. And by no 
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means can this spirit alone infuse a progressive politics or, for that 
matter, fuel lasting political change. But the spirit, in its rapid burning of 
oxygen, creates a momentary vacuum of meaning in which a more 
progressive politics can be articulated and, more importantly, revitalized.  
What is key here is that this occurs because of the closed logic of the 
spirit, not despite it. If the totalitarian logic derives from the process of 
making contingent events seem necessary and, vice versa, making 
necessary and logical outcomes appear contingent, then this creates a 
similarly upended symbolic space, in which the visibility of the Gezi 
grievances, and their longstanding impact, can be maintained even 
beyond the confines of the protest Event itself. In sum, while the spirit of 
Gezi elicits a forceful collision, the ensuing political repression, the 
conspiratorial framing, and indeed even the coup attempt, elicit and 
ensure a long-term (international) awareness of the legitimacy of the Gezi 
movementÕs grievances vis--vis the status quo.  
For more than anything the spirit as such only exists in that it enunciates, 
casts into reality, the multitude of voices as an echoing of its own 
ÔrealnessÕ, seemingly without reliance on external framing (although the 
international media attention such protests elicit would belie this). It is 
exactly a thing that relies on not being a thing. Again, this does not entail 
a positivist sociological phenomenon that can in some way be measured 
or even process-traced, but rather that in the transition from a protest 
event to a protest ÔmovementÕ, a relationship takes shape between its 
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own necessity and the endurance of the contentions that brought about 
its successful mobilization in the first place.  
Evidently this should not be interpreted as an attempt on my part to 
criticize the protests as being somehow irrelevant, nor to deny the 
genuineness of what to all intents and purposes was a historic 
manifestation of cross-identity solidarity and mobilization. Instead, what a 
careful analysis and critical reading of the idea of the Gezi spirit can tell us 
is that despite all the virtues of such a radical collective, the point is 
precisely that it was never meant to last; not due to the impossibility of 
its goals, but because the portended outcome of such a spirit, if 
materialized into political practice, or ÔrevolutionÕ for that matter, could 
never truly reflect the nature of the Gezi contention in the first place. We 
must therefore allow ourselves to distinguish between the Gezi spirit and 
the Gezi contention. That is to say, the spirit can only ever be the vehicle 
for the expression of contention, and should not be allowed to become a 
manifest form of the underlying grievance as such.  
This separation serves a vital purpose. That is to say, there is a distinct 
reason underlying the madness of committing to something as obtuse as 
the Gezi spirit. So yes, the Gezi spirit is flawed, and this results in its 
eventual erosion. But it is a deliberate, and necessary, limiting of its 
fulfilment. So too, does it prevent the movement from becoming a 
totalitarian system, a self-perpetuating logic. While the spirit may be the 
ghost in the machine, it is also the virus that secures its own inevitable 
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destruction. And it is precisely this balancing, this on-the-brink energy, of 
the Gezi protests that forms its greatest difference with both the state 
response and the coup.  
For as much as the Gezi protests did not occur in a vacuum, they relied 
on previous networks of resistance, many of which have now entered the 
political mainstream. In his writing on protest, Peter Dews already 
suggested as much when he wrote that, Ôit is only if the distinction 
between contingency and necessity is preserved, if these categories are 
not blended in the unfolding of spirit, the destiny of being, or the play of 
ÔdiffranceÕ that political action directed towards the overcoming of those 
contingencies which take the form of senseless necessities even becomes 
a possibilityÕ).211 In other words, the problem of the Gezi spirit can only be 
overcome exactly when it can be a finite moment, not a persistent 
ideology or long-term political project. That is, in the culmination of the 
Gezi protests into a nationwide movement, the spirit achieved its full 
success. The seeming erosion of said spirit can be considered part of this 
success. 
This can be summed up as follows. While the Gezi spirit is coded to 
prevent its evolution into a totalitarian system by means of its own 
erosion, both the state response and the coup seek to achieve the 
authoritarianism belying such an outcome. The Gezi spirit intentionally 
                                     
211 Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of 
Critical Theory (London, 2007), p. 52. 
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limits the chances of reaching its logical conclusion, whereas the state 
response and the coup (while seemingly at odds) strive to reach this 
hegemonic point. There is a crucial reversal that occurs here; one that 
cuts to the heart of the very necessary impossibility of the Gezi spirit. It 
is a spirit meant to subside. Not to fail, but to allow for a brief enactment 
of its message, and then to fade away, leaving the origin of its meaning 
intact. The strongman spirit constitutes the exact opposite; a totalitarian 
spirit meant to persist, but to wilfully lose its message, to forgo its 
ontological justification, in order to persist (and appear even more apt) in 
the post-Gezi political landscape. 
 
Conclusion 
At this point, the reader may have become aware that we should be 
approaching a synthesis of sorts. That is to say, if we are to consider the 
Gezi spirit and the strongman spirit in the Hegelian fashion as forming a 
conflict between thesis and antithesis then we should reasonably expect 
that through their negation and realization they can achieve a sublation of 
sorts. Yet, isnÕt this instead rather a case of the Ônegative dialecticÕ in the 
Adornian sense? That is to say, since we have been concerned here with 
conspiracy theory, the real focus has been on ascertaining the limits of 
knowledge in Turkish politics, rather than seeking a moment of unification 
in the positive sense. If you will, we can therefore negate HegelÕs claim 
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that Ôeverything that is real is rationalÕ, by stating that in the paranoid 
society everything irrational becomes real, and in turn, that everything 
unreal becomes rational. Since there can be no positive reconciliation of 
the Gezi spirit and the strongman spirit Ð after all, they are 
interdependent in their negative agonisms Ðthe outcome must be put in 
the negative.  
In other words, throughout the course of these chapters, there has been 
a focus on the false, on the conspiratorial, on imaginary collectives, 
fantastical enemies and the forces these phantasmagorical images impose 
on the political. To this extent, I believe the idea of the strongman and 
the Gezi spirits, respectively, form part of the method, validity and scope 
of such an epistemology. Or, if you like, they demonstrate how the non-
method, invalidity and intellectual confines of both the Gezi and 
strongman spirit function in a dialectical relationship to another.  
With regard to the two ÔspiritsÕ discussed in the current chapter, the 
emancipatory collective momentum of the Gezi spirit and the 
contradictory rise of the uncanny strongman spirit are linked not in any 
unity principle, but, in their self-reinforcing necessity, contribute to their 
own rise and downfall. In the case of the strongman politician, I have 
characterized this as the death-birth of the leader figure. As for Gezi, I 
have tried to demonstrate how the movementÕs supposed failure was in 
fact a predetermined escape mechanism implicit in the enrag-style 
 314 
protest, to liberate it from becoming entangled in the totalitarian logic 
that any synthesis of the two spirits would imply.  
I have sought here to juxtapose these two notions of the spirit (of the 
strongman and of resistance) and, without attempting to reconcile their 
opposition, instead suggest how their confrontation posits a discovery for 
us regarding conspiracy not simply as an object of knowledge, but as 
indicative of a systemic process of thought itself. In this, we have seen 
how the idea of the conspiratorial society goes beyond both the figure of 
Erdoğan and the Gezi contention, or for that matter, even the more 
recent coup attempt. In other words, how conspiracy theory informs what 
one might call TurkeyÕs Ôdemocratic dilemmaÕ: the curious contrast 
between a coup seeking to restore democracy, a purge seeking to protect 
democracy, and a protest movement seeking to preserve democracy.212 
The fundamental flaw of the spirit, whether in the mode of Gezi or the 
strongman, is that it exists only to the extent that it can maintain a 
tension between the object of desire and the resistance it faces in 
achieving this goal. For the ultimate fulfilment of its desire, the 
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culmination of its project and the vanquishing of its foe would equally 
render the spirit non-existent. That is to say, the Gezi spirit requires the 
idea of the conspiratorial strongman leader, just as much as the 
strongman spirit requires the idea of a conspiratorial protest collective. 
What makes this a relationship of conspiracy is therefore not that one or 
the other position is empirically valid or invalid, pure or impure, but that 
both are locked in their mutual impossibility.  
One way to think of this is in terms of a chess game. In the game the king 
can only ever be checked. Yet apart from forming the illusive object of 
the gameÕs premise, the king himself does not embody any discernible 
identity or characteristic as such. In this, he becomes Ôthe kingÕ only by 
means of being the object of desire for the opponent, in other words the 
fulfilment of the act, which is at the same time the death of the king. In 
this, the fulfilment of the kingÕs own desire, the Ôbeing kingÕ cannot be 
reached through his usurpation. Yet it exists only in the imminent 
possibility of his being taken by his opponent. The exacerbation of this 
dilemma fuels the game. It does not seek to resolve it. In other words, 
one finds that in recognizing his negative image, the subject can 
therefore achieve a self-essence. The missing link therefore, to which the 
metaphor of the chess game should draw our attention, is that this 
Ônegative desireÕ holds true not simply for the essence of the resisting 
force, but by means of the very negation ultimately imbues the object 
with its own being. In this case it is the figure of the king. But in the case 
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of protest, or for that matter the coup, there exists a relationship of 
necessity between the symbolism of the strongman leader and the 
justification of the pursuit of resistance.  
This, however, is where we encounter the limit of the chess game as 
metaphor. After all, in a game of chess, there are two supposedly equal 
opponents. In the case of resistance to the State, the momentum of said 
opposition relies precisely on a reversal of the dynamics of contention. Or, 
to put this somewhat less theoretically, the idea of resistance to the 
strongman leader is that of the underdog confronting the hegemonic 
opponent. It is a radical act of questioning the legitimacy of the leader, 
not a fair competition as such. In turn, the strongman leader must invoke 
conspiratorial enemies so as to frame himself as the true victim of this 
confrontation. 
The contradictions this implies are evident. The strongman must portray 
the nation as weak and threatened precisely so as to come to its rescue. 
To put this in one final Hegelian premise, the leader takes on the form of 
the so-called ÔcoupleÕ, that is, the famed negated negation. In other 
words, the transformation occurs exactly when it takes place not only in 
itself, but for itself. From this it can then be derived that there exists the 
possibility of a strategic element or at least the possibility of a 
strengthening by means of such contestation, In the social movement 
literature, it is widely claimed that the clash between strongman leaders 
and protest movements forms a Ôbattle of willsÕ, when in fact it seems 
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much more likely that it is a war between spirits, between the alternate 
ideas of the conspiratorial Other, between imaginary renditions of either 
the ÔsultanÕ or Ôthe mobÕ, and not any distinctly normative or positivist 
concept of the ÔwillÕ as a distinctly rational entity.  
Lastly, what is so interesting about the spirit of Gezi is that it can be seen 
to fulfil dual roles, which is relatively meaningless at least in a normative 
sense, yet bursting with consequences with regard to the subjectÐobject 
relationship implicit in its founding narrative, or what one might call the 
ontological foundation of the movement. On the one hand, the idea of the 
spirit guarantees the ÔhistoricityÕ of the movement and its impact, and at 
the same time it prompts a state response that emphasizes its relative 
obliqueness with regard to concrete grievances as indicative of its 
conspiratorial leanings. In other words, the premise of the Gezi spirit is 
that out of necessity it reinforces its own existence in a closed loop, as it 
were, yet at the same time provides a vacuum that both nourishes it and 
engineers its own antagonism. The stronger the idea of the spirit 
resonates with(in) the founding myth of the Gezi movement, the easier it 
becomes for the State to challenge it as being inherently outside the 
nationÕs representative mandate; dismissing it as irrelevant, at best, and 
conspiratorial, at worst. It is important to begin with this duality of the 
Gezi spirit because it rests on being both the contingent episode of mass 
mobilization as well as a distinctly non-contingent grievance-oriented 
contestation. Yet in the indeterminacy between these two 
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conceptualizations of resistance, and the necessity by which they are 
intertwined, an ontological insecurity takes root that both strengthens 
and weakens Ð reinforces yet undermines Ð the object of resistance by 
destabilizing the subject in its relationship to it. So, in turn, this 
relationship must bring us back to the separation of the contingent 
versus the necessary Ð or at least the semblance of such a separation 
despite its interconnectivity Ð with the added nuance that the 
interpretation of the event as necessity requires again not a supposedly 
ÔcontingentÕ mobilization, but instead a momentum, an echoing of the 
spirit. What this means is that the idea of the spirit (an ÔeffectÕ in the 
modernist sense) becomes on the one hand detached from the actions 
and emotions from which it derives, while at the same time becoming 
linked in a temporal assumption of indeterminate ÔmomentumÕ.  
For now, this can be distilled into two conclusions: first, the notion that 
the resonance of momentum in the Gezi protests is both necessary yet 
detrimental to its emancipatory potential; and secondly, that the 
strongman leader can function as a personified form of the friend/enemy 
dynamic both contested and contrasted by popular resistance. As such, 
this chapter suggested that the contradictions implicit in these sets 
(friend/enemy; contingency/necessity; momentum/conspiracy) resonate 
in the figure of the strongman leader, not only mirroring the idea of the 
collective Gezi spirit, but also allowing him to manipulate the crisis to 
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strengthen and consolidate a more authoritarian and less democratic 
future for Turkish society.  
In addition, I have argued that the dialectic of the strongman vis--vis 
resistance can best be understood in terms of two central premises 
underlying both the strongman spirit and the spirit of resistance. The first 
is that of the social movement collective as a genuine representative 
body precisely because of its perceived exteriority to the political status 
quo, and the second that of the Ôleader figureÕ, who as a strongman 
political persona seeks to embody the collective will of the nation and to 
counter-mobilize his own supporters as a signal of his continued strength. 
In other words, the idea of the strongman leader is crucial to the success 
of the protestorsÕ momentum. Yet the seemingly conspiratorial element 
of momentum is equally crucial for the transformation from politician to 
strongman leader.  
This, then, has been my attempt to posit a more theoretical analysis of 
conspiracy theory in Turkey. I realize that throughout the course of this 
thesis, I may have contributed to some degree to this confusion by 
withholding a straightforward definition of the term. But instead I have 
sought to take the epistemological route. That is to say, I have attempted 
to identify the dynamics and relations of what essentially forms an 
epistemology of conspiracy theory; a theory of knowledge that is, in 
essence, a theory of non-knowledge or an anti-theory of knowledge. In 
turn, it is my goal to have contributed towards an approximation of what 
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might some day lead to a more comprehensive theory of how conspiracy 
theory has altered the course of Turkish politics, and hence history, in 







Conclusion: Does Elite Framing of Conspiracy justify the definition of a 
ÔPost-TruthÕ politics? Discussing a problematic terminology. 
 
A fundamental puzzle underlies the study of conspiracy theory. How can 
we study something of which the defining characteristic rests upon the 
contestation whether or not it is true at all? In this thesis I have sought to 
get around this dilemma by forgoing the ÔdebunkingÕ approach. I have not 
gathered data or evidence to either verify or deny the veracity of 
conspiracy theories, nor, for that matter, have I provided a 
comprehensive list of all the conspiratorial accusations appertaining to 
Gezi and the coup. Instead, by questioning the idea of ÔtruthÕ in political 
conspiracy theories, and therefore also the ÔtruthlikenessÕ of conspiracy 
theories as both interpretative mechanisms and political justifications, I 
sought to situate the underlying impossibility of gathering data on 
conspiracy theory as a source of knowledge production in its own right. 
 
There are of course certain weaknesses that derive from the scope, 
method, and temporality of the work presented here. First, the thesis 
must limit itself to those conceptions of conspiracy theory that relate to 
the Gezi protests and the coup attempt. This is necessary yet also 
somewhat limiting. Secondly, the focus on conspiracy theory by its very 
nature does not facilitate simply answers. Nor for that matter, is it easily 
replicable in any empirical sense, although it could give rise to empirical 
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additions and perhaps even quantitative or qualitative elaborations on a 
theme. Finally, the temporal limitations of the thesis are such that they 
cannot take into account events that have as yet not occurred, and for 
this reason the outcomes are neither strictly descriptive nor prescriptive, 
but rather serve as an application to conspiracy theory of the dialectical 
principle that the real is rational to the extent that the struggle with 
unreal/irrational is a transitory development in which forces are shaped in 
struggle rather than existing as stand-alone dictums.  
 
As a result, I believe that the critical analysis of conspiracy theory 
discourse may well reinforce the idea of a necessary retention of the 
positive within the negative. (This takes on the form of sublation 
(Aufhebung), or in Hegelese, the negation of the negation.)213 Yet this 
ÔpositiveÕ outcome must not necessarily be so in any normative sense, but 
rather exists as a positive entity in the sense that it begets the 
production of knowledge as a progression from the abstract to the 
concrete. A key insight is therefore that this process can equally occur as 
a ratification of seemingly ÔunrealÕ ideas such as is the case in conspiracy 
theory. When this leads to the silencing of opposition, it has very real and 
negative impacts on Turkish democratic practice. The question therefore, 
is whether or not this process can be see to warrant the idea of an 
analytically comprehensive conceptualization of Ôpost-truthÕ, and if such a 
                                     
213 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic (transl. A.V. Miller) (Amherst, 1998). 
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term can prove useful as an analytic concept? In my conclusion I would 
therefore like to synthesise the findings contained in this thesis, by briefly 
discussion whether or not they might constitute a so-called Ôpost-truthÕ 
politics. 
 
When I began writing about conspiracy theory in Turkey the term post-
truth had not yet been coined.214 The idea that Turkish political rhetoric 
was inherently conspiratorial, at times truthful, at others not, and not 
really worth paying any particular attention to, was a relative truism. As 
an outsider, the conspiratorial and at times fantastical manifestations of 
Turkish political rhetoric fascinated me. I came to suspect that Turkish 
politicians enjoyed playing a game of what Richard Hofstadter had already 
diagnosed in the 1960s as  Ôthe paranoid styleÕ Ð a style which, given his 
object of study, he attributed to American, not Turkish, politics.215 Simply 
put, such a politics warrants being called a ÔstyleÕ precisely because it 
forms a consistent trait, an affectation of sorts, in which conspiratorial 
accusations, however absurd, are used to rouse populist support.  
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Seen in this light, I began to understand how conspiracy theories in 
Turkey serve to systematically reinforce and mobilize longstanding 
grievances and imagined communities. As such, I would suggest that 
there is an urgent need to Ôre-frameÕ what the Turkish version of this 
paranoid style can tell us about conspiratorial politics, and in turn, what 
conspiratorial politics can tell us about Turkey. The spread of conspiracy 
theory to the political mainstream presents evident dangers to Turkish 
democracy, and should warrant at the very least a critical consideration, 
perhaps even re-evaluation, of the relationship between conspiracy theory 
and the idea of post-truth as both distinctly Turkish yet in keeping with a 
global movement towards a more conspiratorial politics. 
The post-Gezi and post-coup politic struck me as a particularly well-suited 
case study by which to understand the rise of such a conspiratorial 
politics in Turkey, but with a twist. For the thesis has suggested that 
through the lens of conspiracy theory we might come to better 
understand how non-real ideas drive real political action. So rather than 
applying the established perspective of examining the theory of 
conspiracy theory, I sought to put together a more critical discussion of 
conspiracy theory. That is to say, what is the theoretical component that 
allows the conspiratorial to take on the attributes of the real? And in turn, 
how does this transformation beget real political decision-making?  
My reasoning here has rested on the belief that a certain flirtation with 
the paranoid is at the very heart of the struggle between liberty and 
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equality; that is to say, at the core of what makes liberal democracy such 
a profoundly ambitious project is precisely its amenity to contestations of 
the production of knowledge and, hence, the questioning of political 
legitimacy. This struggle is also one between certainty and doubt, and is 
vital to our capacity to safeguard democracy as a process rather than a 
fait accompli. It is precisely this lack of certainty that imbues the 
democratic project with its emancipatory potential, and in turn requires of 
us as democratic citizens a certain vigilance. After all, to attempt to 
reconcile the tug of war between equality over freedom, and, vice versa, 
freedom over equality, while somehow guaranteeing both, requires a 
certain Sisyphean necessity. But the fruits of such labour are self-evident. 
Liberal democracy is never truly finished. And this is a good thing.  
The politics of post-truth, however, seek to assert the kind of certainty 
that can only be achieved in a totalitarian system. So to begin with, one 
must keep in mind that while conspiracy theory as it occurs, let us say 
Ôfreely in the wildÕ in civil society, constitutes but part of a wider tradition 
of questioning the production of knowledge. But when, on the other hand, 
the State takes on conspiracy theory as its motivating force, its nexus of 
ideas, then a perversion occurs; a stifling of democracy in the pursuit of 
ever-changing enemies. For even in the successful eradication of all non-
sanctioned views, the ultimate lie behind every such society is that it 
constitutes in and of itself a conspiracy. In societies such as Turkey, in 
which democratization is an ongoing process, yet lingering contentions, 
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social injustices and historical grievances remain prevalent, these threaten 
to provide fertile soil for autocratic opportunism and populist 
manipulation to take root.  
There exists indeed, buried within the very experience of democracy, an 
ongoing negotiation of truth(s), which for the sake of its validity should 
never be fully reconciled. In other words, for Turkish democracy to 
flourish requires both challenging antagonist simplifications, while at the 
same time resisting the temptation to enforce a supposed empirical purity 
of one form of truth over another. In the mode of the paranoid style, 
however, politics exists to provide certainty, and does so by the pursuit 
of fictional enemies. It is this doubling of meaning which this thesis has 
referred to as a breakdown of meaning, and that has been here examined 
in more detail apropos conspiracy theory, the Gezi protest and the coup 
attempt. 
Of course, as with any political position that sells its polemics as empirical 
reality, there exists a certain wilful ignorance as to the elusive relationship 
between truth and politics. A truly curious and deeply contradictory result 
of this is that the strongman leader and his supporters decry the effects 
of post-truth just as strongly as do his opponents, if not more so. This 
can take the form of rhetorical accusations or, as has occurred on 
multiple occasions, the imposition of temporary bans on social media or 
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even outright bans on reporting terror attacks or protests.216 More direct 
measures to stem the flow of news, shrouded in claims of combating fake 
news, include mass firings, buying out or expelling media moguls, 
wiretapping and imprisonment.217 In a recent example, Turkish 
prosecutors sought up to 43 years in prison for a journalist from the 
opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet. The charges include the targeting of 
the President through Ôasymmetric war methodsÕ.218 Regardless of the 
form it takes, a truthful media therefore becomes synonymous with the 
elimination of the idea of pluralism and a dismissal of agonistic versions of 
the truth. Post-truth is therefore nothing less than a pure manifestation 
of the contradictions of the possibility of a pure truth itself, and the 
ensuing desire to seek within itself the reasons for its own necessity, 
rather than looking outside.  
In turn, one of the decisive mistakes in the reaction to post-truth is one 
that calls for more censorship of fake news and stronger hegemonic 
                                     
216 Berivan Orucoglu, ÔHow President Erdoğan Mastered the Media: TurkeyÕs Once-Feisty 
Press has succumbed to an Artful Mix of Bribery, Muscle, and IdeologyÕ, Foreign Policy, 
12 August 2015. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/12/how-president-
Erdoğan-mastered-the-media/ (accessed 23 May 2017). 
 
217 ÔDemocracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in TurkeyÕ, Freedom House report, 
available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/democracy-crisis-corruption-media-and-
power-turkey/executive-summary#.VcuwdRNVhBc (accessed 23 May 2017). 
 
218 Tuvan Gumrukcu and Humeyra Pamuk, ÔTurkish Prosecutors Accuse Newspaper of 
Asymmetric War on ErdoğanÕ, Reuters, 5 April 2017. Available at 
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-04-05/turkish-prosecutors-
accuse-newspaper-of-asymmetric-war-on-Erdoğan (accessed 23 May 2017). 
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control of free speech, in the erroneous belief that there exists a central 
truth that can be secured from above yet that remains somehow liberal 
rather than authoritarian. So while there exist presumably earnest efforts 
to tackle the proliferation of fake news in Turkey, the danger is that such 
attempts, at best, inadvertently come to resemble the authoritarian 
measures they seek to prevent, and in the worst case, actively fuel 
further repression.  
As an example one might take a two-day event hosted by the German 
Embassy in Antalya, in which German and Turkish journalists engaged in 
workshops on such questions as Ôcan the media violate Human Rights by 
spreading certain newsÕ?219 A worthwhile topic one might think, yet isnÕt 
this but another manifestation of the fake news accusation Ð the idea 
that news should be Ôkept in checkÕ? We must be wary that, even in our 
earnest desire to curb the spread of untruth in our media and politics, we 
do not sever the line between freedom of speech and censorship. Yet on 
the other hand, how do we establish sound ethical practice to both 
protect ourselves and deter the manifestations of post-truth, without 
simply contributing further to the force thereof?  
So finally, how does the idea of post-truth correlate with that of 
conspiracy theory? After all, to those who busy themselves with the 
                                     
 
219 Yunus Paksoy, ÔTurkish, German Journalists Discuss Fake News, EthicsÕ, Daily Sabah, 
10 May 2017. Available at https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/05/11/turkish-
german-journalists-discuss-fake-news-ethics (accessed 23 May 2017). 
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study of paranoid politics, or Turkish politics for that matter, it must 
seem evident that the idea of post-truth is not something new at all, but 
rather a newish-sounding way of describing a breakdown of the status 
quo already evident at the very least since the Gezi protests. Do I mean 
to say that the political elite in Turkey believes the conspiracy theories 
they readily invoke in their political rhetoric? Not necessarily. Conspiracy 
theory in Turkish politics is, however, hardly a red herring. It is no mere 
diversionary tactic. Instead, to briefly assume the conspiratorial inflection 
ourselves, let me put it this way: The thesis has sought to demonstrate 
that there is something more sinister going on here. Conspiracy theory 
might best be considered as a polarizing strategy, as a form of Ômanaged 
democracyÕ, and as a tactic for consolidating executive powers and 
control of the judiciary. For while we may accept a certain flexibility in the 
so-called truths pandered by (Turkish) politicians, it seems that of late 
the untruths have become increasingly absurd, yet systematic, and 
invoked exactly when uncomfortable yet evident truths, are touted by the 
opposition, by journalists, academics, civil servants and so on. This thesis 
has sought to put some of this rhetoric into perspective, and to 
demonstrate the ways in which such conspiratorial rhetoric can influence 
both state response to (contingent) resistance, political decision-making, 
and perceived shifts in political legitimacy and participation. 
To simply characterize the evident lack of truth in Turkish politics strikes 
me as a limiting view at best, and in the worst case perhaps even as a 
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form of intellectual dishonesty. It is no surprise that it is precisely the 
political strongman who makes the strongest appeal to curb fake news, 
the better to justify the wholesale repression of free speech.220 The net 
cast over such news, or forms of resistance, is almost always too wide, 
and within its tangles even ÔearnestÕ liberal attempts to combat post-
truth come to fulfil what is in essence an authoritarian impulse to control 
and insinuate even the opposition narrative. 
As such, for those who keep up with Turkish politics, the term post-truth 
can be no more than a glitzy piece of nomenclature to describe a lesson 
already learnt long ago: that in a hegemonic system, the truth of any 
given matter is entirely secondary to the overarching whims of the 
strongman political project.221 So while I share in the current fascination 
                                     
220 The idea that the strongman is only as strong as his opposition therefore requires a 
slight alteration. For it is not the ÔstrengthÕ of the opposition, but rather its imagined 
volatility and supposedly irrational yet hostile intentions, that allow the strongman to 
flex his muscles in the form of oppression. In the very resistance the strongman invokes, 
he finds his own strength. Although this point may at first seem self-evident, it plays an 
important role in the current line of reasoning in that it separates the ÔviolentÕ element 
from the ÔinterpellationÕ of ideology. The leader is not strong because he wields force. He 
is strong because he seeks out conflict in which to assert his dominance. In the 
dependency on outside agitators lies the root of the claimed necessity for him to wield 
repressive powers. Ultimately in this balance, one cannot exist without the other, and 
even if it did, it would lose its inherent justification, the necessity to exist. (The 
contradiction between the contingent and necessity will be explored in detail in Chapters 




with the idea of post-truth, I remain highly doubtful of its merits as an 
analytic concept, at least as it is popularly invoked. For as long as one 
employs the concept of post-truth as a mere polemical figure of speech, 
one loses the capacity to integrate it into a wider body of critical and 
political thought. So why dedicate an entire thesis to the concept of 
conspiracy theory and post-truth? For one thing, despite its current 
limitations as a theoretical idea, I believe that the idea of post-truth is not 
just a titillating assumption, capturing our attention because it straddles 
the divide between likelihood and impossibility, but is also a timely and 
opportune one. In other words, it is exceedingly rare for what is 
essentially a philosophical problem, a puzzle of political thought, to 
capture the public imagination to such an astounding degree. And it has 
been interesting to see the notion of conspiracy theory and its impact on 
(Turkish) politics grow so rapidly over the three years in which I have 
worked on this thesis. There is an opportunity here to bring together both 
public awareness and critical considerations of the idea of truth in the 
political sphere. Secondly, if we can relate post-truth back to a 
rediscovery of the intellectual merits of a theory of conspiracy, then the 
term may in turn become more valid in the analytic sense.222 So yes, it 
                                                                                                           
221 Ece Temelkuran, ÔTruth is a Lost Game in Turkey: DonÕt Let the Same Thing Happen 
To YouÕ, Guardian, 15 December 2016. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/15/truth-lost-game-turkey-
europe-america-facts-values (accessed 23 May 2017). 
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can be a useful and revealing lens through which to assess the crisis of 
Turkish democracy, but only if applied carefully through a theoretical 
analysis of conspiracy theory in, or as, political praxis. This thesis has 
sought to take some preliminary steps in this direction, and has brought 
together a variety of literatures and ideas that can bring about a more 
rigorous theorizing of the concept of post-truth. 
One serious critique of the validity of post-truth as a concept remains to 
be addressed. It is currently the fashion to decry conspiratorial politics as 
a contemporary phenomenon, a deviation from the supposedly rational 
status quo that preceded it. But this conceals what, in my view, is 
nothing but a thinly veiled desire to establish what is essentially a form of 
censorship, an ellipsis-like desire for a return to a pre-post-truth era. And 
                                                                                                           
222 Clearly in this regard, much work remains to be done, and pathways to new 
opportunities are yet to be explored. Future research will no doubt continue to shape the 
parameters by which we have come to understand the intrusion of accusations of 
conspiracy into the process of contentious politics, (elite) framing, and state response. 
In turn, the challenge remains as to how one might criticize the Turkish government, and 
the strongman figure of Erdoğan, without falling prey to similarly conspiratorial language 
that relies all too heavily on a depiction of the State as being governed by a supposed 
ÔdictatorÕ, ÔdespotÕ or one with the relatively positive or negative (depending oneÕs 
position) nickname of ÔSultanÕ. Of course in so doing, one merely reinforces the 
strongman persona of the leader figure, which in turn exacerbates the conspiratorial 
mindset and the hyperbole of the paranoid style. On the other hand, the problem 
remains that many such accusations are urgent and need to be made, particularly as the 
Turkish government grows more oppressive and takes on more totalitarian visions of the 
state. The hope is, therefore, that in developing a better understanding of the 
conspiracy frame, one might also identify more apt means by which to voice opposition 
to this troubling course of events.  
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therein lies what appears to me to be a complete, and perhaps wilful, 
neglect of the totalitarian impulses such a desire entails. In Turkey, where 
it has become difficult at any given time to distinguish between 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned news outlets, and fake versus real news 
has come to be synonymous with whether the content thereof supports 
the government or not, the danger such a politics entails is already 
evident.  
Simply ÔcurbingÕ fake news or disavowing post-truth as a politics of the 
far right is no solution to this dilemma. The problem is that post-truth is 
precisely a form of truth in that it contains within it the premise for its 
own justification, rather than allowing for any refutation as such. In other 
words, one cannot fight post-truth by seeking for a pure pre-post-truth 
impartiality. That would only trap us further in conspiratorial politics. 
Instead, I would argue that we may best be served by de-escalating the 
contentions surrounding post-truth not by ignoring it entirely, nor by 
embracing it, but instead by honing in on the idea of conspiracy theory, 
and what it can tell us about the kind of politics that may well nurture the 
breakdown of truth in politics.  
To begin with, I would suggest that this requires of us a certain 
willingness to think of conspiracy theory in a more theoretical fashion, and 
to build upon and question some of its own ÔtruthsÕ. These have been 
presented here as follows: first, the notion of conspiracy as being 
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inherently a language or delusion of political losers;223 secondly, the false 
assumption that conspiratorial rhetoric is a sinister and evasive belief, 
rather than a constitutive one, the so-called Ôphilosophical debate on 
conspiracyÕ;224 thirdly, that conspiracy is used as a way to frame the 
inexplicable, the elusive and the paranoid in politics. Instead, the 
arguments contained in this thesis have suggested that we turn these 
truisms on their head and argue the exact opposite: first, that conspiracy 
is a language of (political) winners; secondly, that the untruth of 
conspiracy theory brings about very real forces; and thirdly, that 
conspiracy theory begets a very real system of prejudices, antagonisms 
and friend/enemy relationships, that serve rather than detract from the 
political system in Turkey today, in which the current governmentÕs 
increasingly authoritarian politics form but part of a wider conspiratorial 
praxis.  
Of course these three reversals are all related, and in many ways their 
presentation here might beget and require further elaboration so as not 
to seem merely polemical. Throughout the thesis I have sought to 
illustrate the contradictory dynamics of these arguments through what 
can best be understood in terms of a set of antinomies; and furthermore, 
that it is in the contradictions arising from these sets that the very real 
                                     
 
223 Ted Goertzel, ÔBelief in Conspiracy TheoriesÕ, Political Psychology 4 (1994), pp. 731Ð
42. 
 
224 David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (Farnham, 2006).  
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forces of conspiratorial rhetoric can be brought to bear onto, through and 
as a result of the political process and the events of Gezi and the coup in 
Turkey today. Some of these have been the friend/enemy dynamic, the 
tension between contingency/necessity, between conspiracy 
theory/theory, truth/untruth, and the spirit of Gezi versus the strongman 
spirit. The topic of conspiracy theory, and the relative merits of the term 
post-truth, the (im)possibility of truth in Turkish politics, and the crisis of 
democracy in Turkey have provided the backdrop for the discussion of 
forces elicited by and through the contestation inherent in these sets. 
 
Discussion of Findings: Revisiting case selection and assumptions 
 
My research has led me to the following conclusions:  (1) The state 
response to the Gezi protests signaled the emergence of a distinctive 
conspiracy frame in which differing forms of social mobilization and 
resistance were interpreted as constituting part of an international 
conspiracy to undermine the Turkish state. (2) In the time-frame between 
the Gezi protests and the coup, conspiratorial framing was employed to 
curtail and delegitimize political opposition, which in turn led to an 
increasing legitimizing of the grievances underlying the protest movement 
(3) The coup presented the emergence of a ÔgenuineÕ conspiracy, which 
was nonetheless deeply rooted in the elite framing of conspiracy. This led 
to a form of cognitive dissonance, in which the ÔtrueÕ motives of the coup 
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plotters, and indeed their identity is still in doubt (4) The thesis suggests 
that the perpetuation of such frames of conspiracy have since come to 
embody a process of paranoid framing, in other words, a praxis of political 
paranoia, that both consolidate state power and threaten to undermine 
further the democratic gains made by Turkey over the past decades. 
The thesis thus depended on an analysis of conspiracy that relied, 
perhaps paradoxically, but necessarily so, on the assumption that 
conspiracy and accusations thereof should not be considered an external 
force that shapes the political process, but instead must be read as a 
means by which politics is constructed from the inside out. I have sought 
to suggest that a conspiratorial politics is a means of manipulating a 
supposed Ôimaginary revolutionaryÕ, that is, the emancipative potential of 
a protest or coup, but also the political legitimacy required to consolidate 
political power against (in some cases, fictional) enemies. It has also been 
my goal to demonstrate how between what might be understood as a 
negotiation of the contingent/necessity relationship between 
conspiratorial framing and resistance thereto, a post-truth system of 
meaning and political decision-making, takes shape that in turn reinforces 
such a conspiratorial politics, perhaps even a politics of Ôpost-truthÕ. 
 
In other words, post-truth should neither be considered the catalyst of 
conspiracy theory, nor is it in reverse that conspiracy theory constitutes 
the a priori condition for post-truth. We would be much better suited to 
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think of the ÔpostÕ in post-truth as a particular affect of truth Ð or as 
Popper puts it, as the embedded verisimilitude of a given theory, which 
the notion of conspiracy theory, when strategically employed, can exploit 
and manipulate, and posit as a contesting truth, and hence, suggesting 
the possibility of an alternative system of truth.225 To take conspiracy 
theory more seriously is first to examine what exactly we mean by the 
word theory in conspiracy theory.226 The preceding chapters have sought 
to provide both a different mode of reading conspiracy theory that goes 
beyond the predominant trends in the popular literature on conspiracy Ð 
the so-called ÔdebunkingÕ approach Ð as well as presenting an innovative 
angle on the idea of post-truth in Turkey.227  
 
                                     
 
225 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 
(London, 1963). 
 
226 Pigden already famously disagreed with Popper by stating that Ôthe belief that it is 
superstitious to posit conspiracies is itself a superstition.Õ Here I intend, however, to go 
beyond even PigdenÕs suggestion that we take conspiracy seriously, to posit that instead 
we take the theory in conspiracy more seriously. See Charles Pigden, ÔPopper Revisited, 
or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?Õ, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 
(1995), pp. 3Ð34. 
 
227 David Aaronovitch, How Conspiracy Theory Has Shaped Modern History (London, 
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Without seeking to equate the failed coup attempt and the Gezi protests, 
I have situated both within a critical consideration of the role that 
conspiracy theory has to play in navigating, interpreting and influencing 
both events and the state response they have given rise to. To put this 
in, say, the terms of a crime mystery, the failed coup attempt here 
provided the narrative catalyst (the murder), whereas the events of the 
Gezi protests and their outcomes are seen as the preceding contestations 
leading up to the cumulative event. Yet, as in the murder mystery, things 
are not as they seem. For one thing, I do not attempt to ÔsolveÕ the 
puzzle of the coup, inasmuch as I do not mean to assess the relative 
failure or success of the Gezi movement in any normative sense.  
 
Secondly, in no way do I mean to suggest that there exists a 
straightforward causal relationship between the Gezi protests and the 
coup attempt. Instead, if one identifies both cases as interconnected, yet 
highly distinct Events, what becomes clear is that they both cannot be 
discussed, whether in writing or in spoken word, without assuming a nigh-
on conspiratorial attitude. The central premise underlying the notion of 
conspiracy theoryÕs efficacy is the argument that the internal dynamics of 
the protest or coup contestation give rise to the context in which the 
conspiracy frame can be deemed viable as an elite-framing tactic. For 
now, let me stress that I do not and did not consider Gezi and the coup 
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attempt as comparable entities in any sociological, political or ideological 
sense. Rather, I have sought to demonstrate how both fit within the wider 
dialectics of what is, in essence, a politics of conspiracy theory, a political 
manifestation and exploitation of post-truth insecurities and uncertainties. 
 
This prevalence of conspiracy theoryÕs dissemination into the political 
mainstream in Turkey, and the way in which confabulations, accusations 
and confusion have all come together in a peculiar blending of the 
meaning and non-meaning of what might constitute a New Turkey, have 
resulted in deeply antagonistic and fantastical claims. Conspiracy theory 
has been described here as both catalyst and outcome, the rule as much 
as it is the exception to the rule. It is the supposed ÔproofÕ of the reason 
behind paranoid politics as much as it is its contestation. Or, to employ a 
different imagery, conspiracy theory is both the ÔtellÕ of Turkish politics, 
as much as it is the ÔbluffÕ. In the antinomies of truth and lies, it takes on 
both creative and destructive roles.  
 
As such, the exploration of conspiracy theory, in all its dynamism, its 
seductive powers, and its seeming power to shape the future of Turkish 
politics, should not simply be dismissed as a curiosity of the Turkish 
political experiment. Rather, I believe it warrants being placed centre 
stage, viewed not as a causal outcome of political upheaval, but as a 
systematic indicator of the contradictory powers underlying the events 
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themselves. Or, to put this more succinctly, the antinomies of conspiracy 
deserve to be unpacked, in order to demonstrate how they give rise to 
what somewhat facilely has come to be referred to as a conspiratorial 
politics.  
 
To argue such necessitates a novel conceptualization that frames 
accusations of conspiracy as a constitutive force rather than relying on 
the traditional notion of either ÔunearthingÕ or ÔdebunkingÕ conspiracy.228 
                                     
 
228 In this light, what becomes clear is that the simple reproduction of conspiratorial 
frames is more than a historical or political or even purely academic curiosity, but rather 
a struggle by which a relation to the real is fulfilled and reproduced in its own paranoid 
negative image. It bears repeating that this observation on the true recurring 
mechanisms that drive the accusation of conspiracy must also imply again that the 
veracity of the claims themselves, i.e. the existence of conspiracy, can only ever be 
secondary to the primary importance of these relations of forces under which the 
accusation occurs and acts out its intended outcomes. Indeed, I would argue that the 
conspiracy itself has next to no purpose or relevance in the matter at hand, save its 
propensity for the theatrical, which in turn facilitates the colonization of both the 
imaginary revolutionary and the dream-space of politics, of a righteous leader and 
villainous opposition, of cathartic antagonism above consensual democracy. We should 
therefore move away from our fixation on verifying or seeking to rationalize the truth 
ÔbehindÕ conspiracy theory, to instead think in strategic terms of the possibility that 
what constitutes post-truth, and distinguishes it from conspiracy theory, is its deliberate 
strategic implementation to unsettle the parameters of truth and untruth. In that sense, 
the focus should move away from ÔdiagnosticÕ approaches to conspiracy theory, which in 
turn should lead us to avoid prognostic analyses regarding the supposed societal effects 
of Gezi or the coup. Indeed, many studies in the field, including more popular 
conceptions of what Hofstadter referred to as Ôthe paranoid styleÕ, seem excessively 
occupied with a desire to determine whether or not conspiratorial rhetoric is a sign of 
the relative health or decline of a given society.  
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The goal is not to rationalize supposedly fantastical claims, but instead to 
analyse how and why accusations of conspiracy become internalized in 
elite framing strategies, and how these can be seen as a response to 
shifts in political opportunity structures in contemporary Turkey. In other 
words, accusations of conspiracy do not, as it were, in and of themselves 
bring to light previously existing but hidden structures of opposition. 
Rather, elite accusations of conspiracy cast the accuser in the central 
subjective position, and hence reaffirm their dominant political authority. 
In so doing, the framing of conspiracy undergoes an ontological transition 
or shift away from acknowledging resistance, towards instead leaving the 
subject of the accusation a passive recipient of determination.  
 
Certainly, the Gezi protests and the coup provide a highly visible and 
opportune target for accusations of conspiracy, yet this does not in and 
of itself explain or take into account the dynamics of resistance that 
mirror the conspiratorial frame, and provide it with a parameter for its 
most effective employment. When, for example, members of the Turkish 
political elite accuse protestors of being controlled by means of psychic 
powers (the same accusation arose after the failed military coup of 2016) 
                                                                                                           
Instead of employing such a normative approach, the current method has allowed for a 
more nuanced and ultimately more valuable assessment of the structural processes that 
drive accusations of conspiracy as political language. The state response to the Gezi 
protests and the coup provides an interesting case study for a vivid and dramatic 
employment of the conspiratorial framing strategy, yet should also be considered 
indicative of the possibility of a wider trend of conspiratorial state response to social 
turmoil, and indeed as a possible theory-building opportunity for further study.  
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we cannot simply put this down to a slight of reason in the midst of 
turbulent times. Rather, the accusation becomes part of a wider struggle 
for what can be deemed an Ôimaginary revolutionaryÕ; a narrative as it 
were, by which to decide not the interpretation of events, but a 
contestation over the authority to interpret them in the first place. 
Conspiracy in this context should therefore not be about ÔdebunkingÕ the 
obviously erratic and unsubstantiated nature of the claims. Instead, the 
dynamics and power structures that give rise to them, and under which 
they are uttered and cast into the public realm, merit genuine scrutiny. 
 
In a sort of negative inversion of the Wittgenstenian truth process, the 
fear of post-truth is thus best considered as a form of latent nonsense, 
whereas conspiracy theory should be recognized as patent rather than 
latent nonsense. What I mean to say by this is that while conspiracy 
theory is usually treated at best with a smug hint of relativism, the 
current alarm surrounding post-truth elevates all political antagonism to a 
form of conspiracy theory. Both interpretations make a categorical error, 
which is to treat conspiracy theory as incapable of producing truth, and in 
turn, attributing to post-truth the undeserved centrality of it constituting 
a fully fledged, if alternate, truth system. The solution to this dilemma, I 
would suggest, is as follows: Let us take conspiracy theory more 
seriously, by beginning with the idea that conspiratorial politics entails as 
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much of a ÔrealÕ system of forces, as would a supposedly non-
conspiratorial, ÔpureÕ politics.  
 
Recommendations for practice and comparison of findings to the 
literature 
It cannot be stressed enough that the current fascination with normative 
or historicist accounts of TurkeyÕs relative democratization or, on the 
other hand, authoritarianism is folded into the very conspiratorial dynamic 
this thesis describes. What I mean to say by this is that contrasting 
studies evaluating the ÔdemiseÕ229 or ÔriseÕ230 of Turkish democracy, while 
relevant in their own right, contribute towards a false binary of viewing 
Turkish politics as de facto progressive or regressive. In the above-
referenced texts, both accounts are even written by the same author. 
This is not to say that they are not insightful and well-researched 
accounts, for evidently they are. But the danger of any normatively tinted 
account is that it becomes internalized in the idea that Turkey must be 
scrutinized either as a model of success, or a model of failure.231  
                                     
 
229 Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (London, 
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230 Soner Cagaptay, The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First CenturyÕs First Muslim Power 
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231 Furthermore, it becomes evident that this form of reasoning relies too heavily on 
singling out the figure of Erdoğan as the main culprit of the current political instability, 
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This does not mean that such analyses are invalid. Nevertheless I would 
suggest that one needs to take into careful consideration the extent to 
which they feed into the politics of post-truth in Turkey, where the 
relative rise or demise of the Turkish nation is seen as being in the 
subjective hands of experts and academics. One way to defuse this 
tension is to begin to think perhaps somewhat more critically about the 
impact of such normative interpretations of TurkeyÕs politics. So a good 
way to begin to remedy this is to avoid normative, historicist, analyses of 
the coup, Turkish democracy or the Gezi protests, and instead Ð as I 
intend to do here Ð to think them, as it were, ÔagainstÕ one another. In 
                                                                                                           
rather than searching for more systemic contradictions and impossibilities. So while it 
may be tempting to depict the state of emergency and the referendum vote as being 
essentially an opportunity for voters to elect their own dictator, the truth is that the 
contradictory dynamics of the state of emergency as a paralysed society deserves to be 
acknowledged as part of a systemic dilemma of conspiratorial politics. To see Erdoğan 
simply as a Machiavellian despot, engineering chaos and manipulating the dissatisfaction 
therewith into personal gain, is to underestimate the long-term impossibility of the 
overtly optimist expectations, and indeed impossibilities, of a Turkey that could 
continuously experience growth while simultaneously ramping up social tensions and 
limiting opportunities for political participation. In the cracks that emerge between the 
two extremes of globalized free-market style democratization and conservative populist 
isolationism, the tightrope that Erdoğan, and by extension the AK Party, has sought to 
walk, in and of itself gives rise to a quasi-conspiratorial belief in either the inherent 
success or demise of Turkish democracy. Any writing on Turkey that seeks to validate 
one or the other position is unlikely to remain relevant for long, nor, it would seem, can 




either case, the attempt to pinpoint whether the coup attempt should be 
interpreted as part of a downward or upward trajectory Ð either a new 
beginning or an end for Turkish democracy Ð has proven at best 
contradictory and ambiguous. At worst it has contributed further to 
paranoid suspicions of international plots against Turkey. 
So what can we do to protect ourselves against this type of 
generalization, the temptation to either ÔcelebrateÕ Turkish democracy or 
to write it off entirely? First, let us consider how the coup attempt and 
Gezi fit within the same parameters of the conspiratorial framing strategy. 
There exists a noteworthy similarity between the state response to Gezi 
and the state response to the coup, even though the two events are 
clearly dramatically different in origin, execution and outcome. Secondly, 
it requires formulating a critique of conspiratorial politics that does not 
rest solely on indignation at the polarizing tenor of ErdoğanÕs political 
rhetoric. Thirdly, we would do well to consider how the very idea of the 
parallel state in its uncanny suggestion of ever-evolving stasis comes to 
mirror the authoritarian dynamics of Turkey under the state of 
emergency; a situation in which everything changes, yet everything stays 
the same. In other words, there are alternatives to writing about Turkish 
politics in a normative manner. And these alternatives are equally Ðor, I 
would argue, even more Ð useful in aiding us in our pursuit of a greater 
understanding of the role conspiracy theory has come to play in Turkish 
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politics and whether or not this merits the description of an emergent 
conspiratorial politics.  
If anything, one might well conclude that the politics of conspiracy is 
fuelled by this very mode of normative, and, in some cases, historicist 
analysis of TurkeyÕs democratization. What I mean to say by this, is that 
both (a) the over-optimistic projections for TurkeyÕs continued growth (in 
all areas, from economic to democratic, but mostly within the secular 
confines of a belief in TurkeyÕs supposedly uniquely successful merger of 
secularism and religious conservatismÕ (also referred to as the ÔTurkish 
paradoxÕ))232 in the international and domestic imagination, coupled with 
(b) a desire to believe in the AK PartyÕs liberal credentials, Ð as well as the 
(c) subsequent clash with that other overarching myth, which is that of a 
neo-Ottoman strongman project, a blend of nationalism and religious 
identity with a generous sprinkling of nostalgia and ontological mythos, 
ensue from which the conspiratorial strategy derives its strength.  
Decreasing political opportunity structures and growing economic 
inequality have confounded the expectation of perpetual growth and 
democratization in Turkey within the past decade. These contentions in 
turn led to popular manifestations of dissent, including Gezi, to which the 
State responded by fomenting further polarization. In the adversarial 
                                     
 
232 Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, ÔTurkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versus 
Reactionary SecularistsÕ, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies xvi/3 (2007), pp. 289Ð
301. 
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framing that ensued, the possibility of armed resistance to this form of 
political paranoia was increased. The suspicion arises that, perhaps 
somewhat counter-intuitively, the ambiguous idea of a supposed ÔNew 
TurkeyÕ undergoing a Ôquiet revolutionÕ towards democracy is in part to 
blame for the political turmoil we are seeing today.233  
For there is a tragic irony to the way in which the failed coup, and the 
democratic atrophy that followed, is being interpreted along the lines of 
pessimist historicism. In such accounts the current crisis is but proof that 
Turkey was never a viably democratic ally in the first place; or for that 
matter, that secular Turks have invited the current resurgence of 
conservatism by having gone too far in breaking with religious 
traditions.234 In my estimation, both such accounts are fundamentally 
flawed. In this way, the coup became plausible, if not predictable, not 
simply as an exacerbation of the increasingly religious and authoritarian 
sympathies of the AK Party government, but as a result of the 
internalization of a conspiratorial expectation in Turkish politics, and by 
proxy, Turkish society. The increasingly critical attention devoted to 
Turkey by Western countries and their political leaders, contrasting 
                                     
 
233 Chris Morris, The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe (London, 
2006). 
 
234 Timothy Waters, ÔCoups have consequences: including making more room for IslamÕ, 
Los Angeles Times, 24 July 2016. Available at  www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
waters-turkey-coup-islam-constitution-20160724-snap-story.html (accessed 22 May 
2017). 
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sharply with the previous optimism regarding Turkish secular democracy, 
further heightened the stakes of such suspicions. Thinking of future 
avenues of research, one might also take into consideration the geo-
political dimensions of TurkeyÕs Gezi and Coup developments. 
As such, it seems to me that only within a critical analytic understanding 
of the structural ways in which conspiratorial politics arises can any steps 
towards resolving TurkeyÕs crisis be realistically achieved. By now, the 
idea that Erdoğan resembles a proto-progressive harmonizer Ð let us keep 
in mind that this was originally how he was depicted in the West Ð now 
remains as a tragically ironic example of the dangers of such historicist 
jubilation. Seen in this light, one might also think of how Turkey was once 
considered a so-called Ôglobal swing stateÕ, that is to say, as a strategic 
partner not merely in terms of the fight against terror, but as one with a 
willing populace, whose hearts could be made to beat faster for 
democracy and of course for the brand of free-market capitalism that has 
come to be sold in tandem. An older idea, and perhaps a more accurate 
one, is that of considering Turkey a ÔtiltÕ state, leaning either one way or 
the other, but never fully committing to the subservience implied in 
meeting Western expectations which are seen as overly didactic and 
moralizing.235 In some ways, one might even say that the speed with 
                                     
235 For a comprehensive analysis of the ÔtiltÕ idea, see Svante E. Cornell, ÔUnderstanding 
TurkeyÕs TiltÕ, The Journal of International Security Affairs 27. Available at  
www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-27/understanding-turkeys-tilt (accessed 28 May 
2017). 
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which Turkey was able to develop, both in democratic and economic 
terms, may have contributed towards conspiratorial narratives, rather 
than made it immune to them. To this extent, conspiracy theory in Turkey 
might not be seen as indicative of democratic shortcomings, but instead 
counter-intuitively be regarded as a sign of its rapid development. There 
is a theory-building potential here that would seemingly demand further 
exploration as events continue to unfold. 
So I would suggest that the central dilemma of conspiratorial framing, is 
that it inherently creates a form of stasis, a political limbo that 
constitutes neither an open society nor a truly closed one. In the blending 
of the old and the new, and the suspension of the experience of time in 
the state of emergency, the country finds itself in an uncanny state of 
being frozen in perpetual turmoil, or, in other words, paralysed by its own 
momentum. And not just a motion as such, but in fact what might well be 
deemed a form of Ôun-motionÕ, a state of stasis which can only fulfil its 
paradoxical requirements within the perverted golden mean of the 
pendulumÕs rotation, which seems a more realistic characteristic of the 
swing stateÕs lapidary motion. For even in the ÔswingÕ analogy, what 
becomes lost is that the axis of the movement must always remain a 
fixed point; or, inasmuch, we might well conclude, as it is the swing 
motion itself that requires the axis to remain fixed in place, stationary to 
the extent that it enables an objective point of return on which to hook 
the force of the swingÕs momentum.  
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The grim truth of the contemporary obsession with either TurkeyÕs 
ÔprogressionÕ as a beacon of democracy in a troubled region, or 
alternatively the presupposed inevitability of its regression, is therefore 
not merely that both accounts adopt a historicist view of TurkeyÕs 
supposedly inevitable progress, but that in so doing they perpetuate a 
linear mode of reasoning in which Turkey can only be conceived of as 
going either forward or backwards, depending on a relative and normative 
expectation of what such a movement might entail or how it can be 
measured. The concept of conspiracy theory, and the imagery it invokes, 
is therefore deeply vulnerable to totalitarian conceptions of an ordered 
and centrally controlled vision of society.  
First, it denies the possibility of conceptualizing TurkeyÕs destiny as 
anything more than a subjective object of historicist musing, which in turn 
allows a reactionary Turkish nationalism to accuse its international allies of 
secretly meddling with its domestic politics. Secondly, it subsequently 
fails to see that the system itself can remain rigid exactly because of this 
fixation on the back-and-forth motion, and the ensuing obsession with 
determining a Ôturning pointÕ for Turkish democracy. And thirdly Ð and to 
me this is the most important feature Ð such analyses and interpretations, 
commentaries and think-tank reports become blind to the fact that 
nationalist factions, and populist leaders in Turkey, will relentlessly exploit 
this spotlight on TurkeyÕs ÔfutureÕ as a way to argue for increased 
isolationism, and as part of the paranoid stance towards foreign meddling. 
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And that in this perpetual rediscovery of the back and forth, no true 
movement as such occurs, allowing increasingly totalitarian figures to 
emerge within the vacuum of such a distorting political experience.  
In essence the historicist expectations of TurkeyÕs democratization come 
to mirror that of the belief in the parallel state. For while the democratic 
ÔpromiseÕ of Turkey goes unfulfilled it remains essentially in stasis Ð at 
least to the extent that one continues to hold on to the rather useless 
idea of Turkish politics as consisting of a binary forward or backward 
movement. Perhaps this would seem counter-intuitive, as progressing and 
regressing also implies a necessary beneficial, even consensual, stasis of 
checks and balances. It would be a form of stability, rather a rigidity 
enforced through perpetual turmoil. What becomes implicit therefore, in 
the realization that the idea of Turkish democratization currently orbits 
around a moving axis, is that even such genuinely historic events as the 
failed coup attempt, or Gezi for that matter, occur in a self-contained 
contestation of framing strategies, yet above which looms the 
conspiratorial expectation of a sui generis democratic or totalitarian 
Turkey. To remedy this, we must look not at Turkey as either progressing 
or regressing, but instead consider the extent to which this very binary 





Recommendations for future research, and methodological considerations 
 
In an ideal world this thesis would be able to benefit, so to speak, from 
hindsight. During the process of writing it, many political changes and 
shifts have occurred and continue to occur. While time does not stand 
still, certainly in the past years it has felt as if time has accelerated in 
Turkey, and processes that might have occurred over decades have at 
times been shaped in a matter of days. Therefore, at the mercy of rapid 
developments, the thesis had to address events even as they developed, 
even if it could be difficult to interpret situations that only with the 
progression of time may be fully clarified. An example of this would be the 
coup attempt. Due to limited resources, evidence and research regarding 
its occurrence and outcome the thesis must acknowledge the speculative 
nature of any interpretations thereof. Fortunately, due to the focus on 
conspiracy theory, the research did not rely too heavily on the verification 
or ÔdebunkingÕ of any account thereof as accurate or inaccurate, but 
could instead locate the forces of the contesting narratives within their 
relationship to each other. 
 
At first glance the study may appear to be overly critical of the current 
government in Turkey. However, to ensure that there is no bias in the 
analysis of conspiracy theory, I on many occasions highlight the extent to 
which the proliferation of conspiracy theory also forms part of the 
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protest-narrative, in that it simplifies the political process into a for-or-
against position. The thesis applies its findings and theoretical approach 
to all forms of political conspiracy theory, not simply that promulgated by 
state actors. I am also aware that I have not presented any data in a 
quantitative sense. However, through a critical analysis of the driving 
forces, paradoxes and contradictions of conspiracy theory, I presented a 
series of theoretical conclusions that bear upon the problems of what has 
been referred to as Ôthe paradox of political representationÕ, Ômanaged 
democracyÕ or, as the thesis proposes, Ôconspiratorial praxisÕ, the 
Ôconspiracy frameÕ and Ôpost-truthÕ politics. The thesis has related these 
topics to elite framing, social movement theory, political thought, and 
critical approaches to knowledge production and conspiracy theory. 
 
The thesis assumes that conspiracy theory as elite framing can also 
function in a dialectical sense. This posits that the thesis and antithesis of 
truth versus falsehood in the political sphere creates a mutually 
reinforcing relationship. The methodology can therefore best be described 
as a counter-intuitive approach to the ÔreasonÕ underlying seemingly 
unreasonable political justifications: in sum, the study of conspiracy 
theory as the sum and unity of opposites, as an internally contradictory 
force that gives rise to a fruitful struggle, an unfolding of the relations of 
truth versus untruth in light of perceived political legitimacy. The thesis 
posits that the best way to circumvent the impossibility of ÔverifyingÕ 
 354 
conspiratorial beliefs in contemporary Turkey is to instead study the 
separate parts, the unity of which is framed as a struggle for political 
legitimacy, a consolidation of agency and power that can only be achieved 
through negation of the other position. 
 
I do not think that a different method would necessarily be considered 
better, at least not unless one takes into account subjective expectations 
of the nature of the desired outcomes. Conspiracy theory by its very 
nature is very difficult to quantify, and even strictly qualitative 
assessments of it quickly become descriptive and mired in normative 
assessments as to their relative truth content.  
 
The thesis did not take include in-depth analysis of the Turkish media and 
the ways in which conspiracy theories are popularized in popular 
interpretations and news reports, both sympathetic and critical to the 
ruling party. Future research could include a more detailed analysis of the 
ways in which conspiracy theory becomes codified through repetition 
both online and through various forms of traditional and modern media. 
The topic is slowly gaining in momentum, as conspiracy theory becomes a 
more serious object of study. Most recently, a study appeared on 
conspiratorial framing of Gezi online, and at conferences I have spoken 
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with other academics who are currently in the process of collecting date 
on conspiracy theory in Turkey.236 
 
Looking back, I would have liked to engage more directly with Turkish 
scholars, activists, and perhaps even politicians through interviews, 
fieldwork or collaborative research. Due to the relatively taboo nature of 
conspiracy theory as a legitimate political subject, I thought it would 
prove difficult to conduct interviews on the matter. It would have been 
fascinating to include more firsthand accounts of the experience of 
conspiracy theory in Turkey and the relative impact it has had on Turkish 
politics according to Turks themselves. I realize that as an American 
writing about Turkey I must always be considered somewhat of an 
outsider, and at risk of misinterpreting cultural intricacies and socio-
political nuances that may have been more evident to Turkish researchers 
or interviewees. 
 
It is also good to note that alternatives to my approach exist, all of which 
may have merit in their own right. For one, there is a growing interest in 
transnational studies of contentious politics, especially as social 
                                     
236 Trkay Salim Nefes, ÔThe impacts of the Turkish governmentÕs conspiratorial framing 
of the Gezi Park protestsÕ, Social Movement Studies (2017), pp. 1-13. Also: Kristin 
Guiler at the University of Texas is currently researching the impact of conspiracy theory 
on Turkish social media users. Some of here writing on conspiracy was featured in the 
Washington Post: Kristin Fabbe and Kim Guiler, ÔWhy there are so many conspiracy 
theories about the Turkish coupÕ, Washington Post July 19 (2016).  
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movements increasingly identify themselves globally. In turn, a more 
detailed historical or anthropological study of conspiracy theory in Turkey 
would certainly warrant scholarly attention. Finally, as mentioned above, if 
one were to implement a more interview-driven approach, this might allow 
for a more accurate method of process tracing that could help verify or 
perhaps contradict some of the findings contained in this thesis.237 
 
It would no doubt also prove worthwhile to pursue a transnational case 
study. For example, one might choose to conduct a study into the 
response to the 2013 protests in Brazil, the so-called ÔFree Fare 
MovementÕ. The comparison would be especially interesting because of 
the strongly divergent state response. However, in both the Turkish and 
Brazilian cases, conspiracy theory has come to play a central role in the 
continuing contentions following the outbreak of protest four years ago. 
It would furthermore be interesting to put together a broader study of 
conspiracy theory in developing countries, or, on the other hand, to 
contrast the findings on Turkey with the recent surge of so-called Ôpost-
truthÕ politics in the West, most notably the United States and Great 
Britain. 
 
While it is difficult to say with certainty whether the current study 
presents the best possible research design, I believe that the outcome of 
                                     
237 James Mahoney, ÔThe logic of process tracing tests in the social sciencesÕ, 
Sociological Methods & Research 41.4 (2012), pp. 570-597. 
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the research outweigh any shortcomings that might have been addressed 
by a different methodology. While my research sample, to the extent that 
there is one, may appear large, it is only so as to emphasize the 
prevalence and high frequency, indeed the impact, of conspiracy theory 
as part of the political decision-making and framing process in Turkish 
politics. 
 
In sum, I stand by my choice to implement a critical and dialectical reading 
of conspiracy theory in Turkey, while reserving judgement as to the 
possibility of further and alternative research approaches to the topic, 
which I hope might take my own approach into consideration as possible 
inspiration. 
 
My findings can be generalized to the extent that they indicate wider 
trends with regard to the rise of conspiratorial framing in cotemporary 
political rhetoric. While my study does not suggest that this is a distinctly 
new phenomenon, nor for that matter that conspiracy theory alone is to 
ÔblameÕ for the increasingly contentious divides that mark Turkish politics 
today, it does lay the groundwork for a critical consideration of the 
structural ways in which narratives of conspiracy theory can be used to 
justify political repression and so-called ÔpurgesÕ. 
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To cope with known problems in the field, I began by identifying what 
appear to be some of the most pressing problems and puzzles relating to 
the study of conspiracy theory. This has led me to deviate from a 
positivist approach that may have revolved around ÔdebunkingÕ or 
ratifying conspiracy theories, or otherwise normatively evaluating those 
who subscribe to conspiratorial beliefs.  
 
While the study cannot claim to have fully ÔsolvedÕ the problem of 
conspiracy theory in Turkish politics, it is nevertheless my contention that 
a significant contribution has been made towards what might be 
considered a more critical approach to the dilemma and puzzle of 
conspiratorial politics in Turkey. 
 
The research did not pose any ethical problems. However, regarding the 
contentious and indeed contested nature of the political events described 
in the thesis, I have sought throughout to present what to me appears to 
be an unbiased view of both the constructive and destructive forces of 
conspiracy theory and their political outcomes, while avoiding to the best 
of my abilities any impulse to show bias towards either the opposition or 
the ruling party in Turkey. Nevertheless, the findings, and perhaps one 
might even say the structure of my research, suggest a critique of the 
current mode of politics in Turkey, and hence produces what to some 
might seem to be overly critical views and conclusions regarding the state 
 359 
of Turkish democracy today. While this was not my goal, and I believe I 
have done what I can to eliminate any accusation of bias, I nonetheless 
understand that the topic of my thesis may be exposed to such criticism. 
 
 
Personal Reflections and Conclusion 
 
In hindsight, it appears to me that there exists an unwarranted and indeed 
somewhat Orientalist expectation regarding the inevitability of 
conspiratorial politics in Turkey. As a result of undertaking my research I 
instead have come to believe that the structural forces underlying 
conspiracy theory are much more global, and can readily be traced in 
other cases around the globe.  
 
During the three years in which I put together the doctoral thesis, my 
views on conspiracy theory in Turkey changed, but only to the extent 
that I began to appreciate and understand the extent to which 
conspiratorial narratives form a systemic mode of political rhetoric 
designed to cement and consolidate existing power structures and to 
reignite existing social contentions. In turn, I began to understand that 
the ways in which this process occurs is not necessarily unique to Turkey 
and may well be identified in other cases, most notably in what have 
come to be referred to as so-called Ômanaged democraciesÕ. 
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On a general level, the most interesting thing to come out of my thesis 
was the way in which the deterioration of democratic principles, and 
indeed the rise of Turkish authoritarianism under the Erdoğan regime, 
became a more or less commonly accepted media narrative in non-Turkish 
and particularly Western countries. When I began my research there was a 
much more optimistic consensus regarding TurkeyÕs democratic 
development, an optimism which increasingly has given way to alarm at 
TurkeyÕs rapid undoing of its democratization and civil progress. 
 
I have already put together a proposal for a subsequent study into the 
global impact of Ôconspiratorial politicsÕ, and intend to implement my 
findings on Turkey, and the ideas contained within the thesis, for a 
broader comparative study of the relative merits, or lack thereof, of the 
idea of a conspiratorial politics beyond Turkey.  
 
Finally, if the true antidote to conspiratorial politics is not to take 
seriously the demand for a licensed form of empirical truth, but to instead 
re-evaluate how conspiracy theory comes to inform the political in 
Turkey, then there is clearly much work to be done. And if there is 
something humbling in such a realization, then perhaps it is that the 
experience of post-truth can provide us with a foundation upon which to 
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